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# The French Relationship with the Native Peoples of New France and Acadia



Canada

# THE FRENCH RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIVE PEOPLES OF NEW FRANCE AND ACADIA

by

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CONTENTS

## ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used in the endnotes for each chapter:

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|---|---|
| A.A. | Archives Acadiennes, Moncton |
| A.A.Q. | Archives de l'Archevêché de Québec |
| A.N. | Archives Nationales, Paris |
| A.P.Q. | Archives de la Province de Québec (now ANQ) |
| A.S.Q. | Archives du Séminaire de Québec |
| B.N. | Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris |
| B.S.S.P. | Bibliothèque de St-Sulpice, Paris |
| P.A.C. | Public Archives of Canada |
| P.A.N.B. | Public Archives of New Brunswick |
| P.A.N.S. | Public Archives of Nova Scotia |

CHAPTER I

First Contacts and the Thesis of a Colonizing Genius

When the first Breton and Norman fishermen, following the routes of earlier Norse, Spanish and Basque incursions, arrived in North America, they found it was an inhabited continent. Europeans had been preceded by peoples of many different linquistic and cultural groups, ranging in northeastern America from hunting band societies such as Montagnais and Micmacs to tribal horticultural societies such as Huron and Iroquois. The first extant document concerning this French penetration to 'another world' is dated 1504, but several decades earlier Newfoundland cod and North American furs had made their appearance in French ports, notably at Rouen. It was not long before Amerindians,* or Indios as Christopher Columbus called them, would also make their appearance in French coastal towns and major cities. Contact had been made with a New World and with 'new men' whose existence had hitherto not been suspected.

Of course, there had been hypothetical theorizing about an intervening continent between Asia and Europe, if only to maintain the balance of sea and land masses, and there were innumerable legends of land beyond the Pillars of Hercules (Gibraltar), sometimes in the context of the isles of Brazille and St. Brendan's fabulous lands and at other times in the context of the catastrophic destruction of

*Amerindians is the preferred scholarly term for all the Native peoples of the Americas. It denotes all the linguistic, cultural, political and ethnic groups of the continent in the same way that European or African are used to refer to peoples of many different cultures, languages and traditions who historically share a continent and can be perceived by 'outsiders' as sharing certain broad social, political and intellectual attributes. Indian is a misnomer which requires some qualification such as West, East, Canadian, Native or American for accuracy and precision. In this study we shall adopt the current politically popular term, Native people.

Atlantis and its advanced civilization. It was not until the mid-eighteenth century that European scholars seemed to take much note of the Viking intrusion into North America which began in approximately A.D. 985 and was last heard of in 1431. Much of France's information, therefore, came in the first instance from the fishing contacts and from the Spanish and Portuguese navigations and eventual invasion of Central and South America.

In spite of the information circulating in French Atlantic ports and in literate circles acquainted with the Spanish intrusion in America, there was surprise, curiosity and wide-ranging speculation about the Native peoples inhabiting the 'new found lands' on the western shores of the Atlantic. The questions asked were generally of a philosophical and religious nature, rather than 'scientific'. Were the inhabitants of these new found lands truly human beings? Did they possess souls and human reasoning? Were they capable of understanding Christian doctrine and receiving divine grace? These questions were quickly given an authoritative response, though apparently not entirely convincing so far as many Europeans in succeeding generations were concerned. Pope Alexander VI issued a bull in 1493 which justified conquest if it were designed to bring the Native peoples of the Americas into Christian subjection. In 1537, Pope Paul III issued the famous bull Sublimus Deus in which he stated that the Native inhabitants were "truly men... capable of understanding the Catholic faith" and should not be destroyed as opponents of Christianity or enslaved as supposedly inferior "dumb brutes created for our service." The official view that they were fully human and fully capable of understanding and embracing the mysteries of Catholicism was repeated by the Pope in 1639, indicating that contrary opinions had not yet been fully eradicated.[1]

There were varying opinions about the New World itself. On the one hand, there was an idyllic view of the 'new found lands' as the Lost Paradise, the re-discovered Garden of Eden. The French

settlements in the tropical zone of America in the sixteenth century fitted well into this conceptual framework. Tupinamba tribesmen were brought to France, decked out in their scant and brightly colored feathery costumes, to perform at Court, at public festivals and church services. There was even an attempt to fit the northern zone into this concept, the names Acadia (Arcadia) and Avallon remaining as a testimony to such a vision. On the other hand, there was also the conviction that the rocky barren lands of Labrador and the north shore of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the forested coastline of much of North America, were under Satanic domination. Jacques Cartier described the barren craggy shoreline along which he sailed as "the land God gave to Cain". It could produce neither bread nor wine essential to Christian worship. Canada's first historian, Marc Lescarbot, described Acadia as probably unfit for European settlement because of its pestilential north-westerly winds which carried deadly vapours, "the exhalation from rotten matter in the forests".[2] From the outset, opinions about the colonial environment and prospects for successful colonization were quite divided.

European intellectuals at the time of first contact were interested in the effects of climate and environment on human temperament and activity. It was not surprising, therefore, that a Jesuit missionary should have thought that the character of his Native hearers "partakes of the climate under which they live" and that religion would take no deeper root in their hearts than did the wild trees in a sterile land. In France it became commonplace to visualize the native peoples of America as wanderers, as possessing no ordered religion or government, as hairy bestial creatures living like wild animals in an uncultivated wilderness. The essayist Michel de Montaigne defended them rather weakly, saying that although they were "without any civility, living like unreasoning beasts... eating roots, remaining ever naked...", they were "as nature has produced them", that is natural men. As for the charge of cannibalism, which seems to have originated from the contacts with Caribs and some Brazilian

tribes, he thought the "devouring" of the estates of poor widows and orphans in Europe represented a more reprehensible form of cannibalism. Unwittingly, he had set a pattern of social criticism which became very popular -- that is, using the positive qualities of the hospitality, freedom, equality and relative peacefulness and contentment of Native societies to attack social inequities, injustice and corruption in 'civilized' Europe. Consequently, two diametrically opposed views of the Native peoples circulated among the French -- the view that they were 'noble savages', to employ an appellation that was later popularized in literature, and the view that they were sub-human wild men, similar to the hairy, untamed and dangerous forest dwellers of mediaeval art and literature.[3]

France's initial incursions into the Americas in the sixteenth century coincided with a significant shift in French national sentiment and this would have its effects on both French attitudes towards the Native peoples and their policy respecting Native 'nations'. Historians had traditionally identified the motherland with the dynasty, but as the result of forty years of devastating religious wars (1559-1598) there developed a sense of national identity which could be termed 'French', as opposed to Burgundian, Gascon, Norman or Breton. The French rediscovered their Gallic origins so to speak and attempted to reconcile this with the Frankish origins of their monarchy. François Connan elaborated an ingenious thesis of the Gallic origins of Frankish law and feudalism which gained widespread acceptance when supported by such eminent scholars as Jean Bodin and the cosmographer François de Belleforest. The kingdom was seen as a sort of mystical body, embracing king and subjects, or a sovereign community sanctioned by God and the law of nature. In this patriotic direction of loyalty and devotion to the nation, the Catholic church identified even more closely with Gallican principles.[4]

Increased national consciousness spilled over into overseas colonizing ventures as the exploitation of the Newfoundland fishing banks, the Brazilian forests and the Canadian fur trade led to settlement and evangelization of the Native peoples. In the sixteenth century settlements were attempted in the St. Lawrence valley, the Carolinas, or "Florida" as the French then called it, and the Bay of Rio de Janeiro area. The Cartier-Roberval settlement in 1541-43 was neither permanent nor did it establish friendly relations with the Laurentian Iroquois who inhabited the St. Lawrence lowlands at that time. The Sable Island colony was no more successful and the establishment at Tadoussac in 1600 also had a chequered existence. More permanent settlements came in the seventeenth century with the founding of Port Royal in 1605, Quebec in 1608, and Ville-Marie (Montreal) in 1642. The Antilles and Guiana as tropical lands were more attractive to both settlers and entrepreneurs, so not surprisingly the populating of the French bridgeheads in Acadia and Canada proceeded very slowly. King Francis I in justifying the French intrusion into a New World, which with papal sanction had been divided between the crowns of Spain and Portugal, appealed to France's mission to christianize and civilize the Native peoples and dismissed Iberian claims with the challenge "show me Adam's will". The missionaries subsequently had a hand in formulating colonizing theory and provided propaganda not only for their evangelizing efforts but also for the charter companies which exploited the fur resources of the continent in return for the obligation to populate and govern the vast region. This linkage between commerce, conversion and colonization remained an important characteristic of the French approach to the New World.[5]

The French appear to have learned something from their initial unfriendly and unfortunate contacts with the Native peoples of the Americas. Champlain's approach was different from that of Cartier and Roberval in the previous century, although it should be noted that by consolidating the Huron-Algonkian alliance with the support of French arms he left a legacy of a century of Iroquois hostility

towards the French settlers. Exploitation of the cod fisheries by the French Atlantic fishing fleets did not interfere with Micmac traditional fishing practices, and the trade in furs did not at first disrupt the life cycle of the Algonkian hunting bands or the village life of the Iroquoian Huron Confederacy. French settlement was restricted to the marshy coastline in Acadia and to what in the seventeenth century was the no man's land of the St. Lawrence valley. Thus settlement by European intruders and traditional Native activities were not in conflict and each party saw advantages in maintaining friendly relations with the other. Other areas of contact with Native American peoples reinforced this emerging pattern of French contact. In Guiana, for example, the French claimed that the Native peoples were naturally friendly to them but were sworn enemies of the cruel Spaniards, an interpretation which developed into the propagandist Black Legend. Nevertheless, within a year of settlement of Cayenne hostilities broke out with the Galibis, and the French feared for their lives and property. In 1664, however, Antoine Le Febvre de la Barre, who payed an important role in the formulation of the colonial policies of the first Minister of the marine, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, stressed the need for friendly and peaceful relations with the Galibis and all other tribes with whom contact was made. Father du Tertre, who is sometimes credited with originating the idea of noble savages, and La Barre's views on Native relations were important in orienting the policies of future French colonial administrators.[6]

Soon the French came to believe that their approach to the Native peoples was unique in the annals of European contact in the Americas. This assertion that the French possessed a peculiar ability and facility for getting along with Native peoples, a national trait of compatibility, was canonized in the génie colonial thesis. In view of this supposedly inherent Gallic quality, France seemed destined to assume a civilizing mission abroad and perhaps even to be the instrument for the creation of an Amerindian Christian civilization. The thesis also stressed the negative qualities of Spanish and English

colonization. By the eighteenth century the French would rediscover Las Casas's indictment of the conquistadores and they would revive their sixteenth century Black Legend with renewed vigour, charging the Iberians with genocide, the systematic extermination of 15 to 20 million people. The naturalist Buffon did not have a particularly flattering 'scientific' opinion of Native capabilities, nevertheless he was outspoken in deploring the cruelty of the conquest and subjugation of these people. He wrote:

> They [Spaniards] permitted themselves all the excesses of the strong against the weak: the measure of their glory is that of their crimes, and their triumph is the disgrace of virtue. By depopulating this new world, they disfigured it and almost annihilated it... all the gold which they took out of America weighs perhaps less than the human blood which they shed there.

The polemist Cornélius de Pauw argued that the Spaniards used the disorganization they said existed in Amerindian societies to legitimize their ill-treatment of these unfortunate beings and that "it would have been better had they persisted in the opinion that the Americans were monkeys" rather than admit their humanity and arrogate to themselves "the atrocious right to kill in the name of God". De Pauw held the Native peoples in low esteem and attributed their conquest to their natural weakness, their degradation and their paucity of numbers, but took even greater delight in castigating the Spaniards for having them "devoured by dogs, burnt by the Dominicans at the Inquisition, drowned in diving for pearls, choked in the mines, finally crushed under the weight of labour and impositions." Whether the French held the Native peoples in high esteem or despised them -- and it should be noted that opinions varied from one extreme to the other -- they saw their own conduct and relationship as superior in every way to that of their southern Catholic neighbours. Perhaps the only favourable comment was to concede, as did the soldier Duret in deploring the "military license" of the conquerors, that "they arrived by this means at the conversion of an entire nation of Infidels."[7]

Colonials agreed with the metropolitans. In North America, Governor Vaudreuil opined that the southern tribes "prefer the French to all other nations." The missionary Charlevoix, who wrote a six-volume history of the colony in the 1740s, added that his nation was "the only one which has had the secret of winning the affection of the American natives." The trader Jérémie, who intruded into the regions claimed by the Hudson's Bay Company, found that the northern hunting bands received the French as "brothers" but, said he, "they do not have the same attachment for the English." He was restating an affirmation made a generation earlier in Louisiana, where an officer remarked that although the English of Carolina "appear richer and more liberal to them, yet they do not find their intercourse as pleasant as that of the French."[8]

Since the English were little better than the Spaniards, according to French assessments of Native reactions to European intruders, what would be the response to the British conquest of Canada in 1759? Mme de Pompadour, the politically influential mistress of King Louis XV, confided to a correspondent that the English would have considerable difficulty in establishing themselves permanently in Canada because the Native peoples "still like the French and do all the harm they can to their new masters". She was convinced that there was no other nation "which possesses so well the art of making itself hated as the English" and therefore that the Native peoples would welcome a return of the French eventually. This conviction of an English lack of colonial genius extended to the Anglo-Americans. The traveller Brissot de Warville, during a visit to North America after the American Revolution, commented on what he took to be the reaction of the tribes of the Great Lakes region to francophones and anglophones respectively:

> A touching fact, which will give us a good idea of the virtues and of the gratitude of these people, is the affection they retain for the French. A man of that nation can travel in safety, unarmed, from

> Canada to the Illinois. The natives distinguish by his manners, his skin, his language, to which nation he belongs and they entertain him like a brother. But if he is found in the company of Americans, they treat him with the same cruelty, for they detest the Americans.[9]

The French had little doubt about their génie colonial, as it would later be defined by the school of Imperial historians.

It is more difficult to reconstruct Native peoples' opinions of the relative merit of French and English intrusion into their ancestral lands and way of life. In cultures that were pre-literate and relied on oral transmission of values and information, there are few records which the historian, using traditional methodology, can consult. Nevertheless, both French and English sources often relate verbatim the responses of various Native individuals (sometimes appending their own interpretations thereof which are invaluable to the historian who seeks to penetrate into European understanding or misunderstanding of Native responses). Thus, for example, we have recorded the sentiments of the Native prophet who aroused Pontiac's supporters against the Anglo-Americans in 1763, "these dogs dressed in red, who have come to rob you of your hunting grounds, and drive away the game." The Great Lakes tribes were asked to "take up the hatchet" against them, to "wipe them from the face of the earth", adding that "the children of your great father, the King of France, are not like the English", that they "love the red men", and even the improbable "they understand the true mode of worshipping me" which referred to a revitalization movement. Or, again, the Saulteaux chief who told the trader Alexander Henry in the autumn of 1761 that he knew "our father, the King of France, is old and infirm" and tired of making war so he had fallen asleep and consequently Canada had been conquered. But, he warned, "this slumber is drawing to a close. Already I hear our father waking up and asking about the fate of his children, the Indians."[10]

English commentaries at the time do not seem to have been in disagreement with these views. An observer in 1755 conceded that "the French have always had a great advantage over the English in treating with them." An anonymous pamphleteer specified that "according to their superior dexterity in address and civility of usage, they are more successful than we, in procuring and retaining their friendship." The clearest statement remains Thomas Mante's judgement in his History of the Late War in North America:

> ...and it must be owned, that the general behaviour of the French to the Indians was so very different from that of the English, as to give all the weight the French could wish to those lessons; the effects of which, accordingly, became every day more and more visible. We mention these particulars, not only to recommend the manner in which the French treat the Indians as highly deserving to be imitated by us; but to wear out of the minds of such of our deluded countrymen as are not entirely destitute of good sense and humanity, the prejudice conceived against an innocent, much abused, and once happy people who, with all their simplicity, are no strangers to the first principles of morality; and, accordingly, entertain as deep a sense of the justice, benevolence, and condescension of their former friends, the French, as they do of the injustice, cruelty, and insolence, with which they have been used by their present fellow-subjects, the English.[11]

Mante attributed the supposed French colonizing genius to an espousal of the view of Natives as noble savages, bons sauvages worthy of French citizenship, inter-marriage with Europeans, and indispensable companions in war and trade. But, the French genius lay in more than a facility in dealing with Native peoples on more or less equal terms. The French contact was marked by an absence of the traits of nascent racism that so marred the Anglo-Saxon contact.

With Mante's judgment we have passed from contemporary views to those of the historians. In the wake of France's defeat at the hands of the Prussians in 1870 and the decision to turn once again to colonial expansion overseas, there developed a school of nationalist historians, now generally identified as the French Imperial school, which turned its attention to the colonies of the Ancien Régime. Almost without exception, these historians adopted the view that the French were possessed of a special genius for colonizing areas with aboriginal populations -- a thesis that had had its opponents as early as the sixteenth century and that was disputed by many of the philosophes in the eighteenth century who were decidedly anticolonialist -- and that they called a génie colonial.

Georges Hardy wrote, for example, that his countrymen "have been delivered more quickly of primitive expansionism and we have from the beginning incorporated with our needs of colonial domination the scruples of civilized peoples and the concern of educators." André Julien added that the "French had without argument a gift for conciliating the aborigines that no other people possessed to the same degree." Hubert Deschamps, in describing French colonial doctrines since the sixteenth century, stated that "their gift of sympathy (for the Amerindians), their facility of assimilation, their absence of racism were there from the beginning."[12]

Since the time of Edmund Burke the English-speaking world has tended to accept the same thesis. Herman Merivale, in a series of celebrated lectures on colonization delivered at Oxford in 1839-41, pointed up the deficiencies, as he saw them, of English contact with Native peoples. Although he deplored the history of all European settlements in America, Africa and Australia in terms of a "wide and sweeping destruction of native races by the uncontrolled violence of individuals, if not of colonial authorities, followed by tardy attempts on the part of governments to repair the acknowledged crime," it was English colonization that was the most disastrous. Of the

French he said that "no other Europeans have ever displayed equal talents for conciliating savages, or, it must be added, for approximating to their usages and modes of life".

No historian of North American experiences expressed the thesis more elegantly and succinctly than did the Boston Brahmin Francis Parkman in the late nineteenth century: "Spanish civilization crushed the Indian; English civilization scorned and neglected him; French civilization embraced and cherished him." Even Frederick Jackson Turner's celebrated frontier thesis portrayed the Native peoples only as barriers to the onward and westward march of civilization, roadblocks to progress. Philip Means, writing in 1965, commended the "singularly sympathetic and conciliating spirit which Frenchmen have always displayed towards races distinct from their own." Mason Wade, as dean of Canadian Studies in the United States, affirmed that the French exemplified "a peculiar ability to conciliate aboriginal peoples and to win their confidence." And for those who might see a direct connection between New France and modern Quebec, or persistence of Ancien Régime attitudes among French-Canadians, we have the assessment of social scientists J. Rick Ponting and Roger Gibbins, who see a much more favourable relationship between francophone Québécois and the Native peoples of Quebec than exists between anglophone Canadians and Native peoples.[13]

These are some elements of the ideological background of the investigation of the Native peoples' contact experiences with the French during the period prior to the British Conquest. It has sometimes been asserted that Europeans invaded America in the name of God, in search of gold, and in pursuit of glory. The French came to Acadia and Canada specifically for fish, furs and farmlands. But since the New World, perhaps a more recently created "infant world" as some Renaissance theorists speculated, was inhabited by "marvellously strange" peoples who might be either the long-Lost Tribes of Israel eager to receive the gospel of Jesus Christ or degenerate savages who,

having lost contact with their Asiatic homeland, had fallen into a pitiful state of devil worship and cannibalism -- depending on one's inclinations and perceptions of the moment -- some compatible relationship had to be developed if the French were to maintain their small beachheads in New France.

## Chapter I Endnotes

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7. Buffon's chapter on gold cited in Michèle Duchet, Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des lumières (Paris, 1971), 279; Cornelius de Pauw, Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains (Berlin, 1768), I, 55-56, 61-63; Sieur Duret, Voyage de Marseille à Lima et dans les autres lieux des Indes Occidentales (Paris, 1720), 261-262.

8. Huntingdon Library, Vaudreuil Papers, Letterbook I, Vaudreuil to Maurepas, I June 1744, 260; P.F.X. de Charlevois, Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle-France, avec le Journal historique d'un Voyage (Paris, 1744), vij; Public Archives of Canada (hereafter P.A.C.), MG 18, H-27 Félix Martin Papers, Description of Hudson Bay and Strait by Jérémie, 196; J.F. Bernard, Relation de la Louisiane, et du Fleuve Mississippi (Amsterdam, 1720), 10.

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10. Citations from Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac (New York, 1962), 169; Sylvie Vincent and Bernard Arcand, L'Image de l'Amérindien dans les manuels scolaires du Québec (Ville La Salle, 1979), 188.

11. Anonymous, The Expediency of Securing our American Colonies (Edinburgh, 1763), 57; Thomas Mante, The History of the Late War in North-America (London, 1772), 479.

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## CHAPTER II

### French Sovereignty and Native Nationhood

The French intrusion in the sixteenth century was into territories which were already partially occupied and some portions of which were under cultivation. Presumably, the Native peoples had migrated into terra nullius and as first occupants had established undisputed possession. There was no way of knowing if the Native inhabitants at the time of French contact were the direct descendants of those peoples who had originally settled north-eastern America. There was evidence, in fact, of major displacements of Amerindian cultural or ethnic groups at a period relatively close to the establishment of the first French settlements. The disappearance of the Laurentian Iroquois between 1542 and the establishment of a trading station at Tadoussac in 1600 is but one example of such important territorial redistributions. The French established beachheads for settlement in largely unoccupied lands such as the marshlands along the Bay of Fundy and the St. Lawrence valley in the early seventeenth century. At the outset, therefore, there was no question of displacement of aboriginal residents or of concern about legitimate title to lands appropriated. Contact with areas inhabited by the Native peoples was limited largely to pursuit of trade and missionary penetration, neither of which involved land acquisition per se.

For what reasons did the French come to North America and on what arguments did they base their claims of possession? They came initially in search of cod, of fabulous riches, and the route to the exotic Orient. Having landed in the New World they took formal possession of it through a variety of symbolic acts. A long legal and political tradition was brought to bear on this unique experience.[1]

The nature of the French relationship with the Native peoples in juridical, political and diplomatic terms cannot be understood without some acquaintance with this European tradition.

The first strand went back to mediaeval Christian musings about the rights of infidel or non-Christian populations. Pope Innocent IV opined in the early thirteenth century that non-Christian states enjoyed the same rights, authority and privileges as Christian states. Thomas Aquinas taught that legitimacy of dominion did not depend on the religious beliefs of those who exercised authority. On the other hand, Henry of Susa, Cardinal of Ostia, (d. 1271) held that infidel nations were not legitimate, their rulers lacked recognized jurisdiction, and the lands of such states could be appropriated without compensation. He argued in favour of a universal papal dominion over pagans who had lost their sovereignty to Christ, but in France the Gallican theologians argued in favour of possession by the Christian prince.[2] King Francis I, as has been mentioned, used the motive of evangelizing the Native peoples to justify his commissioning of exploration and settlement. The Pope assumed he was the arbiter and over-lord of the non-Christian world, and he was in some measure so regarded. The Spanish monarchs had consulted churchmen on the manner of taking possession of "new found lands" and had been given the answer that immediately upon arriving in the New World they should "require the natives to subscribe to the articles of the Christian faith, and the supreme jurisdiction of the Pope over all the earth, which if they did not do, they were to be reduced to slavery by fire and sword."[3]

But the French ignored papal claims to temporal jurisdiction and used a religious justification to bolster royal claims. The first historian of New France, Marc Lescarbot, explained France's right to Acadia in these terms in 1618:

> The earth pertaining then, by divine right to the children of God, there is here no question of applying the law and policy of Nations, by which it would not be permissible to claim the territory of another. This being so, we must possess it and preserve its natural inhabitants, and plant therein with determination the name of Jesus Christ and of France, since today many of your children have the unshakable resolution to dwell there with their families.[4]

He was aware that the Micmacs had some legitimate claims too, but he restricted himself to observing that they should not be exterminated "as the Spaniard has those of the West Indies." Even the Protestant Jacques de Charron supported the French claim to "inherit" the New World in the name of Jesus Christ on the basis of the Gauls being the descendants of Gomar, of Japheth and of Noah.[5] Robert Challe, a self-appointed adviser to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, France's first Minister of Marine and Colonies, attacked papal and Spanish pretensions as insulting to "reason, justice and the rights of others." He deplored the papal "donation" or division of the New World between Spain and Portugal because it was founded on "force: a right however which is execrable among Christians."[6] While contesting Spanish claims and methods, the French employed the religious argument that the Christian prince had a role in bringing the non-Christian world under the jurisdiction of Jesus Christ. Royal Gallicanism saw the extension of the kingdom of France and of the kingdom of Jesus Christ as concurrent.

A second strand was based on Roman civil law in an attempt to define the status of newly discovered lands. Francisco de Vitoria, a theologian at the University of Salamanca in the mid-sixteenth century, argued in two famous treatises entitled De Indis and De Jure Belli that the Amerindians were the true possessors of America by virtue of their occupation of these lands from time immemorial. This was the initial statement of aboriginal rights. But he also maintained that all nations had the right of visiting, sojourning in

and trading with foreign countries, including newly discovered lands. He included in this formulation the use of the high seas by all nations. There was emerging the concept of international law, which Vitoria described as "having been established by the authority of the whole world."[7]

But Roman law had never contemplated the discovery of vast new areas of unpopulated and unclaimed lands. It was Hugo Grotius who in 1625 applied the Roman law dealing with disputes between individuals over ownership of lands previously unclaimed to nations. He affirmed that "as to things without a master, if we follow nature alone, they belong to him who discovers and occupies them." On this basis, set out in Droit de la Guerre et de la Paix, the vacant lands of America could legally be claimed by the nation that first discovered and took possession of them. It provided a justification for the occupation of a continent which was only asserted to be "vacant" because it was, at least in north-eastern America, neither heavily populated, cleared of virgin forests nor largely under cultivation.[8]

This view saw intrusion as a normal expansion of European law and government into a legal vacuum and European peoples into vacant lands. Discovery of a territory that was virtually uninhabited and not extensively cultivated might be occupied and appropriated. Europeans did not believe that nomadic, loosely organized societies with communal land-sharing constituted sovereign states which could be recognized as such in international diplomacy. This amounted to a denial of any presumed aboriginal sovereignty. The New World was "vacant land" either in the sense of terra nullius, what Dickason calls "lands not already under Christian control", or vacuum domicilium, land devoid of extensive human occupation and cultivation in Berkhofer's description.[9] The concept that the "laws of nature" permit a nation to settle on unoccupied territory and develop its own form of government and society was adopted by all European powers.

In 1672, Samuel Pufendorf clarified somewhat Grotius' concept by affirming that "the bare seeing a thing, or knowing where it is, is not judged a sufficient Title of Possession." He added that "twould be in vain for you to claim as your own, which you can by no means hinder others from sharing with you." Discovery did not grant more than the right to later appropriation. Legal acts of appropriation, such as erecting crosses, posting the King's arms, or burying inscribed lead plates, gave only "inchoate title" and claim against other European powers. A claim had to be made good by effective occupation. In 1688, Pufendorf defined the concept of usufruct and stressed its basic dualism in terms of "dominion lies with one, and the right to enjoy the fruits with another."[10] It was a concept Europeans would apply to their relationship with the Native peoples whose rights, according to Pufendorf's thesis, were inalienable.

A third strand may be traced to feudal concepts of possession. Under feudalism the acquisition of a territory presupposed the possibility of effectively holding it, and "positive rule and legal authority not being exercised" resulted in loss of any legitimate claim to it.[11] It was towards the close of the French régime in Canada that the Swiss legal scholar Emmerich de Vattel's Le Droit des Gens (The Law of Nations) dealt more specifically with the dispossession of Native and nomadic occupants of recently discovered lands. It was not the ancient occupation of the land, as consecrated in the phrase "from time immemorial", that was the basis of title and right, but the use made of the land which was the ultimate justification for its possession. He thought that most of the Native peoples of "those vast tracts of land rather roamed over them than inhabited them" and by pursuing "this idle mode of life, usurp more extensive territories than, with a reasonable share of labour, they would have occasion for", therefore it was just "if other nations more industrious and too closely confined, come to take possession of a part of those lands..." He added concerning the majority of Native people of New France:

> Their unsettled habitation in those immense regions cannot be counted a true and legal possession; and the people of Europe, too closely pent up at home, finding land of which the savages stood in no particular need, and of which they make no actual and constant use, were lawfully entitled to take possession of it, and settle it with colonies... we do not, therefore, deviate from the views of nature, in confining the Indians within narrower limits.[12]

This view represented the culmination of conceptualization regarding the right to colonize. The philosopher Diderot could not help but wonder if his compatriots would defend the thesis had some Amerindians by chance landed on French soil and "had written on the sand of your beaches or on the bark of your trees: This land belongs to us."[13]

Was French practice in accord with these European legal formulations? A summary of French claims and symbolic acts of possession throws some light on the question. From the outset, the French avoided the common Dutch and English practices of purchase and legal cession of Native lands, also, as far as possible, the more direct Spanish claim by virtue of conquest. The French did not read a requerimiento as did the Spaniards, but by erecting crosses in Brazil they seemed to be intent on imposing French laws and customs and the Catholic religion, as well as laying formal claim to the land.[14] The commander of the French fleet, however, interested in the Brazilian trade, asserted in 1538 that the Native peoples were free and independent nations and France's claims were restricted to freedom of the seas and the right to trade with all Native people, as Vitoria proclaimed.[15] As far as New France was concerned, the official French view in the eighteenth century was that Jean da Verrazzano had taken possession for Francis I in 1523 and Jacques Cartier had reaffirmed this prise de possession in 1535.[16] But contemporary documents do not seem to permit such a categorical statement.

Thomas Aubert of Dieppe, who brought back the first Amerindians from New France to Rouen in 1508, like other fishing expeditions does not appear to have been concerned about making any formal claim of possession. Da Verrazzano's instructions were confined to "discover new lands" and "discover some profitable trade". It was Maggiolo's map of 1527, using information from da Verrazzano's voyages, that indicated the territory as "Francesca". Jacques Cartier's 1534 voyage was "to discover certain islands and lands where it is said there is a great quantity of gold, and other precious things"; the 1535 commission stipulated he was "to discover beyond the Newfound Lands"; and that of 1541 said he was to penetrate inland and "converse with the said peoples thereof and live among them, if need be" in order to facilitate the spread of the Christian religion.[17] It is true that Cartier planted many crosses on his journeys but most of these, as Slattery has demonstrated, were markers or navigational aids, religious symbols or commemorative pillars without any indication of a symbolic taking of possession of America.[18] On the first voyage, Cartier's men erected a thirty-foot cross at Gaspé with a shield and royal inscription which was apparently interpreted by the Native chieftain as a taking of possession of his country. Cartier gave the following account:

> And pointing to the cross he made us a long harangue, making the sign of the cross with two of his fingers; and then he pointed to the land all around about, as if he wished to say that all this region belong to him, and that we ought not to have set up this cross without his permission.

Cartier's men forcibly seized the chief and his escorts and "then we explained to them by signs that the cross had been set up to serve as a landmark and guide-post on coming into the harbour."[19]

The royal commission to Roberval, dated 15 January 1541, did provide for formal taking of possession of maritime regions "uninhabited and not possessed or ruled by any other Christian

princes." He was to "descend and enter these lands and put them in our possession, by means of friendship and amicable agreements, if that can be done, or by force of arms, strong handed and all other hostile means," to destroy its strongholds and establish French control, laws, religion, missions, etc. Two methods of acquisition were cited -- either voluntary cession or "conquest and tuition of the said countries."[20] This aggressive approach dominated during the rest of the sixteenth century. The Marquis de la Roche received authority in 1577 to "invest and make his own all lands which he can make himself master of" and not previously claimed by other Europeans. The following year he was named governor of "new found lands and countries which he shall take and conquer from the said barbarians." In the letters-patent of 1588 to those who had inherited Cartier's privileges in New France, "conquests under our name and authority by all due and licit means" was again stressed as a means of converting the Native peoples.[21] The commission to La Roche for Sable Island in 1598 likewise emphasized acquisition in the same terms as Roberval's earlier instructions: "by means of friendship and amicable agreement, if that can be done, or by force of arms, strong handed and all other hostile means."[22]

By the early seventeenth century, as the fur trade became more important and missionary work was seriously contemplated, a policy of pacification replaced the brief period of aggressive conquest. De Mont's commission of 8 November 1603 stipulated that he was "to establish, extend and make known our (royal) name, power and authority" and subject and render obedient the Native peoples, but no mention was made of employing force. The commissions of 1612 and 1625 for Champlain employed the same conciliatory tone, and the articles establishing the Company of New France in April 1627 made no mention of acquisition of title or imposition of French sovereignty, but contented itself with granting converted Amerindians the same rights

as natural born French subjects when in France.[23] The Company, incidentally, had been given full title to the "property, justice and seigneury" of the colony.

Once the Jesuits assumed the role of principal missionaries in the colony, they actively promoted the extension of French sovereignty. In 1638, for example, the son of a prominent chieftain was sent to France and was received by the King "at whose feet he laid his Crown of Porcelain beads, as a sign that he recognized that great Prince, in the name of all these Nations, as their true and lawful Monarch."[24] The missionaries interpreted this as "paying hommage to the King", but it may be doubted that the distribution of presents to representatives of "three nations" which followed in Canada was seen in the same light by the Native peoples. The mission of Jean Bourdon and Father Isaac Jogues to the Mohawks in May 1646 drew only the promise that the French "will always have an assured dwelling among the Iroquois" and that the missionary personally "will always find his mat ready to receive him."[25] The continued hostility of the Iroquois in the 1660s necessitated a retention of the right to use force. Thus Prouville de Tracy's commission of 19 November 1663 empowered him to make "peace or truce" with "the barbarians" as well as with European powers in expanding colonial possessions and authority. The charter of the Company of the West Indies, May 1664, similarly stipulated that it was to establish itself "by chasing or submitting the Natives or natural inhabitants of the said countries" who were not allies of the Crown. It gave title for a period of forty years "to all lands it shall be able conquer and inhabit" and permitted it to enter into negotiations with "the kings and princes of the country" for "peace and alliance in our name".[26]

In the interior of the country, as exploration, missions and trade progressed, more formal claims of possession through symbolic acts occurred. Among the better known examples is Saint-Lusson's prise de possession at Sault Ste. Marie on 14 June 1671. As

representative of the King and special envoy of the Intendant Jean Talon, Saint-Lusson, with Nicholas Perrot as chief interpreter and in the presence of 4 Jesuit missionaries, 14 Native chiefs and about 2,000 Native spectators took formal possession of the upper country "bounded on the one side by the oceans of the north and west, and on the other side by the South Sea". He did so "declaring to all nations therein that from this time henceforth they are subjects of His Majesty, bound to obey his laws and follow his customs." In return for this submission to the King of France, the assembled "nations" were promised "all succour and protection against their enemies". A great wooden cross had been planted, and Saint-Lusson had made the declaration with sword drawn in one hand and a symbolic handful of soil in the other. A religious service followed and in the evening the fourteen "nations" were treated to a large bonfire, the giving of the "King's presents", and a Te Deum sung in their name to thank God for having made them "the subjects of so great and powerful a Monarch".[27]

Two memoranda prepared in June and July 1687, and the French ambassador's communication of 10 May 1699 regarding French claims to the Hudson's Bay region, argued the thesis of discovery and a symbolic taking of possession.[28] In the same tradition, the Sieur de Villieu reminded his superiors that he had been captain of a company in 1693 sent "to post the King's coat of arms along a line separating New France from New England" and that the Iroquois had steadfastly protested to the English that they had never been subjects of the British Crown, a statement which the French should keep in their archives for use at the appropriate time.[29] The French tried, on their part, to establish the idea that a protectorate had been established over the Five Nations by virtue of treaties concluded with Sieur de Tracy in 1665 and 1666. This does not seem to have met with much success according to a memorandum dated 12 November 1712:

> It must be concluded that the Iroquois recognize no masters whatever. And although the French have carried the coat of arms of France among them both before and after the English have taken those of England, they nevertheless recognize no domination. That is why they reiterated and tried to establish on two occasions during two assemblies they held at Montreal during the summer of the present year... To leave in perpetuity the marks of their independence from the English and the French, they had an act in due form drawn up to which they put their signs and native hieroglyphs.[30]

South of the Great Lakes, Sieur de Louvigny in 1716 concluded an initial treaty of peace with the Fox tribe. He reported that he had given them "a copy on a sheet of paper as an authentic testimony of our convention and the taking possession of a conquered land by the King's arms," but it was, in his words, more for the benefit of the English who were "ever jealous of the success of French arms" and might challenge the French claim in the West.[31] In other words, the claim was made more against European challenges than for the benefit of the Fox nation.

In 1732, Joseph Normandin undertook to mark the boundary along the height of land north of Lac St. Jean separating the French territory from that of the Hudson's Bay Company. He made a formal claim of possession for the King, placing four fleurs de lys on four trees, and in the middle of a portage along the watershed "we put Three Crosses on a red pine, on the largest we could see. At the end of the said portage, that is to say at the South-West end, we made a fleur de lys on a pine and a cross above it."[32] Similarly, Louis Fornel in 1743 landed at Baie St. Louis in Labrador, erected two large crosses on a promontory, kneeled before them and sang hymns of thanksgiving, then raised a royal standard as a sign of "the Taking of possession which we make in the name of the King and the French nation of a land which has never yet been inhabited by any nation and among

whom we are the first to take possession thereof."[33] He simply ignored the Native accounts of Basque, Spanish, English, Dutch and even of other French visitors to these shores.

La Vérendrye played a similar role in the prairie West. On 19 October 1738, he visited an Assiniboine village and recorded for King Louis XV's benefit a moving "ceremony of placing their hands on my head, taking me in your place as their father and our Frenchmen as brothers, placing their hands on their heads likewise and weeping." Frenchmen might take this to mean the Native people were willing to become the King's vassals, but the ceremony in Native terms was more akin to adoption and the sealing of a solemn compact. Two months later, among the Mandan, he gave a chief a flag and an inscribed lead tablet decorated with ribbons at the four corners. He wrote:

> This tablet was placed in a box, so that it might be kept forever, in memory of my having taken possession of their lands in the name of the King. It will be well guarded, from father to son -- better than it would if I had buried it in the ground, where it might have been in danger of being stolen. I made them understand as best I could that I was leaving this token in memory of the visit of the French to their country.

In March 1743, La Vérendrye's son penetrated even farther westwards to the Chokecherry People, likely Arikaras, and on a hill near the fort deposited a lead tablet "bearing the arms and inscription of the King" under a pyramid of stones. He did not wish to arouse any hostility among these people so he did not tell them about the plate or its significance. He told them only that he was "setting up these stones in memory of the fact that we had been in their country."[34]

In 1749, in order to forestall British claims to the Ohio valley, Céloron de Blainville buried a series of six lead plates asserting French claims to the region, as well as posting the King's arms on prominent trees along the river bank. The Native people do

not appear to have reacted favourably to this prise de possession and wondered if it had magical or spiritual significance. In 1751 some of Joncaire's Native allies removed some of the markers and asked the English about their significance.[35]

The French never doubted their right unilaterally to acquire lands not already under Christian control. Although at first they were uninterested in establishing their sovereignty in the New World, when they began to do so they were not adverse to establishing it through armed conquest. In their prises de possession they asserted their rights against their European rivals and did not consider the question of Native entitlement. With most of the tribes they formed alliances and observed traditional ceremonial in cementing good relations. Only with the Iroquois and Fox, both of whom were regarded at times as under British influence, did they sign treaties. The various "nations" were not regarded as belonging to the international family of nations because they were not organized under sovereign governments possessing coercive powers to maintain order in their communities. They treated with them as "nations" only in the sense that they were collectivities bound by language and custom and ties of consanguinity which acted as a group in terms of defence, trade, religious observances, and the like. It seemed possible in such circumstances to reconcile French sovereignty in the New World with Native "nationhood" and self-rule. The majority of the tribes with whom contacts were maintained were friendly and were counted as allies and "brothers" who accepted the King of France as their "father".

When New France fell into British hands during the Seven Years' War did the French try to protect the rights the Native peoples had enjoyed as allies under the Ancien Régime? Article 2 of the Capitulation of Quebec in 1759 provided that all the inhabitants, presumably the Amerindians included, would be preserved in the possession of their "houses, goods, effects and privileges". The Articles of Capitulation of Montreal, signed 8 September 1760, in

article 37 protected all land titles, including it may be presumed lands held as reserves for the Native peoples, and in article 40 made more specific provisions as follows:

> The Savages or Indian allies of his most Christian Majesty, shall be maintained in the Lands they inhabit; if they chuse to remain there; they shall not be molested on any pretence whatsoever, for having carried arms, and served his most Christian Majesty; they shall have, as well as the French, liberty of religion, and shall keep their missionaries.[36]

Article 4 of the definitive Treaty of Paris, 1763, permitted the inhabitants of Canada "French and others" to emigrate and protected their property rights in such an eventuality. The laws and customs by which the Native peoples had been governed in New France would remain in force until specifically abrogated or changed by the new Sovereign. Royal instructions sent to Governor James Murray in December 1763 directed him to gather information concerning the several bodies of Native peoples, "of the manner of their Lives, and the Rules and Constitutions by which they are governed or regulated". There was some recognition that under French sovereignty they had enjoyed a certain independence and non-interference with their indigenous system of internal order. Murray was instructed as follows:

> And You are upon no Account to molest or disturbe them in the Possession of such Parts of the said Province, as they at present occupy or possess; but to use the best means You can for conciliating their Affections, and uniting them to our Government...[37]

The interpretation seems to have been that all lands had belonged to the French Crown and that the Native nations had enjoyed a usufructuary and personal interest in the land. The French had done all they could to guarantee a continuation of this arrangement under

British rule, but the transfer of sovereignty seemed to imply that legally the Native people could make good only such rights as the new Sovereign, through his officers, recognized.

While it seems clear that the French had succeeded in establishing their sovereignty and having it recognized in international circles, and never having it seriously contested by the Native peoples, the question of Amerindian rights requires clarification. Recognition of French political sovereignty (usually expressed in terms of receiving the French as brothers, the Governor General as Onontio, and the King as Onontio-Goa, their Father), the acceptance of missionaries, the concluding of military pacts and the conduct of trade were intertwined aspects of mutually beneficial and mutually binding relations from which it became virtually impossible for either party to extricate itself. Although the French never doubted that sovereignty resided in their Crown, and sensed that it was not a matter of any immediate concern to Native societies, they were sensitive to three other aspects of their relationship with Native peoples.

There was, first of all, the matter of Native nationhood, which posed no insurmountable conceptual problem because the bands and tribes were received as nations with whom alliances could be formed, agreements concluded, treaties signed and, if required, wars waged.[38] There was no intention, as has been stated, to recognize these nations as organized <u>états</u> to whom regular diplomatic recognition could be extended. Rather they were seen as independent in the sense of retaining their own forms of social and political organization, customs and practices.[39] The intention seems to have been to restrict French settlement in Canada to the St. Lawrence valley, where some domiciled Native people might come to live on reserves under missionary guidance, and to permit only small French communities at trading posts, military forts and mission stations in the vast Amerindian territory. There was, in other words, a French

area with limited Native settlement, and there was a Native area with limited French settlement. Royal instructions in 1716 not only required peaceful relations with the Native peoples but also forbade (clause 5) the French from settling and clearing land above the Montreal seigneuries.[40] All upper country settlement required special authorization after due consultation with the Native peoples in whose territory it was proposed to establish oneself. At the international level, it was the King of France who spoke for the Native peoples since they were deemed under French sovereignty. The French extended the same recognition to Britain to speak for its Native peoples.

The official policy for the colony had been outlined for Governor Courcelles soon after the replacement of company rule by Royal government in 1663. He was reminded that although the first objective remained "their conversion to the Christian and Catholic faith as rapidly as possible", the King thought it imperative that "the officers, soldiers, and all his adult subjects treat the Indians with kindness, justice and equity, without ever causing them any hurt or violence." The second objective was their assimilation into French civil and commercial life provided "all this be carried out in goodwill and that these Indians take it up out of their own interest."[41]

This curious dualism of Native self-determination under French sovereignty was remarked upon by an observant Spanish visitor to eighteenth-century Louisbourg. He wrote:

> These natives, whom the French term savages, were not absolutely subjects of the King of France, nor entirely independent of him. They acknowledged him lord of the country, but without any alteration in their way of living; or submitting themselves to his laws; and so far were they from paying any tribute, that they received annually from the King of France a quantity of apparel, gunpowder and

> muskets, brandy and several kinds of tools, in order to keep them quiet and attached to the French interest; and this has also been the political practice of the crown with regard to the savages of Canada.[42]

Had he visited the Acadian lands that came under British rule in 1713, he would have seen the difficulties the Micmacs were experiencing since the Conquest.

The British insisted that by the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) the Micmacs and their lands had come under British sovereignty, but the Micmacs replied that they had never been subjects of the French king, only his children and allies. The matter came to a head in 1715 when two officers tried to get the Micmacs to proclaim George I, who had just ascended the throne, their new sovereign in all their villages, to swear allegiance with him, and to permit English settlement in their villages "so as to form only one people." After the usual council deliberations, the Micmacs declared that they would proclaim "no foreign king" in their country and that "they did not want any king to say that he had taken possession of their land." They refused to swear allegiance because, as they expressed it, they had "their natural king and Onontio, the marquis de Vaudreuil, was their chief, and the king of France was their father because he obtained missionaries to instruct them."[43]

In 1749, following an assembly of all Micmac bands at French-held Port Toulouse, a formal declaration of war against Great Britain was drawn up by the abbé Pierre Maillard in the Micmac language and sent to Halifax.[44] Two years later, this was followed by demands for a clear line of demarcation between English settlements and Micmac territory similar to the limits placed in Canada on the French seigneurial tract. In 1754 the abbé Le Loutre proposed to Governor Lawrence that an independent Micmac territory be created in eastern Nova Scotia, but little came of this request after the

boundary commission charged with fixing the boundaries of the colony collapsed. The Micmacs simply continued to affirm their faith in the policies attributed to the King of France.[45]

The case of the Abenakis, who in response to English encroachments on their ancestral territories came in large numbers to settle in New France, further illustrates the favourable comparison many Native peoples made between French and Anglo-American practices. Governor Vaudreuil explained to three New England commissioners at Montreal in April 1725 that the Abenakis were now "under the protection of His Most Christian Majesty". He went on to explain that this "protectorate" meant that for 80 years they had been allies and that "since that time they have always called the Governor of New France their Father, have received from him the Commissions confirming their choice of their own chiefs, and have hoisted in their villages the Flag of France."[46] The Abenakis of St. François reserve told Captain Stevens, the official delegate of the Governor at Boston, virtually the same thing in 1752. Their deposition ran as follows:

> 9. Our Father who is here present has nothing to do with what we say to you; we speak to you of our own accord, and in the name of all our allies; we regard our Father, in this instance, only as a witness to our words...
>
> 11. We are entirely free; we are allies of the King of France, from whom we have received the Faith and all sorts of assistance in our necessities; we love that Monarch, and we are strongly attached to his interests.[47]

While rejecting any English claims their land or their loyalty, it clearly established their independent status under French sovereignty.

The French insisted that the Iroquois, against whom they had fought throughout the seventeenth century and with whom a final peace treaty had been concluded at Montreal in 1701, were an independent

Confederacy under British sovereignty after the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). The Six Nations, whose friendship and alliance the Anglo-Americans renewed periodically in the Great Covenant Chain, insisted they were equal associates and allies, not subjects and subordinates. They stood to the British in approximately the same relationship as the Three Fires Confederacy of the Great Lakes region, the Abenakis and the Micmacs stood to the French. In 1724 the French had been careful to obtain Iroquois consent to build Fort Niagara on territory which the Iroquois claimed as their own by right of conquest. Again, in 1748, the abbé Picquet, who wanted to start a reserve at La Présentation (Ogdensburg), was instructed to obtain "the consent necessary from the Iroquois nations."[48] In the autumn of that same year, Governor La Galissonière and Intendant François Bigot met with eighty Iroquois delegates in the audience hall of the Château St. Louis in Quebec. As a result of this conference, officials at Versailles could reaffirm their belief that "these Indians claim to be and in effect are independent of all nations, and their lands incontestably belong to them." La Galissonière was congratulated for having "induced them to maintain their rights." The boundary commission reported that they were "free and independent" of both Crowns, that the Treaty of Utrecht "is faulty and cannot change the nature of things." "These nations govern themselves alone," yet it was encouraging to observe that they were becoming "more friends and allies of the French".[49] In fact a number of Iroquois did choose to leave their territory to take up residence in the French colony at this time.

Another incident illustrates the nature of this independence. Governor Vaudreuil made the mistake of recognizing as "chief of the Cabin" at La Présentation a certain Onondaga who had not been chosen in the traditional way. The abbé Picquet went with a delegation of sixty Iroquois, including some women and two men who had been to France and had been outfitted in court regalia by the Dauphin, to protest an action "which seemed to them to be contrary to the

rights of a free and warlike people, which recognizes as chiefs only those they give themselves and for the term they wish." They protested that Vaudreuil's candidate was not yet "one who prays" (that is, a convert) and not among those who had sworn allegiance before Governor Duquesne, his predecessor. Vaudreuil explained away the "misunderstanding", reaffirmed the council's authority, and made suitable presents of pikes and stiff collars to the seven war chiefs.[50]

After the fall of New France, Pontiac's uprising can be seen as an attempt at concerted action by the Three Fires Confederacy and other interior nations to assert and defend their independence and special status against British claims and possible European settlement. French agents in the region asserted it was not so much a question of trade that set off the "conspiracy" but a concern about Native rights and possession. One account said:

> Pontiac, great chief of the Ottawas...thought to himself that being the grand chief of all the nations of the North that only he and those of his nation ought to inhabit this part of the earth, where for sixty and some years the French made their homes too for the facilitating of Trade with them...[51]

The rising was also an expression of the Native peoples' preference for the relationship they had enjoyed with the French. The British, to establish their sovereignty and conciliate the Native peoples, after the Conquest would have to consider adopting the French policy.

Secondly, there was the question of Native possessory rights and territorial rights. Even if the French recognized and legitimized existing Native customs and practices in this domain, there remains much obscurity because so little is known about the diverse and flexible patterns and concepts of Amerindian property rights, hunting territories and territorial delimitation. Although various clans,

bands, tribes and confederacies differentiated themselves from one another in their occupancy of land, all seem to have recognized some territorial limits. The various groups seem to have had a concept of boundaries to their territory, whether a hunting territory or traditional homeland. From the days of Jacques Cartier's crossing the "boundary" between the Stadaconans and Hochelagans, and the exacting of tribute by Algonkian bands on the Ottawa River of Huron and French canoe brigades, through to the end of the French régime, care was taken about crossing various tribal boundaries.

All Native peoples allocated resources within their territory among themselves, whether in terms of horticultural plots or hunting ranges. Since there are no modern survivals of the aboriginal systems of tenure, or of the social and ecological conditions which formed their historical context, we are obliged to rely on Native oral tradition and scholarly reconstructions.[52] For the Algonkian hunters it may even be that the game animals were reckoned to be the true "owners" of the hunting grounds.[53] Land was no more "owned" by human beings than the air or the sea. Whether exclusive hunting territories were aboriginal in origin or traced their beginnings to European intrusion and the advent of the fur trade with its demands -- a matter of continuing debate among anthropologists -- the fact remains that a spiritual relationship to an area as well as practical (sometimes even economic) concerns regulated behaviour. Scholars seem agreed that ownership was not conceived in terms of modern land tenure, therefore the courts have sometimes refused to recognize any Native proprietary rights.[54]

The French administration has generally been characterized as avoiding any definition of Native property and territorial rights and avoiding the Dutch and British ambiguity of purchase.[55] Slattery argues, on the contrary, that recognition of Native possessory and territorial rights was the keystone of French sovereignty:

> France was primarily concerned with extending its dominions in America by incorporating Indian nations under French rule, rather than acquiring lands for settlement. This extension of French authority could best be accomplished by cementing links with independent groups through treaties of friendship and alliance, to be followed hopefully by their acquiesence in the Crown's rule. Wherever necessary force might be resorted to. But in general dispossession of the Indian was not the goal. To the contrary, the aim was to attach the Indian nations to the French Crown as subjects and vassals, and thereby obtain dominion over their territories. The Crown's rights to the soil were to be held, not to the exclusion of the indigenous peoples, but through them. This approach was consonant with the economic gains initially sought from the establishment of French colonies in America, which centred upon the fur trade, and depended upon the Indians' retention of their hunting territories.[56]

Two important declarations, one made during the early years of royal administration and the other in the closing years, tend to substantiate such an interpretation. The royal instructions to Governor Courcelles in 1665 said that no one was to "take the lands on which they are living under pretext that it would be better and more suitable if they were French."[57] In 1755, the Ministry of War issued a directive governing relations with the allied nations. It said: "The Natives are jealous of their liberty, and one could not without committing an injustice take away from them the primitive right of property to the Lands on which Providence has given them birth and located them."[58]

In relations with specific nations some divergences did emerge. Among the Iroquoians, inheritance was traced through the female line. The women were the guardians of the fields, whether communal or merely common, as one of them affirmed in a general council: "You ought to hear and listen to what we women shall speak...for we are the owners of the land and it is ours."[59] Father Lafitau had noted that "a woman alone gives continuity to the

household" so that if the women of a clan disappeared, no matter how many men survived, it was defunct and its lands were handed over to a sister clan. Land being a gift of the Great Spirit, a common affirmation across New France, there was no real concept of land sales and the granting of hospitality, that is the right to settle among a tribe, did not convey "title" in a European sense.

Nevertheless, the Iroquois themselves claimed entitlement to new areas south of the Great Lakes by right of conquest, in spite of Intendant Raudot's observation that the Natives "never wish to take the lands nor the woods of their enemies."[60] The French proclaimed loudly that they had never offered to purchase, or pretended to usurp, Iroquois territory as had the English. The Six Nations chiefs gathered at Quebec in 1748 traced the history of European encroachments as a result of the traditional hospitality they had offered. A transcript of Chief Cachouitimi's remarks said:

> At one time there were no whites in the whole continent. But about a hundred years ago some French as well as English had established themselves. That they had engaged in trade with one and the other to obtain guns, blankets and other commodities which hitherto were unknown to them, and that they had ever regarded with pleasure the settlement of Traders in their neighbourhood but that they had never ceded their lands to anyone, for they held them from Heaven alone. He terminated by saying that what he had said was in the name of all the nations there present in the persons of their Deputies including the Tuscaroras.[61]

The Micmacs were quite disturbed to learn from the English, after the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, that their lands had been ceded to the British Crown. They directed their protests to the Governor at Louisbourg, demanding to know by what right the French could dispose of Micmac territory:

> But learn from us that we are on this ground which you trod under foot and upon which you walk as the trees which you see have started to come forth from it. It is ours and nothing will ever be able to take it away from us or make us abandon it.[62]

Governor St. Ovide replied that he knew well that "the lands on which I tread, you possess them from all time", and then added that "the King of France your Father never had the intention of taking them from you" but had ceded only his own rights to the British crown. This was a fine distinction between French sovereignty and Amerindian possession. At best, the French claim was what the Intendant Claude Thomas Dupuy termed joint ownership or "sharing everything with the natives by common consent." One metropolitan writer later called the Micmacs "the legitimate possessors" of Acadia (Nova Scotia) and remarked that "these Savages defended with single-mindedness a territory which they hold from Nature...".[63]

The case of the Abenakis makes even more clear the French dependence upon the so-called allied nations. It also clarifies the difference between French and British concepts of aboriginal title. The Abenakis learned the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht from the British, who said that the French "after having used them to wage war", made a separate peace without consulting them whereby they ceded their lands to the Queen. The Abenakis refused to believe this until some English showed them the precise treaty terms. What followed is recorded in a French memorandum of the period:

> Then the Abenakis became angry and demanded to know by what right the King of France disposed of their country. Their anger would have gone farther had they not been quietened by the Missionaries who told them they were being deceived by equivocal statements and that their lands were not included in what had been ceded to the English.[64]

Three years later, some English settlers attempted to assert their property rights to Abenakis lands along the Atlantic coast and the St. John River region on the pretext that the French had ceded Acadia. The Abenakis were quick to react:

> But the natives answered them that this land had always belonged to them, that they were not subjects of the French but only their allies and their friends, that the French could not have ceded to the English lands that belonged to the savages, and that they would not quit them. They were right to say that the French are only their allies, the Marquis de Vaudreuil always having addressed them in that manner so as not to be held responsible for their deeds.[65]

In 1722, the missionary Rasle reported that two English traders had set up truck houses for the Abenakis, after having purchased the right to do so, but when settlers joined them the Abenakis asked by what right they settled on Native lands:

> The answer which they received, that the King of France had ceded their country to the King of England, threw them into the greatest alarm; for there is no Indian nation but suffers most impatiently what they regard as subjection to any other power, whatever it may be; they term them indeed their allies, but nothing more.[66]

They made grants without any thought of alienation of lands, but with the idea simply of extending the rights and privileges to others that they themselves enjoyed on ancestral lands given them by the Great Spirit. The French understood this concept and did not offer payment for lands appropriated. Both parties seem to have taken for granted that the land belonged to the Abenakis who acknowledged the French King and received his missionaries and so automatically came under French sovereignty. The English, on the other hand, appear to have maintained the paramount claim in the Crown and, while admitting the aboriginal rights of the Abenakis, to have sought to obtain releases through purchase or treaties.

In the Illinois country a very different arrangement seems to have developed although finally attempts were made to enforce the uniform policy of the colony. At Detroit in 1702 the Hurons were granted lands in the King's name. LaMothe Cadillac seems to have wanted to set up a seigneurial type of land-holding for these Native people who had been induced to relocate from the Michilimackinac area. He informed the Governor at Quebec:

> I have myself set up the landmarks, and marked out the place where I wished them to build their fort and their village. By this means I have set all the tribes on the track of asking me for lands, and for permission to settle there. Having shown the others the way, this tribe has cleared up to the present time about 200 arpents of land...[67]

This policy of relocating the interior tribes and setting up seigneuries was repudiated by Quebec and Versailles.

But there were in fact a number of land purchases in the Illinois country, exceptions that may serve to prove the general rule. In 1731 missionaries of the Seminary of Foreign Missions at Tamaroas near Fort de Chartres purchased a strip of land, adjacent to their domain conceded by the Company of the Indies in 1721. Again in 1741, the royal notary drew up a deed of sale for a property in the same area described as having been acquired originally "from one Chickagou Chief of the Indians" and warning that it was not possible "to warrant such land against the troubles and incumbrances which the Indians may bring on." Two years later, another property was sold "as coming from Chicagou, who did not prevent its cultivation until this day." In 1746, Chicagou sold a plot "belonging to him for his part and portion, which he took for himself in his capacity of Chief of his nation." It would appear that Chief Chicagou was disposing of lands which had originally been designated by the French commandant for the use of his band near the French fort.[68] At first the Native peoples had welcomed French settlers, but as their numbers grew and large land

concessions were made, the Native population became concerned and began to demand payment for its lands. Chicagou when in Paris asked that his people not be driven from their lands. Governor Bienville of Louisiana noticed that the discontent of the Native people had manifested itself in demands for compensation as early as 1733. On the eve of the conquest, a M. Belestre made a number of purchases but these transactions were repudiated later by the British on the grounds that French grants had to be approved by the Governor General and be registered by the Superior Council, and in addition "as for the Indian purchases they were not allowed by the French."[69]

Thirdly, there was the question of usufructuary rights, especially as these applied to hunting, fishing, fowling, trapping, food collecting and horticultural pursuits. These usufructuary rights, moreover, were intimately tied to the perceived right of access to resources and to the right of mobility (that is, nomadism) to benefit from these fruits of land. In attempting to fathom Native concepts, it has been argued that it was not land that was seen as "belonging" to a family, clan, or band but the products of a territory that belonged to them. Territoriality and livelihood coincided. The Europeans had been given the other side of the Atlantic and the Great Spirit had given America to the Amerindians. However, through hospitality Europeans could be given lands as a gift, but this does not seem to have been understood by Native people to have meant purchase which gives the right of permanent possession in return for compensation. The hunting range system of the Algonkian hunting bands did indicate a concept of belongingness in so far as there was restricted access, a notion of trespass and sometimes the exacting of tolls. But the concept seems to have been tied to availability of resources, to survival, to shifting patterns of food supplies, and to migratory imperatives.[70] Access to resources often required the mobility offered by nomadism, therefore the royal instructions of 1755 repeated views which had been expressed when the French first established forts in the hinterland. The pertinent passage said:

> The allied natives must be deemed well everywhere... and Sieur de Vaudreuil must leave to certain nations the liberty to wander and go about the lands of the colony, provided that they do not receive foreigners, for that last point is the most essential.[71]

Father Charlevois, who had no great understanding of Native tenure, did observe that Native nations "who look upon themselves as the lords and sovereigns of the soil, are not so jealous of their property as to find fault with newcomers who settle on it, provided they do not attempt to molest them."[72] Thomas Pownall explained to the Albany conference in 1754 that the French had an advantage over the British inasmuch as they had understood that the Native people never ceded territory, but they merely gave permission to settle and trade within their territories which they required for their survival.[73] It was British instrusion that raised the issue of usufructuary rights.

The idea that the Native people had retained land only for its products, whether of the hunt or agriculture, and had conceded that legal title was vested in the European intruders is based on an interpretation of Governor St. Ovide's explanation of the "misunderstanding" over the cession of 1713 and on British treaties with the Micmacs. The Governor at Louisbourg explained that "the lands which they [English] occupy not being of much utility to you and the fishing they carry on along the coasts being of a seasonal Fish these can do you no harm."[74] It was drawing attention to the produce, benefits and profits of what had been ceded, not to land per se. The Treaties which the British signed in 1725 with a number of small Micmac bands, and which were never binding on the whole nation, confirmed unrestricted hunting, fishing and fowling rights on all lands, and the general treaty of 1728 saw the Micmacs submit to British rule only "in as ample a manner as we have formerly done to the Most Christian King." The treaty of 1752 reiterated rights of "Hunting or Fishing in this Country as you have been used to do."[75]

After the conquest of Canada, the Montagnais faced the same problem as the Micmacs had done after 1713. In 1765 the Montagnais asked their missionary, Father Coquart, who had served them since 1746, to intervene with the British administration to assure that the Royal Domain would not be broken up and lands parcelled out to private owners and Native hunting and trapping rights be permitted to lapse. They said, "we have always been a free nation, and we would become slaves, which would be very difficult after having rejoiced for so long in our liberty." General Amherst ordered that matters should "continue on the same footing as previously" under the French régime.[76]

The case of the Iroquois turned also on British intrusion into the area. As already stated, the Iroquois claimed the western hunting territory around the Great Lakes by right of conquest. In July 1701, they "deeded" what they described as "all their Land where the Beaver Hunting is" to the British Sovereign, at the same time as they were negotiating at Montreal peace terms with the French and their allied nations. To the Ottawa, their chief challengers, they said that by right of conquest they had acquired exclusive hunting rights. Their "deed" was reconfirmed in 1726 but the Iroquois explained that they had never given up ultimate title to these lands. The "deed" of 1701 was merely a gesture on their part to recognize British sovereignty as opposed to French sovereignty over the region and to enlist British support against the French. This point was made again at a conference in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1744 when they said they had never been conquered by the British and they did not recall ever having been employed "by that Great King to conquer others." The French had in fact recognized Iroquois claims, and La Jonquière, when asserting French rights to occupy and fortify the Ohio valley which was part of this "conquered" Iroquois territory, said, "I agree that you should hunt there; the French have never troubled

you..." and "I repeat that the lands of the Beautiful River are to be reserved for your hunting...".[77] The Minister of Marine and Colonies described the fluidity of Native territorial concepts:

> ...the territory of these tribes is as uncertain as their alliance. These peoples have scarcely any idea of property. For them there is no territory save that which they occupy at the present moment. They often change their dwelling place and the Iroquois tribes are themselves a terrible and remarkable example. In the time of M. de Champlain, governor of Canada, they chiefly inhabited the shores of the lake to which the name of that governor has been given; since that time they have abandoned that country to seat themselves elsewhere. Nothing from day to day prevents them from going to occupy a new territory, and such transmigrations are frequent. It would therefore be impossible to fix a district and boundaries for tribes which have never known them and which do not wish to know them.[78]

The French claim to New France was based on concepts of Christian appropriation, settlement of vacant lands, and effective cultivation and "policing". The establishment of French sovereignty through symbolic acts met with little opposition, although in the early decades the French did indicate a willingness to resort to force if necessary. French claims were asserted against European rivals and not against Native peoples mainly because French settlement was geographically restricted to areas largely unoccupied by Native peoples. A dualism evolved as some Native peoples accepted the hospitality of reserves in the French seigneurial tract of the St. Lawrence valley and as some French accepted the hospitality offered in the Amerindian hinterlands. The recognition of the independence and rights of Native nations under an umbrella of French sovereignty posed no immediate problems for Quebec or Versailles. The French exercised their sovereign rights in the interior through the allied nations, so Native possessory rights and territorial rights did not conflict with French legal principles. For practical reasons of

an economic, social and military order, the preservation of the Native social order and hunting territories was advantageous. The more specific question of usufructuary rights, which would take on legal importance in the future, was limited to occasions when Native peoples under French sovereignty, or living in proximity to New France, came into sustained contact with the British.

## Chapter II Endnotes

1. It seems incorrect to assume, as does Douglas Sanders, that Europeans started out with no legal or political theories of colonization or of acquisition of new lands. Ancient and mediaeval history are replete with instances of annexation, colonization, etc. See Harry W. Daniels, ed., The Forgotten People. Metis and Non-Status Indians Land Claims (Ottawa, 1979), 5. The notion that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 is the basis of aboriginal rights in the British context ignores the fact it concerned itself more with ancestral hunting territory than with possessory rights.

2. Fred H. Kimmey, "Christianity and Indian Lands," Ethnohistory, VII (1960), 44. Olive P. Dickason suggests that the French turned the Ostiensian thesis to their advantage by agreeing to teach Christianity in exchange for possession of the New World. "The Myth of the Savage and the Beginnings of French Colonialism in the Americas," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Ottawa, 1976), 202-206.

3. Cited in Walter B. Scaife, "The Development of International Law as to Newly Discovered Territory," Papers of the American Historical Association, IV, 3 (July 1890), 70.

4. W.L. Grant, ed., The History of New France by Marc Lescarbot (Toronto, 1907), I, 17.

5. Jacques de Charron, Histoire universelle de toutes nations et spécialement des Gaulois ou François (Paris, 1621), ch. xii, 13.

6. D. Deloffre & M. Menemencioglu, eds., Robert Challe: Journal d'un Voyage aux Indes (Paris, 1979), 100-101.

7. Francisco de Vitoria, Leçons sur les Indiens et sur les Droits de Guerre (Genève, 1966), 82-84; James B. Scott, The Catholic conception of International Law (Washington, 1934), 89.

8. Cited in Scaife, "Development of International Law", 72; See Droit de Guerre et de la Paix (Paris, 1867), II, ch. 2, art. ii, 5; Christopher C. Joyne, "The Historical Status of American Indians under International Law," The Indian Historian, 11, 4 (December 1978), 30-36.

9. Olive P. Dickason, "Europeans and Amerindians: Some Comparative Aspects of Early Contact," Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers/Communications historiques, 1979 (Ottawa, 1980), 192; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man's Indian (New York, 1978), 120.

10. Samual Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (Oxford, 1934), 600-601. See also Friedrick A.F. Von der Heydte, "Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law," American Journal of International Law, 29 (1935), 448-471.

11. Von der Heydte, "Discovery, Symbolic Annexation," 448-450.

12. Emmerich de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens; ou, Principes de la Loi Naturelle (Washington, 1916), III, 38. Quotation is from the English edition, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (London, 1758), I, 35-36, 98-100.

13. Yves Benot, Diderot: De l'athéisme à l'anticolonialisme (Paris, 1970), 197.

14. Arthur S. Keller et al., Creation of the Rights of Sovereignty through Symbolic Acts, 1400-1800 (New York, 1938), 148.

15. Eugène Guénin, Ango et ses pilotes (Paris, 1901), 45-46; Brian Slattery, "French Claims in North America, 1500-59," Canadian Historical Review, LIX, 2 (June 1978), 156-157.

16. P.A.C., MG 4, C-1, Article 14, Vol. I, No. 6, "Droits de la France sur le Canada," 1755, 41-42.

17. H.P. Biggar, ed., A Collection of Documents relating to Jacques Cartier and the Sieur de Roberval (Ottawa, 1930), 42, 45, 128.

18. Brian Slattery, French Claims in North America, 1500-59 (Saskatoon, 1980), 8-13.

19. H.P. Biggar, ed., The Voyages of Jacques Cartier (Ottawa, 1924), 65-66.

20. Biggar, Documents, 178, 180.

21. M. Michelant & M. Ramé, Relation originale du Voyage de Jacques Cartier (Paris, 1867), II, 6, 8, 41-42.

22. Edits, Ordonnances royaux, Déclarations et Arrêts concernant le Canada (Québec, 1854-56), III, 8-9.

23. Marc Lescarbot, Histoire de la Nouvelle-France (Paris, 1618), II, 490; E.H. Gosselin, Documents authentiques et inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la Marine normande et du Commerce rouennais pendant les XVI$^{e}$ et XVII$^{e}$ siècles (Rouen, 1876), 18-19; Edits, III, 11, 13; I, 5.

24. R.G. Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents (New York, 1959), XV, 223.

25. P.A.C., MG 1, Series $C^{11}A$, Vol. I, "Extrait de diverses relations qui peut servir à établir le droit de la France sur le pays des Iroquois, 1646 à 1681", 427.

26. Edits, III, 27, 41, 46.

27. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LC, 104-114; J. Tailhan, ed., Mémoire sur les moeurs, coustumes et relligion des sauvages de l'Amérique septentrionale de Nicolas Perrot (Paris, 1864), 126-128; Collection de Manuscrits contenant lettres mémoires, et autres documents historiques relatifs à la Nouvelle-France (Québec, 1883-85), I, 213, 217-218; P.A.C., MG 4, C-1, Article 14, Vol. I, No. 5, "Droits de France sur le Canada," 1755, 32-33.

28. James Simsarian, "The acquisition of legal title to terra nullius," Political Science Quarterly, 53, 1, (1938), 118-119.

29. P.A.C., MG 5, B-1, Vol. 6, Extracts from a letter of Sieur de Villieu, 16 October 1700, 205-206.

30. P.A.C., MG 1, Series $C^{11}E$, Vol. II, "Mémoire sur l'établissement des Missions aux Iroquois," 12 November 1712, 27-28.

31. P.A.C., MG 1, Series $C^{11}A$, Vol. 37, Louvigny to Comte de Toulouse, 1 October 1717, 387.

32. P.A.C., MG 7, I, A-3, Nouv. acq. fr., Vol. 9275, Journal of Joseph Normandin, 1732, 149-150.

33. P.A.C., MG 7, I, A-3, Nouv. acq. fr., Vol. 9275, Relation of Louis Fornel, 1743, 368.

34. C. Hubert Smith, The Explorations of the La Vérendryes in the Northern Plains, 1738-43 (Lincoln, 1980), 49, 63, 113. In 1913 the lead tablet dated 30 March 1743 left by the Chevalier François de La Vérendrye was discovered near Fort Pierre, S.D.

35. P.A.C., MG 1, Series $C^{11}E$, Vol. 13, Relation of Father de Bonnecamp, 1749, 303, 318; ibid., Series F3, Vol. 13, Pt. 2, Campaign journal of Céloron, November 1749, 472; ibid., MG 21, Egerton MSS, Vol. 2694, 11.

36. Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., Documents relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791 (Ottawa, 1918), I, 2, 25-30; P.A.C., MG 17, A-4, Vol. 4, Articles of Capitulation, 1760, 288.

37. P.A.C., MG 17, A-4, Vol. 4, "Mémoire du Canada, 1745-60," 288; Shortt & Doughty, Documents, I, 2, 25, 27, 199. For a legal interpretation of the effects of a transfer of sovereignty cf. Privy Council in Vajesingji Jovarsingji v. The Secretary of State for India (1924), 51 Ind. App. 357, 360 (JCPC).

38. If the French claimed sovereignty in terms of international law, the Native peoples can be said to have claimed a different legal principle, that of self-determination. See J. Clinebell & J. Thompson, "Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native Americans under International Law," Buffalo Law Review, 27 (1978), 713.

39. Brian Slattery, Canadian Native Law Cases (Saskatoon, 1980), I, 77 cites a pertinent passage from the famous case Connolly v. Woolrich and Johnson et al. (1867), 17 R.J.R.Q. 75: "Neither the French Government, nor any of its colonists or their trading associations, ever attempted, during an intercourse of over two hundred years, to subvert or modify the laws and usages of the aboriginal tribes, except where they had established colonies and permanent settlements, and, then only by persuasion... It is quite true, it is contended, they had no right, no lawful authority to do so; yet, as a matter of fact, they appear to have wholly abstained from the exercise of any unjust or arbitrary power in this respect. In the prosecution of their trade and other enterprises, those adventurers evinced great energy, courage and perseverance..."

40. P.A.C., MG 1, Series $C^{11}A$, Vol. 36, "Mémoire instructif", 1716, 38-39.

41. Collection de Manuscrits, I, 125.

42. Jorge Juan y Antonio d'Ulloa, A Voyage to South America (London, 1806), II, 376-377, cited in Dickason, "Europeans and Amerindians", 193.

43. P.A.C., MG 1, Series $C^{11}A$, Vol. 35, Ramezay to Governor, 16 September 1715, 120.

44. A.S.Q., Lettres P, No. 66, Maillard to de Fau, 18 October 1749.

45. Norman Rogers, "The Abbé Le Loutre," Canadian Historical Review, XI, 2 (June 1930), 122-123; Ken Donavon, "A Letter from Louisbourg, 1756," Acadiensis, X, 1 (Autumn 1980), 125.

46. P.A.C., MG 5, B-1, Vol. VII, Bégon to Minister, 21 April 1724, 362.

47. E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (Albany, 1855), X, 5 July 1752, 253.

48. P.A.C., MG 18, G-1, La Jonquière Papers, King to La Jonquière, 30 April 1749, 12; A.C. (Paris), Series B, Vol. 87, Maurepas to La Galissonière, 23 June 1748, f. 7.

49. Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec pour 1921-22 (Québec, 1922), "Acte authentique des Six Nations Iroquoises sur leur Indépendance", 2 November 1748, 108; A.C. (Paris), Series B, Vol. 89, Rouillé to La Jonquière, 4 May 1749, f. 67; P.A.C., MG 5, B-1, Vol. 24, "Discussions sur les limites du Canada," 9 May 1755, 354.

50. André Chagny, François Picquet, "Le Canadien" (1708-1781) (Paris, 1913), 304-307.

51. P.A.C., MG 19, F-4, Robert Navarre Papers, "Journal ou relation d'une conspiration," 4 May 1763, 1-3.

52. Ralph Linton, "Land Tenure in Aboriginal America," in O. Lafarge, ed., The Changing Indian (Norman, 1943), 53-54.

53. Julius Lips, "Notes on Montagnais-Naskapi Economy," Ethnos, XII (1957), 5-6; Calvin Martin, "Subarctic Indians and Wildlife," in Carol M. Judd & Arthur J. Ray, eds., Old Trails and New Directions (Toronto, 1980), 76.

54. T.J. Brasser, "Early Indian-European Contacts," in Bruce G. Trigger, ed., Handbook of the North American Indians. Volume 15: Northeast (Washington, 1978), 84; John C. McManus, "An Economic Analysis of Indian Behaviour in the North American Fur Trade," Journal of Economic History XXXII, 1 (March 1972), 39, 43, 49; Adrian Tanner, Bringing Home Animals (St. John's, 1979), 182, 187, 190. A.H. Snow, The Question of Aborigines in the Law and Practice of Nations (Northbrook, 1972), 73 cites the United States Supreme Court decision of 1810 in the case Fletcher v. Peck on property rights: "What is the Indian title? It is a mere occupancy for the purpose of hunting. It is not like our tenure; they have no idea of a title to the soil itself. It is overrun by them, rather than inhabited. It is not a true and legal possession."

55. E.E. Muntz, "Race Contact, A Study of the Social and Economic Consequences of Contact between Civilized and Uncivilized Races," (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1925), 81 whose views were followed by Olive Dickason, W.J. Eccles, Jack Stagg and L.F.S. Upton. In French Canadian historiography it was argued by Jean Leclerc, "L'Expédition de Denonville, 1687; antécédents et suites," (Doctorat ès Lettres, Université Laval, 1964), 52.

56. Brian Slattery, "The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, as affected by the Crown's acquisition of their Territories," (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1979), 91-92. Emphasis ours.

57. Collection de Manuscrits, I, 175.

58. P.A.C., MG 4, C-1, Article 14, Vol. I, No. 8, "Moyens pratiques pour concilier la France et l'Amérique," 1755, 72.

59. George G. Snyderman, "Concepts of Land Ownership among the Iroquois and their Neighbors," Bulletin of the Bureau of American Ethnology, 149 (1951), 20.

60. Antoine Denis Raudot, "Memoir concerning the Different Indian Nations of North America," in W. Vernon Kinietz, The Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 1615-1760 (Ann Arbor, 1965), Letter 32, 1709, 355.

61. P.A.C., MG 5, B-1, Vol. 8, Speeches of the Six Nations delegates, 1748, 297-298.

62. P.A.C., MG 18, E-29, "Discours fait aux Sauvages par M. de St. Ovide," n.d.

63. De la Roche-Tilhac, Almanach Américain, ou Etat physique, politique, ecclésiastique et militaire de l'Amérique (Paris, 1784), 420.

64. P.A.C., MG 18, H-27, Felix Martin Papers, Memorandum on Acadia and the Abenakis, 236.

65. P.A.C., MG 1, Series $C^{11}A$, Vol. 36, Vaudreuil to Duke of Orleans, February 1716, 125.

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## CHAPTER III

### Reorganizing Traditional Life: Missions, Reserves, Schools

The French contact with Native peoples in the socio-religious domain was characterized by a variety of experiences and it had wide-ranging consequences. Europeans were convinced of the superiority of their civility, which included their religious beliefs and social organization as well as their political structures, economic activities and technology. Nevertheless, the Native people, who in the words of Pope Alexander VI in 1493 "went about unclothed and not eating flesh", were fully human and capable of receiving Divine grace on two accounts: the Augustinian conclusion that held that, no matter how strange a person was, "let no true believer have any doubt that such an individual is descended from the one man who was first created"; and the humanist definition that "all the people of the world are men, and there is only one definition for each and every man, that he is rational."[1]

Although the French were certain of the general superiority of their way of life, and therefore inclined to believe that the Native people should adopt European modes, the latter did not share those views. Instead, the Native people often expressed the opinion that European modes might be suitable for the French, but traditional ways remained preferable for them. One chieftain stated this view quite categorically:

> For all your arguments, and you can bring a thousand of them if you wish, are annihilated by this single shaft which they always have at hand, Aoti Chaboya, (they say) "That is the Savage way of doing it. You can have your way and we will have ours; every one values his own wares.[2]

As pressures to convert to Catholicism increased, and as some communities were divided between traditionalists and converts to the "new religion", there was talk about the Great Spirit having ordained their way of life, manners, religion, foods, houses, customs, languages, and so on and to abandon these might earn the displeasure of the spirit world. Even Biblical stories were given a dualistic form, with Christ having been killed by Europeans, his followers being from the same group and his message meant for that group and not for Native peoples. Nicolas Perrot reported that even in the afterlife the French and the Native peoples would be segregated according to a widely held belief in the Great Lakes region:

> ...they reply to the Europeans who speak to them about it that we have a special country for our dead, and having been created by the spirits who get along together and are all friends, they had chosen in the other world a different country from theirs.[3]

Some "fitted with a certain pride which inspires them with disdain for all other peoples" even ventured, on the testimony of a few who had visited France, to assert that although there were many wonders in the metropolis their own way of life remained preferable and they should not abandon their traditional ways.[4] Chief Gachraddodow extended this dualistic concept to challenge European intrusion in America in an eloquent speech delivered at Lancaster on 30 June 1744. He said to the Anglo-Americans:

> The World at the first, was made on the other Side of the great Water, different from what it is on this Side, as may be known from the different Colours of our Skin, and of our Flesh; and that which you call Justice, may not be so amongst us: You have your Laws and your Customs, and so have we: The great King might send you over to conquer the Indians, but it looks to us, that God did not approve of it; if he had, he would not have placed the Sea where it is, as the Limits between us and you.[5]

Spiritual, social and educational matters came under the purview of the Gallican church in the French order of things. The first colonization obligations imposed on entrepreneurs who wanted to exploit the fish and fur resources of the New World provided for Catholic missionary work, although the monopolistic charters were granted to Protestants as well as Catholics. Cartier remarked in his account of the 1534 voyage that "these people would be easy to convert to our holy faith." On his second voyage, he read suitable passages from the Gospel, distributed religious artifacts and prayed for the healing of sick Hochelagans during his visit to the island of Montreal.[6] But the abortive settlement attempts of Cartier and Roberval (1541-43) do not seem to have included missionaries destined for the evangelization of the Native peoples. King Francis I had employed the argument of a Christianizing mission to justify French intrusion in the Americas, as has been stated, but no effective measures were undertaken at this time.

Missionary work began in earnest with the arrival of a couple of Jesuits in Acadia in 1611, four Recollets in Canada in 1615, and another four Recollets in Acadia in 1619. The Recollets, a branch of the Franciscans who were favoured by Samuel de Champlain, held an important assembly at Quebec in 1620 at which a four-point programme was drafted. It called for French-type village settlements, the relocation of nomadic Algonkian bands in agricultural communities, the construction of a "seminary" for the education of Native children, and the exclusion of all Protestants from the colony because they were attracting some attention among the Native peoples during their visits to the ports of the colony.[7] The Recollets were soon replaced, however, in Canada. They had asked the Jesuits to come to their assistance in the Huron mission in 1625, an invitation the influential Jesuits did not hesitate to accept. Indeed, following the restoration of Quebec to France, following its capture by Anglo-Huguenots in 1629 and the disruption of missionary work, only the Jesuits were given permission to return to take up their evangelical labours. The

Recollets did not return until 1670 and then they did not become much involved in missionary work. In 1632, Cardinal Richelieu decided to assign the Acadian field to another branch of the Franciscans, the Capuchins, a move that appears to have had the approval of Rome which was attempting to bring all the foreign missions under the direct control of the Sacred Congregation for the Propogation of the Faith created in 1622.[8] Six Capuchins launched this Acadian work, but by 1644 the two remaining Recollets left and in 1655 the Capuchins retired also because of the armed conflict between the Aulnay and La Tour factions and several English descents upon the colony.

Secular clergy then entered the mission field with the support of Mgr. de Laval, who was appointed Vicar Apostolic of New France in 1659 pending the resolution of a jurisdictional quarrel between the Gallicans and Rome and the creation of a bishopric of Quebec in 1674. The Gentlemen of St. Sulpice from a community of the same name in Paris, popularly known as Sulpicians, opened a seminary on the island of Montreal in 1659. They soon undertook evangelistic work among the Native peoples, founded a mission for them on Mount Royal, sent missionaries to the Bay of Quinte, and undertook some exploration of the Great Lakes region. In 1663, a community of seculars attached to the Seminary of Foreign Missions in Paris was established at Quebec. The colonial bishop resided with them at first and attempted to make it the centre for the parish clergy. The seminary in Paris, as well as that of the Spiritans, would later send out missionaries to the Micmacs of Acadia, and the Quebec seminary opened a mission in the upper Mississippi in the eighteenth century. Recollets would be sent to Louisbourg on Isle Royale after the loss of mainland Acadia to the British in 1713. The ideal in the eighteenth century, as military posts that also served as trading centres were erected in the interior of Canada, was to have missionaries present wherever the two cultures met. Le Maire's memorandum of 1717 on missions said:

> ...in each post two missionaries should be maintained, one for the French, the other for the Savages inviolably attached to us. The best means is undoubtedly to give them a knowledge of Christianity. Nothing so quickly civilizes the nations, no matter how savage they are, as Religion does. This was the policy of the Romans, it is that of the Spaniards, and is a very satisfying one. Any Religion, but the true Religion above all others, creates certain bonds which are not easily broken. New missionaries, then, should be sent to this country.[9]

By that time, however, Canada was competing for missionaries with the more responsive and more attractive mission fields of the Orient.

Missionary activity, at the outset, was expected to reap immediate and substantial gains. This optimism was based on at least three premises. First of all, it was commonly said that the Native peoples possessed no religion, that they were not devotees of any spiritual system. First French contacts in all areas of the Americas had indicated that the Native peoples had no perceptible priesthood, no temples, no formalized religious worship, and no sacred shrines. André Thévet, who had seen the captives Cartier brought back to France, said that America was inhabited by "marvellously strange and savage people, without faith, without laws, without religion, without any civilities." Claude d'Abbeville said that they had "neither faith nor any shadow of religion" and Antoine Biet concurred that "they have no religion." Even Champlain accused his Iroquois foes of living like "brute beasts having neither faith nor law, living without God and religion."[10]

Secondly, it was supposed that since there was an absence of organized and institutionalized religion as known to Europeans, the Native peoples were not opposed to Catholicism. They were neither infidels, nor heretics, nor apostates, nor schismatics. They seemed to be in state of primitive ignorance of spiritual truths, predisposed to goodness, and open-minded and receptive. Indeed, the widespread

practices of hospitality would appear to have reinforced the interpretation that Native minds were tabulas rasas on which the Catholic religion could easily be inscribed. Cartier had been among the first to be convinced of amenability to conversion. It was a sentiment which continued to mark first French contacts with new bands and nations. As Calvin Martin has noted, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between genuine conversion and a tolerant assent to strange views:

> ...such generosity even extended to the abstract realm of ideas, theories, stories, news and teachings; the native host prided himself on his ability to entertain and give assent to a variety of views, even if they were contrary to his better judgment. In this institutionalized hospitality lies the key to understanding the frustration of the priest, whose sweet converts one day were the relapsed heathens of the next. Conversion was often more a superficial courtesy rather than an eternal commitment, something the Jesuits could not fathom.[11]

The emphasis on social concord and hospitality, along with the avoidance of openly contradicting or interrupting any presentation of a viewpoint, however illogical or impropable it might have been, may have mislead the missionaries into believing there was a genuine interest in their message when such was not the case. One missionary reported as follows:

> Dissimulation, which is natural to those Savages, and a certain spirit of acquiescence, in which the children in that country are brought up, make them assent to all that is told them; and prevents them from ever showing any opposition to the sentiments of others, even though they may know that what is said to them is not true.[12]

Aggressive disseminators of the Gospel message found it easier to deal with submission or rejection.

Thirdly, there was a certain mystical disposition to believe Amerindians would want to convert when the Gospel was preached to them. Since the thirteenth century a counter-culture of millenarian belief had manifested itself in devout Catholic circles and it had resurfaced in early seventeenth century French dévotisme which made conversion of newly discovered peoples one of its goals. The religious zealots who were instrumental in organizing early colonization and establishing religious institutions in New France, ranging from the founding of women's communities (1639) to the Utopian experiment of Ville-Marie (1642), tended to see the discovery, settlement and evangelization of the New World as marking the last stage in the world's spiritual history, the conversion of the Lost Tribes of Israel, the restoration of the Apostolic Church, and the second advent of Christ. Father Paul Le Jeune wrote in 1635:

> ...but it is also true that it seems as if God shed the dew of his grace more abundantly upon this New France than upon the old, and that the internal consolations and the Divine infusions are much stronger here, and hearts more on fire. The Lord knoweth who are His.[13]

This was the typical vocabulary of the mystics. The concept of the chosen people of this restored Church as envisaged by the Jesuits or Marie de l'Incarnation, the superior of the Ursuline nuns at Quebec, included the Native peoples of New France. Whether one were predisposed to see them as the Lost Tribes of Israel, or merely retaining traces of ancient Judaism, it was certain they had a central role to play in the dénouement of the Divine plan of the ages, because the existence of the last remaining inhabitants of the planet had been revealed especially to the Catholic powers of Europe.

These initial Utopian views soon gave way to more cautious assessments of missionary prospects. It was recognized that the Native people did possess structured religious beliefs and practices, rites of passage, and seasonal observances, which were related to

their everyday activities. Nevertheless, the missionaries saw this animism as inadequate and inferior and were determined to uproot it and replace it. De Creux summed up their assessment:

> Next in regard to religion, though they have some religious sense and a trace of religion in their manners and customs, they have no public prayers to God and no fixed or definite worship of the Deity... They undoubtedly recognize the supernatural, but, enveloped in dense and foul mists, they become involved in foolish superstitions and entirely refuse that reverence that is due to the One who cares for them hour by hour and moment by moment.[14]

Moreover, their shamans or tricksters communicated with the supernatural and claimed to possess powers of healing and divination. Nicolas Perrot, an experienced observer of Native ways, remarked that they believed in the immortality of the soul, in a hereafter, and in the efficacy of prayers and intercessions. He added:

> They most often invoke the Great Hare, because they revere and adore him as a creator of the world; they reverence the sun as the author of light; but if they place the devils among their divinities, and invoke them, it is because they are afraid of them, and in the invocations which they make to the devils they entreat them for life. Those among the savages whom the French call 'jugglers' talk with the demon, whom they consult for success in war and hunting.[15]

Only gradually did some of the French come to recognize the extent of Native spirituality, that it was not limited to religious beliefs and practices but that it impregnated all aspects of existence, all activities and all aspirations. Everything in nature was imbued with spiritual potency or manitou. The early Recollet missionary to the Hurons, Brother Gabriel Sagard, had begun to suspect that Native people tried to live in harmony with all the spiritual forces in the universe in order to assure their own peaceful survival. He wrote:

> They believe also that there are certain spirits which bear rule over one place, and others over another, some over rivers, others over journeying, trading, warfare, feast and diseases, and many other matters. Sometimes they offer them tobacco and make some kind of prayer and ritual observance to obtain from them what they desire.[16]

Catholicism faced some potentially strong opposition if traditional beliefs assigned spiritual power to a French axe or kettle, and especially to brandy.

By the eighteenth century the French were discussing Amerindian religion in a different context. The Baron de Lahontan's Dialogues Curieux entre l'auteur et un Sauvage de bon sens (1703) had portrayed Iroquoian beliefs as rational and logical refutations of many Catholic positions. The Jesuits by this time were speculating that primitive religions were degenerated forms of the "ideas which our first fathers received in clear and distinct form." God, in the beginning, had "imprinted the idea of his existence indelibly on the most ferocious hearts and basest minds", but the Native people of America in their migrations from their Asian homeland and the source of their religion had fallen into superstition.[17] This seemed to be confirmed by the fact that they themselves believed in their fallen or degenerate state. Their paradisiacal state was also in the past when men were immortal, able to communicate freely with the manitous, and were friends of the animals whose languages they understood. Shamanism almost represented a parallel to Christianity in terms of attempting to meet the spiritual needs of corrupted humanity. Pierre Bayle, however, debunked Jesuit figurism and rated the paganism of Antiquity as being little better than the fetishism and "cults" of the contemporary "savage world". Similarly, Fontenelle argued that primitive peoples had created gods in their own image to explain frightening natural phenomena, and that as cultures developed so the concept of the divinity evolved. The Iroquois, accordingly, were already a step above original man in their conceptualization.

Moreover, Fontenelle opposed all diffusionist ideas and argued in favour of an autonomous development of American cultures.[18] So it was that in the eighteenth century speculations about the religious beliefs of the Native people of New France had burst the bounds of orthodoxy and ranged freely into the deistic domain.

Obstacles to conversion sometimes developed into open hostility, overt resistance, and counter-action. The rejection of the missionary and his message was often interpreted as Satanic intervention, with the shaman being singled out as his agent responsible for spreading anti-Christian rumours. The Recollet missionary, Father Hennepin, recorded:

> The savages were astonish'd at the strange Stories these Rascals made upon me on the occasion of baptizing the Child; nay, these imposters added, that we had Tails like Beasts, that the European Women had but one Pap in the middle of the Breast, and bear five or six children at a time, and a great deal more of such stuff to make us odious; and this they did because they thought that what I did would lessen their Credit, and thereby they should be depriv'd of many a good Treat.[19]

Epidemics, droughts, floods, failures of the hunt or fishing, and sudden storms were blamed on the missionaries who on occasion, it should be recalled, had appealed to natural phenomena to reinforce their evangelical appeals. The retardation of baptism until the point of death in many cases, in order to avoid possible relapse into paganism and profanation of the sacrament, had not infrequently resulted in the accusation that baptism was the cause of death. So it appeared to critical eyes. In the councils of the Huron Confederacy in the 1640s there was talk of either killing or expelling the Jesuit missionaries on account of the witchcraft and sorcery they seemed to practise. One influential old woman harangued the elders almost prophetically on the action to be taken to save the Confederacy from annihilation:

> It is the black Robes who make us die by their spells; listen to me, I prove it by the reasons you are going to recognize as true. They lodged in a certain village where everyone was well, as soon as they established themselves there, everyone died except for three or four persons. They changed location and the same thing happened. They went to visit the cabins of the other villages, and only those where they did not enter were exempted from mortality and sickness. Do you not see that when they move their lips, what they call prayers, those are so many spells that come forth from their mouths? It is the same when they read in their books. Besides in their cabins they have large pieces of wood (they are guns) with which they make noise and spread their magic everywhere. If they are not promptly put to death, they will complete their ruin of the country, so that there will remain neither small nor great.[20]

The Christian faction "carried even the majority of the infidels with them; so that it was publicly decided that reparations should be made to us in the name of the whole country."[21] Nevertheless, the old woman's fears for the survival of the Confederacy were eventually vindicated. It is not entirely surprising, therefore, that when a similar Christian faction disrupted the harmony and consensus of the Five Nations Confederacy at their Onondaga councils in the 1670s the Jesuits were driven out one by one from among them, beginning with the Cayugas who had been the least responsive to their evangelization.

What were the objectives of the French civil authorities in not only permitting missionary work but also encouraging it through official protection, subsidies, land grants, exemptions and preferential treatment of native converts? The first objective was civilize and "humanize" Native people, or "reduce them to civility". Eméric de Crucé explained:

> It is necessary to abandon those barbarous customs and show the people the road to humanity and true happiness, so they no longer live in a brutish manner. Reason and justice must be made to reign, and not violence which benefits only animals.[22]

The civilizing mission, to be sure, over-rated European civility and under-valued Amerindian culture. To some degree America needed to be re-fashioned in the image of Europe. The clergy was the class made largely responsible for effectuating this social transformation.

They interpreted their mandate as being first and foremost one of evangelizing, or raising the Native people to the level of Christians. Were christianization and civilization incompatible objectives, or were they inextricably interrelated objectives? French missionaries intent on winning subjects for the King and souls for the church could not conceive these as being incompatible objectives. The Anglo-Americans accused them of having deliberately confused the kingdom of France with the Kingdom of God. Since the days of Clovis (A.D. 496) there had been a consciousness of being a "covenant people", and Jacques Bongars' thesis, enunciated in the early seventeenth century, that the deeds of God were accomplished through the actions of the French had gained wide currency. The naturalist Buffon conceded that the missionaries had played the stellar role in that enterprise:

> The Missions formed more men among these barbarous nations than the victorious armies which brought them into subjection... Nothing brings greater honour to religion than having civilized these nations and having laid down the foundations of an empire without any other arms than those of virtue.[23]

Be that as it may, the missionaries might not have viewed the civilizing mandate and the evangelizing mandate as inseparable or inextricably united. The possibility of implanting the nucleus of Christianity into an Iroquoian culture complex occurred to at least the Jesuits, who represented the intellectual elite of the missions. They returned in spirit to the missionary principle enunciated in A.D. 601 to Augustine and Melletus in converting the British -- to accommodate as much as possible to existing customs and seek to link

indigenous beliefs to Christian principles and morality. Not only could Huron culture be infused with Catholicism, for example, but a degree of flexibility could be tolerated because, as Father Paul Le Jeune observed, "the world is full of variety and inconsistency and one will never find permanence". There was some awareness that the Native people did not view the universe in the same way as Europeans, that their vision of natural laws was different, hence cultural adjustments were called for on the part of missionaries who wished above all to "win souls to Jesus Christ". When the missionaries made the adjustments we speak of cultural relativism; when the Native believers made the adjustments we speak of syncretism. Father Vimont enunciated the thesis of cultural relativism in the Canadian context. It was a thesis which would involve his institute in considerable controversy and censure in the Oriental missions over the "Chinese rites" issue. Vimont wrote in 1642:

> A great step is gained when one has learned to know those with whom one has to deal; has penetrated their thoughts; has adapted himself to their language, their customs, and their manner of living; and, when necessary, has been a Barbarian with them, in order to win them over to Jesus Christ.[24]

Almost a century later, Father Sebastien Rasle told his brother that when he betrayed to the Abenakis an abhorrence of their food they reminded him that they had had to make accommodations to please him. He added:

> There was then no room for hesitation, for it was necessary to conform to their manners and customs, to the end that I might gain their confidence and win them to Jesus Christ.[25]

The dominant mission theory, nevertheless, sanctioned by the majority of religious institutes and the Propaganda Fide, and supported by the French civil power, favoured a complete

transformation of Native societies. In order to implant an institutional church, with resident clergy, parish organization, local support through tithing, schooling, and so on, it was thought necessary to render nomadic hunting peoples sedentary and agricultural, and to impose a European social order with its concepts of work and property. Hence, a programme of francisation went hand in hand with religious conversion. The Belgian Recollet Hennepin defended this approach.

> Our ancient Missionary Recollets of Canada and those that succeeded them in that work, have always given it for their opinion, as I now own 'tis mine, that the way to succeed in converting the Barbarians is to endeavor to make them men before we go about to make them Christians.[26]

In other words, the missionary might ask the convert to confess as his sin his entire traditional heritage. When one stubborn resistor affirmed "I do not recognize any sins", a zealous convert retorted that "thy life is but one continual succession of sins" therefore he could not dinstinguish a single one.[27] The State was possibly more interested in the francisation process but assumed that adherence to the King's religion made for better subjects.

Francisation was envisaged as being accomplished through three approaches: métissage, education, and sedentarization. Racial intermarraige was upheld by Champlain, the Recollet missionaries to the Hurons, the first Jesuit missionaries to the interior tribes, and the pious founders of Ville-Marie as a means of making "one people" and promoting unions which were "stable and perpetual". But these regular marriages were not the first recorded cases of métissage. The literature indicates that Inuit fear of and hostility to Europeans may have originated with Basque and other fishing parties violating their women, that the Micmacs and Malcites had been inopportuned by European sailors and fishermen, and that from the outset fur traders and soldiers had taken advantage of a certain sexual permissiveness in

Native societies and the absence of French authoritarian restraints to engage in illicit relations with Amerindian women and girls.[28] Presumably, the children born of such unions were accepted and raised in their mothers' clans just as any other children because the idea of illegitimacy was a peculiarly European concept related to concepts of hereditary rights and Christian morality. Father Charlevoix remarked that among the Huron Catholics dispersed in the upper Great Lakes region there were offspring of "concubines" but "their children were on the same footing with the others, which occasioned no sort of inconvenience in the country where there was nothing to inherit."[29]

Métissage, in other words, occurred at several different social levels. There were first of all the casual encounters, almost exclusively between Frenchmen deprived of the company of European women and the Native women, beginning with the encounters of the fishermen and sailors along the Atlantic seaboard, and spreading into the hinterland as traders and interpreters, later unlicensed coureurs-de-bois, and finally garrison troops came into contact with the interior nations. These casual sexual encounters were commented upon as constituting either prostitution or seduction and rape. Lescarbot thought that the "maidens of Brazil have the same liberty as those of Canada to prostitute themselves as soon as they are able" and that their parents might even have encouraged liaisons with Frenchmen "in order to have children of their blood." Other observers found the Native people comparatively modest and restrained in their sexual behaviour and astonished at French lasciviousness. The pre-marital sexual permissiveness which characterized most Native societies was taken advantage of by Frenchmen as was the extension of hospitality among some bands to include access to a wife or daughter.[30]

At another level, Frenchmen, whether truchemens (interpreters), voyageurs (canoe-men), or coureurs-de-bois (illicit traders), travelling to and from the hinterland in the interests of fur trade, found it convenient to adopt the practice of their Native

companions and acquired the services of a Native woman to make camp, cook and serve as a mistress. The missionaries emphasized the latter role of these travelling companions:

> They are all the prostitutes of Montreal, who are alternately brought here and taken back: and They are all the prostitutes of this place, who are carried in the same way from here to Montreal, and from Montreal here [Michilimackinac]. At present this is the usual manner in which their journeys are carried on; and the voyages are no longer performed without a continual flow and Ebb of That tide of prostitutes - whom we see ascending and descending, going and coming from one mission to another, without cessation...[31]

Some of these arrangements may have lasted over a number of seasons and led to more permanent unions between Frenchmen and Native women.

Thus, there were unions which were at least serially monogamous, long-lasting and recognized as "marriages" in Native society. Presumably, the children of such unions were raised for the most part by the woman's relatives. The missionaries came to distinguish between two types of such unions: those which were not entered into with any thought of permanence and assumption of family responsibilities, which they called concubinage; and those which were stable unions, often producing numerous offspring, but which lacked ecclesiastical sanction and blessing, which they called mariages à la façon du pays. In time, concubinage came to be a term applied largely to unions between military personnel and Native women, often slaves and domestics, whereas the fur traders, labourers and the few habitant farmers in the hinterland were said to have contracted country marriages which had not been blessed "before the church". The children of concubinage were not necessarily left without education or provision by their French fathers, and it was not impossible for a relationship of this type to be recognized legally in time.

The other level of métissage occurred in the framework of sacramental marriage "before the church". Again, there were essentially two kinds of such unions. There were those which were preceded by the usual religious instruction and preparation, the publication of banns, and finally the solemnizing of the exchange of vows and the giving of the nuptial blessing. Amerindian girls were educated specifically with such marriages in mind by the Ursulines and Hospitallers in the seventeenth century. A few Native men also married French women, but such unions were rare according to the parish registers. The second kind of marriage "before the church" occurred when a priest, usually an itinerant missionary, blessed a country marriage and sometimes even proceeded to baptize the offspring of such unions. As Charlevoix said, the challenge was to put as good a face on events as possible:

> The first proposal made to me was to marry, in the face of the church, those inhabitants, who by virtue of a civil contract, executed in the presence of the commandant and principal clerk of the place, had cohabited together without any scruple, alleging, for excuse, along with those who had authorized this concubinage, the necessity there was of peopling the country, and the impossibility of procuring a priest... In short, the evil being done, the question was only how to remedy it, which I did.[32]

By Charlevoix's time, it will be noted, some post commandants had facilitated the obtention of ecclesiastical sanction by granting a civil contract, which probably did not have any validity in law at the time. Inter-racial marriage can be seen as a mark of recognized equality, whereas the casual encounters and concubinage were not incompatible with servile status.

The offspring of these various kinds of unions, whether illegitimate or legitimate in the eyes of the Catholic Church and the French state, which upheld the Catholic moral code, seem to have

passed either into Native society or French society. There was no special term to identify the "mixed blood" population in French society, nor apparently did any differentiation exist in Native societies. The term Métis appeared in 1770, in a metropolitan publication, with a categorical judgement that such "mixed blood" people were superior to the Native people.[33] The view that people of mixed ancestry were inferior developed in the French West Indies, where Negro slaves were an important element in the population, so that by 1768 Métis militia officers were deprived of their commissions. The ideas that humanity is made up of inferior and superior stocks and especially that there is a linkage between physical characteristics and moral qualities, which led to racism and racial discrimination, did not gain much ground in New France. One report (1723) asserted that the Native people were quite pleased "if some French have children with their young women because these children grow up strong, well-built and warlike." A French report from Louisbourg (1756) concurred and added that from the European viewpoint it "is a circumstance that draws the ties of alliance closer" and that "the children produced by these are generally hardy, inured to the fatigues of the chase and war, and turn out very serviceable subjects in their way." These were utilitarian assessments which did not deal with questions of morality and acculturation or francisation.[34]

Ideals and dominant attitudes do not necessarily reflect practices. Church and state in New France seem to have reacted more to the exigencies of practice than to have imposed their authority to bring about social changes in the domain of métissage. A rapid review of the evolution of official thought on the matter, as related to regional and temporal concerns, is in order. In Acadia, métissage was accepted and widely practised. However, it has long been assumed that the missionary clergy and Gallican officials, unlike their counterparts in the Anglo-American colonies, consistently encouraged racial inter-marriage in all regions of New France and at all times.

The tradition of official sanction and encouragement of métissage finds its origins in the assimilationist policies of Champlain, article xvii of the Charter of the Company of New France, the inter-racial marriages promoted by the Jesuits in the 1660s, and the permissive utterances of Louis XIV who had been influenced by the populationist Ministers Colbert and Seignelay and by the Canadian hero d'Iberville. Louis XIV's tacit approval, which was in effect at the beginning of the eighteenth century, has often been cited as representative of "policy" throughout the Ancien Régime:

> His Majesty has examined the proposal made by the Sieur d'Iberville, namely, to allow the French who will settle in this country to marry Indian girls. His Majesty sees no inconvenience in this, provided they be Christians, in which case His Majesty approves of it. His Majesty welcomes the opportunity to let him know with regard to this matter that his intention is that he should apply himself to prevent debauchery and all disorderly conduct, that he should protect the missionaries and that his principal aim should be to establish the Christian Religion.[35]

This view represents, on closer consideration, a shift from the earlier position of encouraging métissage to a position of permitting it or tolerating it.

Canon law forbade the marriage of Catholics with pagans. That was the reason that in 1648 a Jesuit missionary had asked for a papal dispensation to permit an unbaptized Native woman, or one barely instructed in the Catholic religion, to marry a Frenchman. The church's position did not change -- disparitas cultus remained an impediment. Nevertheless, the missionaries kept insisting that in the hinterland, particularly in the Illinois and Mississippi regions, traders and Amerindian women lived in "concubinage". Was it not preferable to regularize such unions, even if it meant accepting a lesser evil? Jesuits had less difficulty with such a rationalized approach, it would appear, than did many of the civil officials and

the King who were becoming increasingly opposed to métissage. The civil power sometimes adopted a more uncompromising and doctrinaire position than did the missionaries in the field who were much influenced by practical and environmental considerations, as well as intellectual approach, to defend decisions which seemed to denote a degree of cultural relativism.

LaMothe Cadillac's plan in founding Detroit in 1701 was to settle Europeans and Native people together so that they would intermarry and "form one people", to echo Champlain's phrase. He assumed that in this way the Native people would be francised and the French would become permanently entrenched in the pays d'en haut. To Maurepas, the Minister of the Marine, he wrote:

> It is certain that there are no native women who by I know not what inclination do not prefer to marry a mediocre Frenchman rather than the greatest of her own nation, and all the natives feel honoured by these kinds of marriages, so much so that the children who will result therefrom will speak only French and will have an aversion for the native language, as experience shows in Canada.[36]

Of course, earlier Canadian experience, if anything, had demonstrated the very opposite results. The Native people did not learn French or take on European ways, while the Métis offspring were normally raised by the Native mother in her culture.

The Jesuits opposed Cadillac's plan for an intertribal settlement and obtained the support of Governor Vaudreuil, who appealed to the Court for support in discouraging métissage as well as other aspects of Cadillac's plan.

> I am persuaded that one must never mix bad blood with good. The experience we have had in this country, that all the French who have married native women have been licentious, lazy and insufferably independent, and that the children

> they have had have been as lazy as the natives themselves, must prevent any allowing of any such kinds of marriages.[37]

Yet, within a few years the Jesuits and other missionaries in the lower Mississippi and in the Illinois regions had adopted exactly the opposite point of view to Vaudreuil. They deplored the concubinage and immorality they found at the various outposts and decided it was better to sanction inter-racial marriage as a means of bringing social order to the hinterland.

The Crown, however, had not departed from the position taken at the beginning of the eighteenth century. On 8 October 1735, an edict was promulgated from New Orleans forbidding all marriages between French and Native people without the prior consent of either the Governor, commissaire ordonnateur, or commandant of the post of the Illinois. Father René Tartarin, stationed at Kaskaskia, protested and wondered "could not the missionaries submit a few considerations on this subject without lacking in the respect they owe" to the civil power. They had performed mixed-marriages to avoid "scandal intolerable to all", to prevent the return of Métis children "to the wilderness", and to give a good example of Catholic morality to the Native people who "can only judge poorly of Religion when they see the French live in such disorder".[38] The orders of 1735 were never revoked but the missionaries remained convinced of the justness of their position.

In 1749, the Marquis de la Galisonnière, commandant-general of New France, explained to the Bishop of Quebec that he thought the prohibitions issued in Louisiana should be applied in Canada. He told Bishop Pontbriand:

> You will see from the letter enclosed from Father Du Jaunay [St. Ignace] that he did not receive yours of last autumn on the question of marriages of Frenchmen to native women. I am more persuaded

> than I was then that they are pernicious for the state and at least useless so far as concerns Religion. It would be easy to obtain a prohibition from the Court similar to the one it issued for the Government of Louisiana, but I would rather follow the natural course of events and that it were you who ordered the Missionaries to perform the least number possible of such marriages and especially never to perform any without the very express consent of the commandants of the places...[39]

The Marquis de Vaudreuil's instructions to M. de Macarty, who was being sent to the Illinois country in 1751, were explicit on the matter and reflected the viewpoint expressed by La Galissonière:

> An essential point of public order which directly concerns solely M. de Macarty is to prevent the marriages which the French have hitherto contracted with the native women. This union is shameful and of dangerous consequences because of the familiarity which it encourages between the natives and the French, and because of the bad race which it produces.[40]

Vaudreuil, who would be named Governor-General at Quebec four years later, was certain that miscegenation produced a "bad race", an inferior and degenerated offspring. This theory was in line, of course, with the thesis of colonial degeneracy which was beginning to enjoy a certain popularity in France and which played into the hands of the anti-colonialist lobby.

Some confusion about the official views regarding métissage may be attributed to insufficient care in distinguishing between opinions expressed regarding military and economic matters on one hand and cultural and social matters on the other. The French enjoyed certain advantages both in fur trade competition and in continental warfare through the close relationship cultivated with the Native people. But miscegenation was deemed detrimental to French social development, to the civilizing mission and the perpetuation of the French racial stock in the New World. In summary, the promotion of

inter-marriage as a means of achieving the assimilation of the Native people, or at least attaining some degree of francisation, proved disappointing.

Would education prove more successful in bringing about marked changes in Native society? The church sought to achieve its objectives through a number of different methods. First, there was the attempt to educate the children in the mission fields as a means of reaching out to the older generation and also rearing up a new generation of converts who would eventually rise to positions of prominence and influence in the band or tribe. The emphasis was on converting families and in creating a Catholic community. Secondly, there was an attempt to educate an elite, which would serve as examples and instructors, by sending select candidates to France. Thirdly, there was the attempt to educate the youth in the controlled atmosphere of the reserves under the guidance of missionaries and converted Native dogiques or catechists. Finally, there was some attempt made to francise boys and girls, more especially the latter, in the boarding school environment.[41]

Education of the children in the mission field was attempted by all the missionaries. The Recollets made valiant attempts to instruct young Hurons near the shores of Georgian Bay between 1615 and 1625, the Sulpicians undertook the instruction of Iroquois children at the Bay of Quinté, and the Capuchins operated a school for Micmacs at their mission station of La Hève in Acadia as early as 1632. The Jesuit, Father Jean Pierron, who laboured among the Iroquois, devised a game called "Point to Point" to teach the basic catechism and made great use of brightly coloured pictures as instructional aids.[42] Father Paul Le Jeune came to the conclusion that "we could not retain the little Natives, if they be not removed from their native country". He said that "when we first came into these countries, as we hoped for scarcely anything from the old trees, we employed all our forces in cultivating the young plants". It turned out that the

adults responded better than the children so "we are turning the great outlay we made for the children to the succor of their fathers and mothers."[43]

In some measure the objectives of the missionaries had to be diminished. The abbé Pierre Maillard, who enjoyed considerable influence among the Micmacs, contented himself with making of his flock hommes priants or converts in a state of very simplified Catholic instruction, while he himself became more like one of them or "a poor Mikmak". Among the Illinois, on the other hand, the missionaries were pleased to report their converts had even taken up some farming, were cultivating "French wheat" and raising cattle, pigs, horses and chickens, as well as operating three grist mills. The Saguenay missions had been without a regular missionary for some time when in 1720 Father Laure tried to re-establish a permanent presence. He reported that "the young people had never heard [our Religion] spoken about" and that only the "most aged mumble a few confused lines of the Lord's Prayer and the Hail Mary of their ancestors". Polygamy, drunkenness and licence had become their chief qualities, he said. One could only hope to restore them to a very elementary level of Catholicism.[44]

When Charlevoix investigated conditions in the interior country in the 1730s he concluded that what made the Native people "so fond of their own way of living" was not attributable to the fact they were not "acquainted with the charms of ours". When Father Nau wanted to establish a mission among the Iroquois in 1735 he found it essential to conform to some of their customs: he accepted adoption into the clan of the Bear saying "it is a necessary formality, for a missionary would not be an acceptable person in the village were he not a member of the tribe." His co-religionist Aulneau, at the same time, was quite discouraged as he saw the mission field expanding to the prairie West but the number of missionaries declining rapidly. He wrote:

> ...seven or eight of our missions had lately been suppressed for want of evangelical laborers, and there are others where there is but one missionary, and one is not enough to work with fruit...though missionaries here do not find as much comfort and consolation as in many other countries, these are not wholly wanting, while they will find here more numerous occasions than elsewhere in suffering and of becoming more like their model, Jesus Christ crucified.[45]

The optimism of the early heroic age of missions in New France was being sorely tested.

Secondly, the Recollets and Jesuits copied the plan of the Capuchin missionaries in South America and sent a few boys to France to be educated in order to form a Native elite which would spearhead the movement for the evangelization and francisation of their compatriots. The Carmelites in France had also received some Native girls from the southern colonies, so the Ursulines and Hospital Nuns sent a few girls to France to be educated with the hope they would enter a religious order and return to the colony. In 1618, the Recollets sent two boys to their college in Calleville and in 1620 they sent a Montagnais lad named Pastedechouan, who after spending five years at his studies abroad returned to his people unable to speak his Native tongue and quite disoriented in traditional society. The Jesuits took him under their wing, employing him as a language teacher at Quebec, but it was soon evident that he was a "lost soul" unable to fit comfortably into either culture. The Jesuits said he was a "poor wretch" who had "become a barbarian like the others"; in reality, he became an alcoholic, entered into at least five unsuccessful marriages, and finally starved to death in the northern forests.[46]

The Jesuits were little more successful with their choice candidates sent to France for further studies. The adolescent son of a Huron trading captain, Louis Amantacha, whom they had baptized in

the cathedral of Rouen and after some elementary education sent back to their missions in Huron country, seems to have been quite influential in directing trade towards the French but he too was judged to have been quite "ruined" as a result of this educational experiment. Father Paul le Jeune believed it was an approach which had some promise in spite of reverses:

> As to the children of the Savages of this country, there will be some trouble in keeping them [in schools]; I see no other way than that which Your Reverence suggests of sending a child every year to France. Having been there two years, he will return with a knowledge of the language, and having already become accustomed to our ways, he will not leave us and will retain his little countrymen...[47]

Not all the Native people were happy to see their children, to whom they were very attached, sent off to France. Champlain had taken a Huron boy, named Savignon, to France with him in 1610 but this was in exchange for sending some French adolescents to the Algonkians. It is possible that parents offered a few children as "presents" to friends and allies in order to seal trading arrangements and military pacts.

A few girls were also sent to France to be educated and prepared either for marriage with a French settler in the colony or a religious vocation. In 1636, three little Montagnais girls were in the party of Native people sent to France, and the following year another two were baptized at a great public ceremony in the convent of the Carmelites in Paris. An Iroquois woman was also sent over in 1636 and lived with a Mme de Combalet, who was to supervise her education, in preparation for her return to the colony in the company of some Sisters Hospitallers "for she would teach the little Native girls, who will be with them, to plant Indian corn." When some of these nuns did come to Canada in 1639, they brought back to the colony a little native girl named Louise who had done extremely well in her religious studies at Dieppe.[48] The arrival of both Ursulines and Hospitallers

in the colony seemed to mark the end of sending promising candidates to France to be educated. A few did go, but such cases were rare and were no longer perceived as a major approach to francisation.

Diplomatic or military delegations continued to be sent, but the purpose was either to impress the Native people with the grandeur of French civilization or to keep alive French interest in the colony. A Sulpician priest had three Native people paddle a canoe up and down the Seine for Louis XV in 1720. Cadillac sent over headmen of the Ottawas and Hurons, de Montigny an Abenakis chief, and Bienville a whole delegation of Missouri and Illinois region chieftains in the early eighteenth century. Towards the end of the French régime the abbé Picquet, founder of the reserve of La Présentation, also accompanied some Iroquoians to France. This was an unauthorized visit, which upset the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Marine and Colonies, but the Sulpician missionary succeeded in obtaining several important audiences at Versailles at a time when budget cuts for the colony were being contemplated and when anti-colonialism was strong in Court circles.[49] At least one author, Pierre Poivre, was impressed with the aptitudes of a young boy named Louis Gaston sent over in 1740: "he made surprising progress in his studies, in Geometry, in Geography, in Physics, and even in Music. His curiosity was insatiable; he read day and night". To refute the claims of Cornelius de Pauw, who had alleged that after the age of twenty all Native peoples decreased rapidly in intelligence, he added that he saw him when he was about thirty years old "and assuredly he had forgotten nothing and had not become an imbecile."[50]

The Jesuit missionaries labouring in New France did not agree with the negative assessment de Pauw would make at the end of the French régime. Father Paul le Jeune said in the early stages of mission work among the Algonkian hunting bands that "two admirable truths" had been impressed upon them: the Native children were capable of discipline and "education alone is wanting in these poor

children, whose minds are as good as those of our Europeans". The problems to be overcome were of a cultural nature; there was no question of intellectual inferiority.

Itinerant missions did not appear to be a fruitful approach to francisation. As early as 1637 it was suggested that the "wandering" tribes and bands who followed a subsistence cycle of migrations should be "enclosed in a village" and be made to "settle down for a couple years".

> It all lies in getting the young people into the right habits, which cannot be easily done except by making them sedentary, or by having well-endowed Seminaries. It is that which is lacking, as I have already said; for the expenses in a new and altogether primitive country are very great.

Throughout the eighteenth century, colonial opinion remained pessimistic about the value of attempting to provide much education in the Native villages and encampments. Governor and Intendant told the Minister of Marine and Colonies in 1731 that "the idea of taking children who could be left at the different villages passed on the way is impracticable".[51]

There was perhaps one exception to the effectiveness of itinerant missions in the domain of religious instruction. The abbé Pierre Maillard, who laboured among the Micmacs who passed under British rule in 1710, was an accomplished linguist and he devised a system of hieroglyphics by which the Micmacs could learn their catechism, their prayers and their chants from copy-books in a form which not only they could read but also which they could teach to their children. When these people were left without missionaries, Catholic practice and instruction of the young did not cease because it was not dependent solely on the presence of the missionary. The Native catechists saw to the teaching of the children, they presided at public prayers each Sunday and feast day, they administered

baptism, they heard the exchange of matrimonial vows, and they read the service for the burial of the dead. This practice could only have strengthened Native identification with Catholicism for it became effectively "their religion".[52]

A third approach to francisation gained some favour. The opportunity presented itself when a small number of Montagnais and Algonkian children were gathered at Sillery, near Quebec, where Algonkian hunting bands were being relocated near a mission house and some agricultural lands and buildings specially prepared to receive them. This first réserve, created in 1637, was financed by Noël Brulart de Sillery, a wealthy nobleman and member of the Company of New France (One Hundred Associates) which administered the colony at the time. The project had as its objective the relocation of nomadic bands in proximity to French farmers from whom they would learn to farm and live in a French peasant manner under the close moral and spiritual direction of the Jesuits. The children would presumably grow up in a French, Catholic and agricultural milieu; they would acquire civility, religion and popular class mentality from the environment in which they were raised. This reserve or reduction was modelled on the closed settlements of Jesuit converts started in Brazil in 1549 and which enjoyed great success in Paraguay after 1588. Each community was administered by a couple of missionaries, agriculture and various trades were taught, and the Native converts owned as a common property the products of their industry. As Father Paul le Jeune said, those who knew "what is occurring in Paraquais" were aware of "that which shall some day be accomplished in New France". It was perhaps significant that when the first Algonkian peoples began to leave the reserve of Sillery, discouraged with a sedentary existence which did not even provide them with their daily necessities, and other people were being attracted to the plan, the Company of New France placed the reserve on a more stable legal footing in 1651 by granting the title to the seigneury to the Native people "in franc aleu without any dues to the Company of New France"

and granting them "all the other rights that a seigneur may enjoy" except that of justice. The letters-patent did stipulate that the lands granted (but not necessarily the seigneurial rights) were "all under the conduct and direction of the Jesuit Fathers who have converted them to the Christian faith".[53]

The reserve had been conceived as an institution of integration of the Amerindian population with the French. The Amerindians were to learn French ways by close contact with French neighbours and the children would learn from their French companions in school. However, the reserve very soon became an institution of segregation, as was the case in South America, with the missionaries attempting to insulate their new converts from the "evils" of French contact, especially the nefarious brandy trade. Governor Denonville articulated the failure of francisation on the reserves and concluded that segregation, although it might also promote a degree of retention of the Amerindian identity, was the soundest policy. He observed:

> It was believed for a very long time that domiciling the savages near our habitations was a very great means of teaching these people to live like us and to become instructed in our religion. I notice, Monseigneur, that the very opposite has taken place because instead of familiarizing them with our laws, I assure you that they communicate very much to us all they have that is the very worst, and take on likewise all that is bad and vicious in us...[54]

The reserve, from the educational point of view, was an attempt at total education, of acculturation of not only the children but also the adults. The school was not a mere agency of socialization; it was part of a complex of socialization.

Indeed, education was part of a programme of social control and the imposition of Christian authority. The reserves were to become "republics" under the paternal authority of the missionaries

and the Native catechists. A puritanical order was enforced by the dogiques, some of whom were women, not only on the professed converts but also on the pagans. The children came under particularly strict supervision, their education for a new French way of life (which was the objective the missionaries had in mind for them) consisting of constant supervision and correction at all times, not only in the classroom. The Relation of 1672-73 offers some evidence of this authoritarian approach to child-rearing and instruction:

> This year our hurons observed that, in The School which is kept in their village of nostre Dame de foy for the french children, those who are neglectful of Their duties are frequently punished; and they thought that, in order to bring up Their own children properly, it was necessary to chastise Them for Their faults, as is done with the french children. So The Captain has been in the habit of going around the village from time to time, Calling out aloud that the fathers and mothers are to tell Father Hechon their children's faults, so that he may have them punished...
> The example of the french Pupils... has had the good effect that the little savages, in order to imitate them, have learned to sing beautiful Hymns in Their own Language...[55]

Although the children were beginning to take on some French ways, especially in matters of dress and diet, it was quite clear that they were not being apprenticed with success in either agriculture or manual trades. They seem to have learned little, if any, French and it was the missionaries who continued to learn the Amerindian languages and to translate catechisms and missals into the Native tongues.

By the mid-1640s the Jesuits had decided already to change the emphasis of their educational programme. They would concentrate on educating the youth in "seminaries" or boarding schools in the French towns while on the reserves they would direct their efforts more towards the adults. The school for the Huron children at Sillery

was closed down "because no notable fruit was seen among the Savages; our experience in beginning the instruction of a people with the children, has made us recognize this fact." Two years later, the assessment was even more radical:

> God has confounded our thoughts and overthrown the foundations or the principles on which we were building. We watered, at the start, only the young plants, -- despising, as it were, those old stumps which appeared incapable of bearing any fruit; but God has made them put forth green shoots again, to great advantage.[56]

When Royal Government was introduced in 1663, an anonymous memorandum made it clear that the King expected the missionaries to convert the Native people and to make loyal subjects of them. Using the examples of the ancient Romans and Charlemagne, it said that "one of the great secrets of politics to hold conquered peoples in obedience is to diminish their numbers, and to segregate them by transplanting them." The argument for relocation on reserves suggested that yet another measure might be implemented -- the removal of their children to be educated in a French milieu:

> It will not be difficult after their conversion to attract them to the settlements and habitations of the French to have them exercise their Religion there more commodiously and advantageously, and to reduce them little by little by quitting their hunting and fishing to clear the land...and to consent that their children be raised in public institutions to be instructed, and to learn trades as are practiced amongst us. By these means we will be able to separate them and transplant them. We will take away by slow degrees their children who will be so many hostages and we will snuff out all probability of revolts.[57]

Thereafter, the reserves were not mainly centres of education, but took on other economic and military qualities, as shall be seen later. The time had come to emphasize a fourth approach to education for francisation -- the seminary or boarding school.

The education of Amerindian children in seminaries or boarding schools was initiated in New France by the Recollet Fathers in 1620 at Notre Dame des Anges, near Quebec. Champlain had petitioned King Louis XIII for financial support:

> That it may please Your Majesty to found, and endow for six years only, a seminary for fifty Indian children, after which time they can be supported from the increased returns of the lands which will by that time be under cultivation. The children are daily offered by their parents to your petitioners to be instructed by them and brought up in the Christian religion.[58]

The Recollets started with six Native and three French boys, all of whom received instruction together in catechism, reading and writing. But before long the Native children found the regimen of studies too exacting, the curriculum often impractical, and the discipline and separation from their kind unbearable. Brother Sagard reported on the progress of the school:

> We had made a beginning of teaching them their letters, but as they are all for freedom and only want to play and give themselves a good time, as I said, they forgot in three days what we had taken four to teach, for lack of perseverance and for neglect of coming back to us at the hours appointed them; and if they told us that they had been prevented because of a game, they were clear. Besides, it was not yet advisable to be severe with them or reprove them otherwise than gently, and we could only in a complaisant manner urge them to be thorough in gaining knowledge which would be such an advantage to them and bring them satisfaction in time to come.[59]

When there were no more Native students the Recollets closed their seminary. This had taken place before they were forced to leave the colony in 1629.

It was the Jesuits who returned as chief missionaries in Canada in 1633, despite the efforts of Cardinal Richelieu's "grey eminence" to have Capuchins succeed the Recollets. It is not clear whether this was simply a move reflecting his own religious preference or whether it represented a choice between two opposing missionary theories -- the Jesuit tradition which was cultural relativist and enjoined on missionaries by the General in letters to all superiors in 1549 and 1556, and the Capuchin tradition which may be characterized as integrationist and assimilationist. Francisation policies, of course, would seem to have indicated a bias in favour of the latter mission theory.

The Jesuits planned by 1634 to erect a college for French children in Quebec and also "to establish a Seminary for the little Natives, to rear them in the Christian faith". Father Antoine Daniel was sent to the Huron Confederacy to bring back twelve young boys to launch the seminary, but "the extraordinary tenderness which the Savage women have for their children stopped all proceedings" and he brought back only one frightened lad, so the missionaries "had recourse to God and to men." It was especially their recourse to men that brought results. Their religious propaganda in France brought more financial and material support while the pressures put on the Huron elders resulted in the decision to send two more boys so that the Jesuit seminary could begin with three pupils. Unfortunately, two of the students died -- both under somewhat strange circumstances, for one had been involved in a fist fight with a Frenchman and another had been struck by a sword during an altercation. These uneasy relations between the 'races' did not bode well for the success of the school. However, more students came as the French sought to attract them. Le Jeune reported in 1637:

> Behold, then, our Seminary begun under very great difficulties. These young men are petted, are dressed in the French way, are furnished with linen and other necessary articles. They are lodged in

> the place selected for this purpose, with the Father who is to have the care of them. All seems to be going along peacefully. Our French people are pleased at seeing these young Savages anxious to live after the French fashion; all seemed very contented.[60]

The Jesuits soon began to clothe their young "seminarians" with "stuffs which originate among them" because these not only lasted longer, suited them better and protected them better from the winter cold, but it was less costly. However, this scarcely advanced the francisation effort. They also started "using the money of the Country to save something for the benefits of these poor abandoned creatures", but their enemies soon accused them of being more interested in the conversion of beaver pelts than in the conversion of the Native children. The seminary was seen by the Amerindians as a means of extracting material benefits from the French, and the missionary-teachers were unable to extricate themselves from this dilemma if they hoped for any success.

> We have no greater attractions for these poor people than their hope of getting from us some material assistance, and they never cease asking us for it. To refuse them is to estrange them. If we always give to them without taking anything in return, we shall soon be at the end of our string; and yet, if we take away from them the liberty of asking, they will never become civilized. That remains then?[61]

The Jesuits persisted and soon they had fifteen residents students, a number of day scholars who came to them for instruction and they had to divide their classes into three linguistic groups -- Huron, Algonkian, Montagnais. Pious laymen began to take an interest in the education of Native children. A few boarded some students and sent the boys to the Jesuits to be educated. Orders from Versailles to both Governor and Intendant emphasized the need to press the francisation policy on the missionaries and indicated that state officials might themselves set a good example by adopting Amerindian

children and raising them in a French environment. The Iroquois gave Governor Frontenac four boys in 1674; he quickly placed two of them in the "seminary" and the other two he kept in his household but sent to the Jesuits daily for instruction. The Intendant Duchesneau took in three boys in 1680, but he had no sooner outfitted them with French clothes than they ran away. He took in two other boys and sent them to the Jesuits for instruction.[62]

Bishop Laval opened a Minor Seminary in 1668 and recruited some Native students.

> As the King told me that he hoped we would attempt to raise in the manner of life of Frenchmen the little children of the Savages, in order to discipline them little by little, I have formed a seminary, into which I have taken a number of children for this express purpose; and in order to succeed better, I have been obliged to join with them some little French children, from whom, by living with them, the Savages could learn more easily both the customs and the language.[63]

He soon discovered that the Amerindians wanted their children at home in order to teach them the ancestral beliefs and way of life, and in particular their responsibilities to their kinsmen and tribe. After two years Laval admitted he had spent twice as much for the education of each Native child than for that of a French child and the undertaking was "very difficult". He would continue to take those who were offered him by the parents, but in reality he had never founded a new school. He had provided board and room and had sent them to the Jesuits for instruction. By 1673 all his boarders had left due to their "inordinate passion" for liberty, and the only other attempt he made was to accept a Métis boy for a brief period in 1679.[64]

Among the children sent to the Jesuits in the 1630s were a number of girls. They boarded these Native children with devout French families in Quebec until the arrival of Ursuline nuns in 1639.

Within four months of her arrival in the colony, Mother Marie de l'Incarnation had started teaching the first eight pupils. Her first report indicated a reaction not too different from that of the male missionaries:

> When they give them to us they are as naked as a worm, and it is necessary to wash them from head to foot, because of the grease with which their parents anoint their entire body; and whatever care we take, and although we change their linen and clothes often, it is a long time before we can rid them of the vermin because of the abundance of this grease. One sister spends part of each day at this task. It is a task which every one desires ardently.[65]

By 1668 the Ursulines, who were always short-staffed, limited their boarding school to taking in sixteen French girls and three Native girls. They had been offered seven Algonkian girls that year but they had had to turn them away because they had insufficient funds to clothe, feed and educate that number of students who contributed nothing to the cost of their education.

The number of students who remained for any length of time was quite limited, so that at all seasons of the year the Ursulines were able to accept a few new candidates as they presented themselves. Some of the students were captives taken from enemy tribes, a few were promising candidates for the sisterhood recommended by the missionaries, a few were intended brides for Frenchmen, and one or two were 'hostages' offered by parents who wanted to please the French traders and military personnel. Little wonder that many did not remain any longer than they were obliged to stay. By 1668, Mother Marie de l'Incarnation questioned the wisdom of the royal directives which said that the Jesuits should continue with the education for francisation of boys and the Ursulines and other sisters with the francisation of girls. She commented:

> It is however a very difficult thing, not to say impossible, to francise or civilize them. We have had more experience in this than any others, and we have remarked that out of a hundred that have passed through our hands scarcely have we civilized one. We find docility and intelligence in them, but when we are least expecting it they climb over our enclosure and go to run the woods with their relatives, where they find more pleasure than in all the amenities of our French houses. Savage nature is made that way; they cannot be constrained, and if they are they become melancholy and their melancholy makes them sick. Besides, the Savages love their children extraordinarily and when they know that they are sad they will do everything to get them back, and we have to give them back to them.[66]

Ursuline efforts gradually diminished and the nuns turned more and more to the education of French girls. Amerindian girls were never excluded but very few came.

The efforts of other religious orders were less intense than those of the Jesuits and Ursulines, but the failures were just as great. The Sulpician secular clergy at Montreal undertook the education of boys at their reserve at La Montagne, which was subsequently removed to Sault au Récollet and then to Lac des Deux Montagnes. They always claimed this to be part of their objectives, so that in 1721 they were granted an annual subsidy of 6,000 livres from the revenues of the King's domain. The use to which this was put was questioned by a succession of Intendants, until in 1755 François Bigot demanded an explanation. The superior at Montreal had to admit that they were not really raising and educating their Iroquoian and Algonkian children on the Lac des Deux Montagnes reserve in a French manner. He offered the following justification for the acceptance and spending of the royal subsidy:

> But is it not in keeping with the spirit of the benevolent ruler and even in keeping with the strict letter of making expenditures for the upkeep

> and education of the children of the natives to maintain missionaries for their instruction, to dispense abundant charity to the fathers and children, and to sacrifice several priests for the maintenance of this good work.[67]

Evidently, the money was being spent largely on the two active missionaries, one for each language group, and the four in language training, in addition to the upkeep of the church and repairs to the fort. The Sisters of the Congregation had been invited by the Sulpicians to teach the Native girls at the La Montagne reserve after Marguerite Bourgeoys accepted four girls into their petite école at Ville-Marie. The Sisters of the Congregation had the distinction of having two Iroquois nuns among their number, Barbe Attontinon and Maria Thérèse Ganensayas, both of whom died in the 1690s. Nevertheless, their girls' school proved no more successful in the long run than did the boys' school operated by the Sulpicians.[68] Even the Ursulines, who were thought by the state to have had some success, came under scrutiny again in 1712 because it was believed that the 2,000 livres destined for the education and francisation of Native girls was being diverted to other uses. It was subsequently made clear that they received 1,500 livres in subsidies, but that 500 livres was in lieu of the free freight allowance and the remaining 1,000 livres was for the "subsistence and maintenance of the daughters of the Natives". The Council of Marine in Versailles concluded that "the care of these Religious for the education of these girls has not up to the present had much success". Nevertheless, there was a continuation in 1720 of the grant of 1,500 livres to the Ursulines "for their subsistence and the maintenance of the daughters of the Natives", while the Sisters of the Congregation were given 1,000 livres "to teach the Native girls to work".[69] In other words, efforts would not be abandoned totally but there was a realization that residential schools did not prove more successful in the long term than did the itinerant mission, the sending of children to France, or the reservation scheme in francising Native children and acculturating the adults.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which the French were able to reorganize traditional Amerindian life and the degree to which the Native people were able to accommodate to the impact of French contact and maintain some of their traditional beliefs and practices. These are not quantifiable matters, nonetheless there are indices of acculturation and accommodation. There is no doubt that the Native people did adopt some of the external trappings of French life and some elements of European values and beliefs. In the domain which concerns us presently, the most striking observation is the variation in acculturation from region to region, from tribe to tribe. At the close of the French regime, as throughout much of the period, the "most civilized" were the Hurons of Lorette according to the accounts of the missionaries, the state officials, disinterested observers such as Franquet and Catalogne, and a foreign visitor like Peter Kalm. They were reported to "live in much the same manner as the Canadians" and to possess "excellent good Houses, Cultivate their own lands and live upon the produce." Even so, they continued their annual hunts, inter-tribal trade, and retained their mother tongue and several social customs. They were apparently staunchly Catholic. The elders, who were influential in keeping them in their Catholic religion and the French alliance, "have been so tenacious of their Mother tongue they hardly speak a word of French." In addition to cultivating the ground and bringing the produce to market, they made traditional items such as snowshoes, canoes, sleighs, sashes, mocassins, fur caps and mittens for the Quebec market, and they supplied the French with game animals and birds and wild fruit in season. They also took advantage of the crazes for exotic items such as maiden hair ferns, elk's hooves and ginseng root which commanded good prices from merchants and communities involved in exporting.[70] The Ottawa, Cree and Montagnais did not have the same degree of contact with the French and therefore their traditional way of life had been affected more by European technology and economic values introduced with the fur trade than by socio-cultural factors.

The missionaries had been assigned a major role in the pacification and civilizing of the Native people on the assumption that the state religion was the highest expression of French ideology. It seemed to follow that conversion and adherence to Catholicism were the surest indications of the acceptance of French sovereignty and the best guarantees of economic and military co-operation. External observers, particularly the Anglo-Americans, were convinced the missionaries assigned the priority to their diplomatic and political activities, and that they firmly controlled their Native converts. The missionaries were less certain of their ability to influence their Native flock unless the objectives they had coincided with those of the Native people. As for the matter of the sincerity of conversions, these too varied all the way from some enthusiastic Montagnais who "mingled their blood with their tears" during the Holy Week observances, at one extreme, through to those who viewed their baptism as a French form of adoption, or a rite of alliance, or a means of obtaining either immunity or a cure during an epidemic, at the other extreme. To have converted for economic or political reasons, such as obtaining guns, preferred status in trade and war, sharing in the power and status of Europeans, may not have indicated insincerity nor did it result necessarily in unstable and ephemeral adherence.

The missionaries on occasion threatened to have military protection or access to trade goods removed if they were not given a hearing; the state, for its part, often made the acceptance of missionaries a condition of peace and intercourse. It is even possible that the number who converted simply to avoid controversy, or to please the French and ingratiate themselves was larger than the missionaries suspected. The ceremonial and aesthetic appeals of the new religion were not inconsiderable factors, and the knowledge and supposed spiritual power (in shamanistic terms) of the missionaries could be awe-inspiring. A small number may even have converted for personal reasons such as the desire to marry a Catholic. It is even

possible that a few converted with the thought of gaining access to the mysteries and secret formulas of the new religion in order to rebuild or revitalize the old traditional Amerindian beliefs and practices. It is not surprising that if religious adherence and practice among Europeans served social, economic, political and personal ambitions the same motives should operate in a mission territory among Native people.

Of equal interest is the nature of Native response to these French efforts to transform a whole traditional way of life. Again, the range of responses was extensive. There were traumatic and almost sensational conversions which provided good grist for the mills of missionary propaganda. The converts whose experiences are told in detail in the Relations des Jésuites and Lettres édifiantes, for example, publicly renounced their old ways, became active proselytizers themselves in many cases, and were among the most vociferous denouncers of traditionalism. Just as there was complete acceptance by the aforementioned, there was also complete rejection and hostility on the part of others. In the more organized and sophisticated political nations, such as the Huron Confederacy and the Five Nations Confederacy, the Christians formed a faction and the resulting factional strife almost destroyed the political fabric of tribal union.

A few of the "old resistors", as the missionaries depicted them, sometimes yielded to the claims of the new religion under pressure from converted members of their clan, especially when they became the victims of disease, famine, old age, war, accident, or desertion. But many of the opponents of Catholicism remained firm in their rejection, even when they saw the material benefits of conversion, because they associated the epidemics, brandy trafficking, immorality, increasing avarice and greed with the coming of the French. The missionaries were blamed for having undermined the old ways and disturbed their traditional observances, thus creating divisions. As the shamans were manifestly unable to prevent this

degeneration and dislocation, traditionalists either turned openly against the intruders, an unusual move in a tolerant and hospitable society, or else they turned to them in the hope that they possessed superior powers capable of halting the transitional confusion.

There were still others who held to the view expressed during the early stages of contact that the French had religion, laws and customs which suited them and their country and that Native beliefs and customs were meant for them and their country. This dualism could lead either to a rejection of most aspects of European ways and beliefs as unsuitable for Native people, or to a kind of parallelism in which the individual selected elements from both traditions and tried to relate personally to both systems of thought. A number of converts seem to have attempted this latter reconciliation and compartmentalized their beliefs, so to speak, or else they operated at two different levels of perception and comprehension depending on their environment or activity. Thus, most of the staunch Catholics among the "domiciled natives" of the reserves and the Micmacs still observed the traditional hunting rites and taboos and continued to bury personal belongings with their dead. There were some cases of dualism in which the Christian component or level was external and professed while the old traditional beliefs were kept secret. Conversely, during the years of persecution among the Iroquois a number of adoptees, who had converted to Catholicism before their capture, outwardly appeared to be pagans but inwardly held to their new religion. The Christian faction among the Five Nations in the 1670s was composed in good measure of persons belonging to the latter category.

In some cases there were some transfers from one religious belief system to the other. Thus pagan resisters appealed to visions of the "true Jesus", performed their own baptisms, and a few (including some women) even assumed a sacerdotal office. These

counter-innovative techniques sometimes shook the faith of new converts, as did, for example, the vision an old Huron woman who claimed to have seen the French torturing the Hurons in the hereafter. Christian converts, on the other hand, might see Jesus as a very powerful manitou and expect him to appear in answer to their vision quests. The saints might be expected to assist a hunting or war party to achieve its goals. It may be that the two systems became so integrated, or merely confused, that a new holistic belief system began to emerge. More recent anthropological studies have tended to show that there was a persistence of traditional beliefs and that the Catholicism of many groups, especially the Micmacs and Abenakis who seem to have converted en masse, was a syncretic Catholicism. Be that as it may, there is reason to believe that the most enduring conversions were among those who had arrived at some reconciliation or compartmentalization of the two belief systems at the personal or clan level.

All these combinations were the results of three basic forms of response to the intrusion of militant missions: acceptance, rejection, selective acceptance and rejection. Conflict which ensued as a result of the intrusion of the new religion into traditionalist society may be classified into three categories, as we have seen: internal personal conflict, external personal conflict, factional conflict.

The French may not have succeeded in transforming Native societies into the ideal North American society they had hoped to be able to create. They had altered profoundly existing cultures and had introduced a multiplicity of elements which would continue to modify and influence the direction Native societies would take in the future. In this process, French colonial society was itself profoundly affected not only by the American environment but also by its contacts with Native cultures. The possibility that many French

might become assimilated, rather than the Native people being "reduced to civility", was still discussed in the closing years of the French regime. One officer remarked:

> There are not wanting here, those who defend this strange attachment of some of their countrymen to this savage life, on principles independent of the reason of state, for encouraging its subjects to spread and gain footing among the savage nations, by resorting to their country, of which they, at the same time, gain a knowledge useful to future enterprises, by a willing conformity to their actions, and by inter-marriage with them. They pretend that even this savage life itself is not without its peculiar sweets and pleasures; that is the most adapted, and the most natural to man. Liberty, they say, is no where more perfectly enjoyed, than where no subordination is known, but what is recommended by natural reason, the veneration of old age, or the respect of personal merit.[71]

That such a possibility was not necessarily equated with dangerous degeneration and American barbarization, but defensible adaptation to a new environment and new circumstances, indicated that whatever official policies and objections might be, whatever the thrust of church pronouncements and missionary endeavours, there were pragmatic considerations which operated at a more popular social level in New France.

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## CHAPTER IV

### Economic Contacts: Prosperity, Protocol and Presents

New France was founded as a commercial counter, and although the colonial economy developed very slowly and scarcely became diversified, the relationship with the Native people was centred upon and in large measure dominated by trade. The fur trade was hardly the proverbial lifeblood of the colony in a developmental sense because it was largely a metropolitan exploitation, but it did account for many of the crucial contacts with the original inhabitants. It soon developed beyond the bartering of European trinkets of aesthetic and religious value to coastal peoples in exchange for worn beaver cloaks into an exchange of goods which nourished an important hat industry in France and engaged the traditional skills of Native hunters and of their spouses who prepared the peltries in New France. The fur trade very quickly involved the French in the complex trading and warring patterns of North America, drew them along well established lines of communication, and brought them face to face with hitherto unknown elements of Amerindian spiritual and material culture. What appeared to begin as a straightforward bartering of one's own goods "of little account" in the view of both contracting parties in the sixteenth century rapidly became a serious exchange which determined much of their future intercourse in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The fur trade raised fundamental questions about social values, property, territoriality, conservation, the work ethic and the division of labour, although few of the participants at that time would have identified many of those issues. As the French developed a policy and institutions to regulate the trade along lines which would benefit the mother country and permit survival in a colony often conceived as inhospitable and comparatively unprofitable, problems of some magnitude emerged. It was necessary to confront such issues as

brandy trafficking, running the woods, abuses of office and trading privileges, illicit trade with English colonies, and the steadily increasing expenditures on "presents" for the Native people.

The fur trade, which started along the Atlantic seaboard, was soon centred on the St. Lawrence valley, first at Tadoussac and later at Montreal, until it had spread like a web over the entire Great Lakes basin, the Mississippi-Missouri system, and into the Prairie West as far as to make contact with the Athapascans. Each stage in this westward movement brought new considerations to bear in the relationship with the Native people. There were also economic concerns other than those of the fur trade, of course, and these cannot be ignored.

The Native people, as has already been suggested, had developed imposing patterns of inter-tribal trade over a continental communications network of waterways, forest paths and prairie trails. At a trade and communications hub, such as the Huron Confederacy of the Georgian Bay/Lake Simcoe region, goods travelled to and from northern Labrador and James Bay, the western Great Lakes, the Mississippi valley, and the St. Lawrence lowlands in pre-contact times. There was also trade in perishable foodstuffs with tribes living in close proximity. Horticultural tribes might exchange the products of their labour with hunting peoples. The Hurons offered corn to the Nipissings in exchange for meat and pelts, just as the Mandans offered corn for the dried meat and robes of the more northern Plains people.

The French fur trade imposed itself on these historic communications networks and trading patterns. Having penetrated initially into the continent by way of the St. Lawrence gateway, Champlain naturally associated the French trade with the Algonkian-Huron alliance. Had there been permanent settlement and the introduction of sustained commerce one century earlier in the days of Cartier and Roberval, the course of events would likely have been

very different, because Laurentian Iroquois then occupied the St. Lawrence valley. The long-range effect of making fur the staple product of Canada was to encourage the Native people to remain hunters and trappers. In one sense, the economic contacts worked against the social programme which had as its objective the transformation of Native societies, as has already been demonstrated.

The arrival of European trade goods in a region often preceded the coming of French traders, explorers and missionaries. The French trade goods were normally imperishable metal objects such as utensils, tools and weapons of European manufacture, and these were often retraded by the Native peoples who initially acquired them to tribes living farther inland. Although the French travel literature generalized about Amerindian cultures, those directly involved in trade quickly recognized the differences between basically nomadic hunting bands and sedentary agriculturalists. The people who moved with the ebb and flow of animal and marine migrations and the maturation of root and berry crops were perceived to possess some structured system of hunting rights and privileges over definite areas and some exchange protocol. The division of labour among the sedentary Iroquoian peoples was recognized as being somewhat different, and their political structures were correspondingly more complex. In all cases there seemed to be ceremonial provisions for the sharing or redistribution of goods, whether it consisted of the produce of the fields or of the hunt and fishing. A certain equality was preserved through wealth-levelling devices. On the other hand, the highly developed concepts of sharing and of community prevented serious deprivation and poverty of individuals. The greatest contrast with French views was the Native sense of being part of nature, virtually all of which was seen as sharing equally in life and none of which had been meant to be dominated, subordinated and cultivated by man on a large scale. What was new for the Native people, of course, was the shift in emphasis from hunting for subsistence and limited

exchange to trapping for furs on a large scale, from production for use to production primarily for exchange. It was still necessary for all Native groups to hunt, although some food and clothing items were obtained from the French, but the accent was put on the production of furs for market.

The concepts of property and territoriality were soon related to trade relations. It is not certain whether the concept of hunting territories was entirely aboriginal or was one that developed as hunting bands larger than a family were organized to produce peltries on a large scale as demanded by trade with the French. As McManus has argued, there probably was one code of values and behaviour for subsistence hunting and quite another code that developed for hunting for exchange with the Europeans. The two concepts may have co-existed, so that the Montagnais may have continued to behave in traditional ways in their relations with each other relative to food supply and hospitality, while at the same time behaving quite differently in the competition for the obtaining and disposing of furs and the acquisition of European goods. Both Peter Kalm and La Potherie remarked, for example, that while the Algonkians placed no exclusive rights to hunting for direct consumption, they did respect the marks Native hunters placed in or near beaver lodges to claim them as their exclusive property. The divergence between French and 'new' Native concepts, on the one hand, and traditional Native concepts on the other hand, remained so that even during the Seven Years' War French officers were upset when the Ottawas killed several sheep in camp "alleging that all the animals which are on the earth belong to them and that they are there for the needs of all in common."[1]

The French often commented on the absence of a sense of exclusive ownership of goods and lands among both nomadic bands and sedentary tribes. The observation of an officer at Louisbourg is typical of such comments:

> They are also very uncurious of paying the debt they contract, not from natural dishonesty, but from their having no notion of property, or of meum or tuum. They will sooner part with all they have, in the shape of a gift, than with anything in that of payment. Honors and goods being all in common amongst them, all the numerous vices, which are founded upon those two motives, are not to be found in them.[2]

The abbé Maillard commended the Micmacs for their concept of tochechkoug or virtuosus, or what Father Sebastien Rasle called "being real men", that is "being a good hunter and a good payer of debts". Father Lafitau identified "an honest man" among the Iroquois as possessing above all charity and "that moderation which has learned how to content itself with little."[3]

Metropolitan writers often picked up on this theme, linking Native equality, hospitality and happiness. Dom Pernety, for example, said that Amerindians in general reproached Europeans for "their avarice and ambition" in accumulating goods for the future whereas they themselves "ignore luxuries and superfluous commodities, which become necessities for us, and which are sought for in Europe with so much avidity and so great pains." But Nicolas Perrot thought that contact with the French could result in an erosion of traditional Native hospitality and generosity although "it is only the Abenakis, and those who live with the French people, who have become somewhat less liberal, on account of the advice that our people have given them by placing before them the obligations resting on them to preserve what they have." What may in fact have occurred was what Sahlins calls the effect of "kinship distance". There may never have been in traditional society the same moral obligations to share with other tribes in the same manner as with one's own people. Therefore the case of the Abenakis, who were, since the latter part of the seventeenth century, leaving their ancestral lands to settle nearer

the French and other Native peoples, may have been one of increased social distance and they did not feel the same obligations to these "distant" groups.[3]

In the colony, there were innumerable testimonials to the generosity, hospitality and compassion of the Native people. An assessment of Iroquois virtues and vices, written in 1710, included the following passage:

> They recommend hospitality, when they meet a stranger who lacks supplies they hold it a pleasure to give him of what they have that is best and invite in to their lodgings those who pass by in order to be able to regale them well.[4]

Jérémie on his expedition to the Hudson's Bay observed that the Cree were "very charitable towards the widows and orphans; they give them all they possess with a great unselfishness." Seven members of his expedition were killed, however, when they refused to share either their food or ammunition with a band of near-starving Native people in 1712. French behaviour on this occasion, although comprehensible to Europeans because Jérémie's men were far from home and no French supply ships had been able to get through since 1708, constituted an intolerable breach of the Native code of hospitality, humanity and sharing of goods.[6]

Dièreville described this code of behaviour as including the maxim "if one has food, he never fails to share it with those who have none and are suffering from lack of it." When St. Luc de la Corne was shipwrecked off Isle Royale in 1761, the Micmacs received him with traditional hospitality: "they shared with me the little meat they had; which was only dried meat; but they gave me enough for two days."[7] Compassion was not lacking among the Native people as Champlain discovered when he was wounded in the campaign against the Iroquois south of Lake Ontario in 1615 and the Hurons carried him on

their backs in an improvised basket for two days. Similarly, Father Gabriel Marest was carried for several days by some Illinois when he developed painful running sores on his feet.

The fact that status and honour were acquired not by accumulating goods but by sharing and giving meant that French officers at military posts in the eighteenth century who behaved in accordance with European economic practice were often regarded contemptuously as mere "Chiefs of Merchants" selling the goods of Onontio rather than distributing them as truly great leaders should do. On the other hand, Amerindian egalitarianism and generosity might be qualities which doomed the Native people to the lowest level of European esteem. They did not want to accumulate wealth, therefore they were lazy and shiftless. In trade they acted individually and not as a group or company. Even when they acquired gifts and trade goods in substantial quantities they did not keep them but made a distribution; therefore they were accounted improvident. In this manner, the existence of two very different economic concepts resulted in each culture despising some aspects of the conduct of the other. The French were often perceived as selfish, inhospitable and uncaring, while the Native people were stereotyped as improvident and indolent.[8]

There was also a wide ideological gap between European and Amerindian views of animals and hunting. The Judaeo-Christian tradition made man the centre of creation with a mission to domesticate animals and plants and till and mine the soil. The Native peoples, in contrast, believed all animals, plants and terrestrial features had soul life and language appropriate to them, also that men had once been able to communicate with all these members of the universe but that now only the shamans could do so on occasion. Hunting required the establishment of a mystical communication between hunter and game with proper respect being shown to the quarry to ensure success in future hunts.[9]

Charlevoix described the elaborate preparatory rituals and taboos during and after the hunt; Dièreville remarked on a Micmac custom of tearing out the eyes of game animals and birds "saying that otherwise they would be observed by their kind and would no longer be able to approach them"; Father Rasle noted the special reverence for the bear and the steps taken to appease their spirits; and an anonymous correspondent confirmed the special regard for the bear and added that the beavers were viewed as people who lacked only the ability to speak. Father Laure rationalized the taboo about not allowing the dogs to gnaw the bones of animals: "This religious observance has surely no other principle than the fear they formerly had, like our French hunters, that their dogs might break their teeth; the sensible ones agree with this". His skepticism was a minority view as most observers were convinced of the spiritual nature of the Native hunting and fowling.[10]

Even if the French understood some aspects of Native cosmology and hunting rituals there is no indication they showed much respect for Native beliefs. Their concept of natural law stood in sharp contrast to Algonkian concepts of the pact between men and animals. Samuel Pufendorf's authoritative opinion in De Jure Naturae et Gentium was as follows:

> For we do not understand that the law of nature by its absolute authority enjoins us to cultivate friendship and society with brutes, nor are they capable of sustaining an obligation arising from a pact with men.[11]

It reflected French views on such matters. As for the missionaries, they would scarcely have been ignorant of St. Augustine's warnings about falling into Manichaean heresy, especially the idea that the divine part of the world was constantly being released from the soil and that it entered the plants by their roots. Therefore men should be vegetarians. Animals ate plants too but in the process they

defiled the divine ingredients in plants since they were born as a result of the supremely defiling act of sexual intercourse. These heretical ideas resembled the Amerindian belief that in mythical times men lived in peace with the animals and understood their language, but a great catastrophe destroyed that "old world" and man became mortal, sexual, condemned to work and in conflict with the animals.[12]

Both the Europeans and the Amerindians had a conservationist ideology. Pufendorf wrote about the state requiring its citizens to make careful use of resources "so a useless and wanton destruction of animals tends to the hurt of all human society, and to the dishonour of the Creator and Author of such a gift." A visionary in 1763 purported to relay the message of the Master of Life to the effect that because of alcohol and sexual abuse "I withdrew into the depths of the woods the animals so you would have to rely on your brothers (French) for your essentials." In the early eighteenth century some Native hunters were still described as taking care not to destroy all the beaver in a lodge and some hunting parties tried not to exploit the same habitat until all the resources were exhausted.[13]

Yet, there is evidence of depletion of game, probably due in good measure to over-killing by Native hunters who were eager to obtain French trade goods. The reports all seemed to agree: Nicolas Denys underscored the depletion of moose and beaver in the Micmac hunting territories in the seventeenth century; La Potherie in 1701-02 told of beaver being so scarce in the Great Lakes area that the hunters asked if lynx and wolf skins would be accepted in trade; Denis Riverin said the Hurons, Abenakis and Micmacs had totally wiped out the moose in the King's Domain; Raudot doubted aboriginal conservationist attitudes and reported wasteful Illinois hunting of the buffalo as they took only the tongues and the flat sides; Guignas reported in 1728 from the Sioux country that all game "must have removed themselves or else they have diminished in numbers"; and Joseph Normandin confided to his journal in 1732 that around

Lac St. Jean bear, beaver, moose and caribou were rarely seen any more and the people had to rely mostly on fish to survive. Father Rasle commented that the Abenakis had over-hunted the territory they occupied and resorted twice each year to the coast in order to find seafood.

> Our Indians have so entirely destroyed the game in this part of the country, that during ten years they have scarcely found either elk or roebuck. The bears and beavers have also become very rare. They have scarcely anything on which to live but Indian corn, beans, and pumpkins.[14]

Not only was there a crisis in the hunting economy but there was a notable shift in nutritional patterns.

Traditional hunters had clear notions about animal populations, so one wonders how and why they over-hunted and how they explained behaviour which was so contrary to their ideology. They blamed depletion on natural factors such as forest fires, bad weather, changing animal migratory patterns and on supernatural factors such as directions of animal masters and war between animals and hunters. The latter explanation could be related to the spread of epidemic disease because animals were seen as disease carriers just as plants were seen as sources of healing. Over-killing was a declaration of war against the animals for having caused devastating epidemics. On the other hand, the Native people had associated many of the epidemics with the coming of Europeans, and their diffusion specifically with the itinerant missionaries, so that their abandonment of conservationist practices was likely related to new economic motives. The war with the animals explanation was a rationalization for over-killing. The depletion of game increased the demand for efficient hunting tools, implements and weapons which could not be repaired, much less duplicated, using traditional Native mechanical skills. In a situation where dependency on the French increased, there were demands

for better quality goods, the sending of European smiths, and the Native people themselves expanded their hunting territories and tried to set themselves up as middlemen in trade.

Although metropolitan French may have associated hunting and fowling with leisure and sport, Native people were conscious of the precariousness of their survival and the rigorous work their life-style sometimes imposed on them. Frenchmen, however, tended to see nomadic hunters in particular as wanderers, idlers, lazy and improvident because in economic terms they never rose above bartering a few peltries and other primary products. Joseph Normandin said of the hunters of the Lake Chigoubiche region that they were not very ambitious and "as long as they have enough to eat they do not hunt, for it is only hunger that makes them hunt, and if they had French provisions in winter at their discretion there is not one who would hunt for furs." Civility was equated with arduous work, discipline, the restrictions of farm, town and mines, and large-scale commercial and financial transactions. Father Charlevoix summarized a common view of Native people:

> As for the men they glory in their idleness, and actually spend more than half their lives in doing nothing, from a persuasion that daily labour degrades a man, and that it is only proper for women. The proper function of a man, say they, is to fish, hunt, and go to war.

Apart from the men's repugnance for agricultural work, they fitted well into the economic order the French were establishing in the colony. As far as their Christianization was concerned, the only alteration Charlevoix noticed was that they became "a little more industrious, but never work except by way of penance."[15]

The involvement of Native people in the fur trade brought about some changes in the division of labour and in gender differentiation. The French were sure that the women worked harder

than the men, and that instead of being idlers they were often slaves and drudges. Radisson and La Vérendrye gave them credit for having provided their expeditions with food, clothing and equipment, for having performed important domestic duties, and for having helped with establishing trade contacts and obtaining safe conducts through unknown territories. Raudot was certain no women in the world were "more wretched or treated with more indignity" than the Sioux. The French, of course, thought it natural for women to be kept in a subordinate role, and they also admired the "masculine virtues", that is, the skills in hunting and warfare, which the Iroquoian people upheld, and they understood the Micmac view that a boy became a man only after he had killed a moose. The matriarchical nature of Iroquoian society they found difficult to understand, especially as it related to economic activities.

The division of labour among sedentary Iroquoians saw men hunting animals and women cultivating plants. Since plants played a special role in the Native spiritual world, a matriarchical society could be viewed as one which stressed harmony with nature, the continuation of life in an orderly and balanced middle world. The women had a key role in the spiritual aspects of everyday life. But they also controlled agricultural production and food supplies. They did most of the field work, except the clearing of forests and breaking of new plots, which was men's work. Men's work, contrary to French perceptions, was much more strenuous, continuous and dangerous than women's work. Men were expected to hand over the game and fish they had caught to the women, who became the owners and dispensers of the fruits of the hunt. Thus women had a large measure of control over the economy of the tribe. In addition to preparing food for consumption and furs for market or clothing, they had absolute authority over the entire provisions of the tribe so they effectively could direct religious festivities, war parties, hunting expeditions, or village relocation in addition to the daily rationing of food. This power was institutionalized in the matron of each longhouse. The

matrons could nominate tribal council elders, influence council decisions, remove or "knock off the horns" of an incumbent who displeased them, and even played a role in the selection of religious practitioners. Father Lafitau was one who began to understand the economic and political implications of matrilineality and matrilocality:

> Nothing, however, is more real than this superiority of the women. It is of them that the nation really consists; and it is through them that nobility of the blood, the genealogical tree and the families are perpetuated. All real authority is vested in them. The land, the fields and their harvest all belong to them. They are the souls of the Councils, the arbiters of peace and of war. They have charge of the public treasury. To them are given the slaves. They arrange marriages. The children are their domain, and it is through their blood that the order of succession is transmitted. The men, on the other hand, are entirely isolated...[16]

Their control of food supplies was particularly important, apart from the political power they wielded, because stored food constituted one of the major forms of wealth of the tribe. Governor Courcelles and Lt. Gen. Prouville de Tracy attacked the food stores of the Mohawks in the 1660s in order to bring them into submission.

The situation was somewhat different among nomadic Algonkian bands. First of all, a man often had several wives and usually only the youngest accompanied him on hunts to take care of domestic chores and carry the baggage. Raudot reported that "the old wives are the mistresses of the foods and the furs and console themselves in this way to see the favors of their husbands shared by another who spares them the trouble of mending his effects, by taking sole care of them." The European trade imposed new burdens on the women who were required to prepare many hides, skins and pelts for market. French goods were of immediate interest to the hunters and they extended

their territories in search of more furs. This increased nomadism meant that the work load of the women, who set up and broke campsites and gathered fuel, in addition to performing other services, became considerably heavier. It also undermined some traditional skills and occupations so French clothing, cloth, blankets and foodstuffs were sought from the French. These European goods were not always superior to traditional goods in terms of wearability and the protection they offered. Another effect was that women were alienated from the decision-making process with regard to migrations and winterings, matters which one missionary had noticed was traditionally "in nearly every instance in the hands of the housewife."[17]

Among the Micmacs, the impact of French wares may have been greater because the contact came earlier and was more intensive as year-round contact by ship was possible. The pressures on the Micmac women to prepare hides and skins for the French trade meant that there was less time available for preparing food, clothing and household items for their own subsistence. Thus, in addition to the usual kettles, knives, hatchets, needles, cloth, etc. they acquired foodstuffs such as prunes, dried peas, sea biscuits and bread. In the Great Lakes region, Raudot observed that at marriage a man presented himself with "his quiver full of arrows, his bow, his war club, and a knife to signify that it is for him to go to war and to hunt" and he gave his bride a kettle, an axe and a collar saying to her "by these three gifts that she must take care to feed him and to go to fetch wood and the meat of animals which he has killed." In old age the women still played an important role, he said:

> The women work at painting their dresses and at sewing, which they do with the sinews of moose or with nettle thread spun on their thighs very delicately. They also make things of bark ornamented with porcupine quills tinted different colors and sewed with roots.

These comments reassure us that although there was a new economic order there was evidence of social continuity, and traditional ways had not been completely supplanted.[18]

One strength of the French economic contact was the consistency with which they recognized the importance of Native satisfaction with trading arrangements. A few years after having assumed personal direction of his government, Louis XIV issued the following orders to Governor Courcelles at Quebec:

> In order to conform to the inclinations of these Indians, and especially those who inhabit the lands of Acadia, it is appropriate that the French put themselves in a posture to be able to obtain by exchange everything that the Indian hunters will bring them, giving them the same price as the English do.[19]

It will be noted that it was the French who were expected to make adjustments, that they were to be prepared to accept all furs offered for exchange, and that prices had to be competitive with those of the English.

Originally the Native people had brought their furs down to the French ships off the Acadian coasts, to Tadoussac and then to Quebec. Then annual trade fairs were organized at Trois Rivières, and later on a larger scale at Montreal. In 1672, La Salle with the backing of Governor Frontenac set up trading operations at Fort Frontenac (Kingston). Stiff competition for the upper country trade soon developed among the Montreal merchants in particular. To maintain some order and to restrain brandy trafficking Frontenanc issued in 1681 a limited number of congés de traite, or licences. However, a number of young men went up country each year without licences or permission from the Governor and Intendant; these lawbreakers became known as coureurs-de-bois. The colonists enjoyed the right to trade freely with each other and with the Native people

within the limits of the settlement colony. The succession of monopoly companies, from de Mont's merchant association through to the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, had the exclusive right to export furs from the colony. These exports were subject to an excise tax of 25 per cent on beaver pelts and 10 per cent on moosehides. The region from Isle-aux-Coudres to Sept-Iles with its hinterland was reserved as the King's Domain, closed to settlement, and its trade was farmed out.

By 1696 there was a glut of furs on the French market as the hatters did not require the volume being exported from the colony. The engineer Vauban, famous for designing almost impregnable fortresses, was among those who opined that less attention should be paid to the fur trade because "it dissipates a lot of people who lose themselves in the woods and live in animal fashion like the Savages with whom they conspire and whom they come to resemble." He promoted higher economic objectives and thought that the colonists should concentrate on agriculture and leave the fur trade entirely to the Native people. There were even pressures on Versailles in 1705 to close down the fur trade entirely for three years.[20]

The French for a number of reasons could not extricate themselves from this trade. Therefore, in the colony they tried to find other channels to have the excess fur pass into the British mercantile system, while in Europe they sought new markets and new uses for Canadian furs. The crisis was heightened by the fact that in the eighteenth century the French hat manufacturers developed a process known as carroting, or a chemical processing of furs to soften them which enabled hatters to use cheaper pelts, including domestic rabbit and hare, in making felt. This greatly reduced the demand for prime beaver, or castor gras. The obligation to take all the furs of the colony was related to the maintenance of alliances, the need to keep out Anglo-American and Hudson's Bay Company competitors, and the desire to pursue missionary and exploratory objectives. As the abbé Gaulin said of the Acadian situation, "the natives are of little

account when they are our allies, but could become of considerable importance were they our enemies." An Iroquois chief expressed it succinctly in 1735: "Trade and peace we take to be one thing."[21] The crisis of over-production was alleviated when illicit trading developed with New York, and later through the lower Mississippi, and especially as the metropolitan French found important new outlets for all furs through Dutch intermediaries, in particular on the Leipzig market of eastern Europe.

The more or less open competition from 1696 to 1716 resulted in a number of abuses and complaints from the Native people. Lamothe Cadillac seized the opportunity to try to build a small commercial empire centred on Detroit, founded in 1700, to the detriment of the Montreal merchants who claimed that between 20 and 30 thousand livres were spent in hauling trade goods needlessly into the hinterland. They obviously wanted to keep the trade concentrated on their annual spring fair which took place outside the palisades of the town where booths were set up for several months by the local retailers. The barter brought in substantial revenues to Montreal and had the additional advantage of affording the civil officials occasions to renew alliances, honour chieftains and distribute the King's "presents".[22]

Governor Vaudreuil supported the Montreal merchants and argued for a restoration of the congé system of licensed trade. To hold the Native allies to the French connection in the face of economic crisis during the War of the Spanish Succession, he ordered military officers to impress on them the idea that the war was a religious one and that a British victory would result in the enslavement of the Native population and the loss of their ancestral lands. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) made provision for the creation of a boundary commission which would determine which 'nations' came under French sovereignty and which under British sovereignty. The Five Nations Iroquois were recognized as neutral, but under British

sovereignty, and had the right to trade with subjects of either or both Crowns. This so intensified international competition in the upper country that the French had to respond with an appropriate trade policy.[23]

In 1716 congés were reinstated and limited to 25 in number, and Fort Frontenac was designated as the sole entrepot in the upper country, a step which tied the fur trade to the military establishment. Licences were given in lieu of state pensions and as rewards for distinguished public service, and these were usually sold to merchants who might sell them to traders or engage their own hired engagés. Le Maire's memorandum of 1717 explained the rationale for this decision:

> The Trade with the Indians is a necessary commerce; and even if the Colonists could get along without it, the State is as it were forced to maintain it, if it wishes to hold on to the country, unless one wished to adopt the cruel decision of destroying all the Natives, which is contrary at once to both nature and Religion. There is no middle course; one must have the native either as friend or foe; and whoever wants to have him as friend must furnish him with his necessities at conditions which allow him to procure them. Already one hears only murmurings among our new Allies, and even among our old ones; and one and the other are at the point of slipping away from us...[24]

The King's posts along the frontier, especially Fort Frontenac and Fort Niagara, had to be operated at a loss but were farmed out to the highest bidder and bolstered with generous presents and expenditures placed on the military budget.

In 1726 the system of selling congés or trading licences had spread to the entire Great Lakes region under Beauharnois' administration. It varied greatly at the 50 or so posts that eventually dotted the interior. Detroit and Michilimackinac were open

to all licensed traders, whose numbers by 1739 had risen from the original 25 to at least 81. The congés were then being sold at 1,000 livres, half of which went to colonial expenditures controlled by the Intendant and the other half was at the Governor's disposition for subsidies and pensions. In addition to these licences there was provision for each post commander to acquire for a modest fee the exclusive trading privileges of his immediate area. Each commanding officer could equip two canoes of trade goods on his own account, and other officers could equip one canoe. This income was designed to supplement their salaries and enable them to maintain the privileged status which even the Native people expected of leaders. In 1742, a royal decree required all trade at military posts to be farmed out at public auctions, with the exception of Detroit and Michilimackinac, the entrepots, each of which would be operated through twelve assigned congés. This lasted until 1749 when there was another reorganization because English traders were making inroads into the interior and the Native people preferred some of their goods. The French policy was to drive out these English interlopers to seize their goods and destroy their posts, and effectively to occupy the Ohio valley, but nevertheless to "make our natives understand that they will be at liberty to go and trade with the English in their country, but that we will not allow them to receive them on our lands." Britain and France agreed in 1755 to sign a cartel providing for the apprehension and prosecution of all "deserters" and unlicensed traders, but the outbreak of the Seven Years' War nullified this.[25]

An integral part of trade, whether aboriginal or at the time of contact, was the giving of presents. The Native people had well established and ritualized practices indicating relationships with other individuals and groups that imposed themselves on the French fur trade. In the framework of their own elaborate rules of etiquette, precedence and protocol, the French saw that rank, authority and prestige in the New World depended in some measure on the ability to offer gifts and that generosity was one of the most admired

qualities. Presents were identified with words and each parole was embodied in a present. There were words to offer a petition, to light a council fire, cover the dead, console the mourners, dry away the tears, water the roots of the tree of peace, and so forth. Presents became almost a form of bribery in times of intense competition, whether commercial or military, and the Native people could drive up the prices, so to speak, by exacting more presents. The Micmacs, for example, threatened to turn to the English if the French did not guarantee that their gifts would become présents ordinaires distributed annually. Governor St. Ovide said that they must not be "too demanding" in negotiations with the Micmacs because they had to be "attached to the French interest". It was a sentiment that ran through all the official correspondence.[26]

"Singing the calumet" was an important ritual to indicate honour and respect as well as peaceful preoccupations. Pierre Liette said that it was followed by the giving of gifts "according to the ability of each one and in accordance with the honour deserved by the one to whom they sing the calumet and the esteem in which they hold him." The ceremonial smoking of the long-stemmed pipe at Montreal in honour of the Governor-General was part of the annual distribution of the "King's present". All councils or assemblies, it was reported in Versailles, "invariably terminated with a distribution of presents" to the chiefs, taking into account "the number who have attended the assembly, the importance of the business for which the meeting was called, and the greater or lesser consideration the Village with which one has entered into Negotiations merits." This was popularly referred to as "speaking with the hand" or "making words".[27]

Gift-giving ceremonies were an essential prelude to barter encounters. Both parties presented some valuable or spectacular gifts to create an atmosphere of generosity and goodwill. The trade captain was often given a complete suit of clothes. Alcohol, if given at this

time, was carefully rationed in order to avoid abuses, although some unscrupulous traders were not above attempting to defraud their clients and partners by intoxicating them.

Bacqueville de la Potherie has left a description of what may be taken to have been a typical bartering session. He said that "the Chief of a Nation enters the Fort with one or two of his most distinguished Natives. The person who is in command first offers them a gift consisting of a pipe and some tobacco." There followed an exchange of salutations, they smoked together, and then the trading captain went out to tell his party how he had been received. Upon re-entering the fort he presented the commandant with a few choice pelts. There followed some discussion over the quality of the goods to be traded on each side and the actual trading took place outside the fort. Once the furs had all been traded, the French provided a feast of huge kettles of peas and corn flavoured with prunes and molasses. The ceremonial smoking of the calumet was again observed, followed by frenzied dancing and distribution of more tobacco, and sometimes of brandy. The Native trading captains usually redistributed what they had received in the preliminary gift-giving ceremonies among all the members of their trading party until often they were left with little more than their hats, symbolic of their office.[28]

It would seem that the giving of presents, as practised by individual traders and missionaries and official exploratory and military expeditions, was kept within the framework of Native ceremonial exchanges in the seventeenth century. By 1701, if not earlier, presents were given in the upper country in return for the stationing of French garrisons and to keep up the flow of furs to the St. Lawrence valley. As metropolitan directives increasingly urged the cutting back of expenditures on presents, Governor and Intendant tried to impress on Versailles the urgency of the situation.

> We will do our best to diminish, as much as possible, the presents we are obliged to make to the Natives, but we cannot dispense in the present situation with giving them considerable presents, as we have had the honour to inform you before. The natives give no gifts after we give them some.[29]

The King agreed to continue the royal gratification but wished to make it clear that it was only to "maintain them in obedience" and to assist in their conversion. The French were to betray no signs of dependency on the Native people.

> His Majesty is pleased to have them observe with regard to these presents that they must be given without profusion and with a great knowledge of the needs of these Natives, in order that they look upon them as relief for their needs coming from His Majesty's goodness and charity and not as a means of continuing their disorders, nor as the price of our friendship.[30]

The inconvenience was that the Native people were coming to regard them "as a necessary recompense on which they can count".

In 1707 the King indicated he would be pleased "if the giving of presents to the Natives could be dispensed with" because it was a drain on the treasury, "it renders them lazy" and they were coming to regard them as a sort of tribute the French owed them. If they could not be cut off completely, at least "they must be reduced, little by little, until such time as they can be cut off entirely." The opposite happened. In 1716, Governor Vaudreuil asked for 30,000 livres in annual presents, but the Council of Marine set the amount of 22,000 livres annually. By 1736 they were over 25,000 livres, by 1740 they were over 57,000 livres and within a decade they would go as high as 75,000 livres. The presents did not include payments made for services rendered, nor the expenditures in equipping a military force

and caring for the warriors' dependents during a compaign. In 1749, La Jonquière was told he had to go up to Montreal to distribute the annual presents and re-negotiate the military alliances:

> The greater part of the nations are accustomed to send in the spring of each year some deputies to Montreal to receive the presents of munitions and merchandise which is destined for them and the distribution of which is regulated by the Governor and Lieutenant-General, who goes to this town in the month of May to see to this distribution and to the negotiations of the affairs concerning these nations.[31]

French survival and security seemed tied to continuing amicable relations nourished on a regular basis by an increasing amount of presents.

Much more controversial was the argument that brandy was an essential element in retaining Native friendship, alliance and trade. A number of seventeenth-century French sources blamed the Dutch, the English, or the Huguenots for having introduced alcohol to the Native people and having corrupted them. Nevertheless, a number of sources also corroborate the testimony of the Native people that the first fishermen and sailors to visit North America, including French and Catholics, initiated what proved to be a nefarious traffic. Liquor was available in substantial quantities at Port Royal, Tadoussac and Quebec from the very foundation of these outposts. Both Champlain and Governor Montmagny (the Original "Onontio" or Great Mountain) issued prohibitions against its traffic. The Recollet missionaries who arrived in 1615 deplored its prevalence. Even the first nuns, who arrived in 1639, commented on the availability of alcohol and its evil consequence (probably due to the absence of salt in the diet and a low tolerance to a hitherto unknown drug, according to Marie de l'Incarnation) because they became "almost mad and raving". Thus, both church and state were concerned about the social, economic and

physical effects of brandy trafficking but, as shall be seen, neither was able to control effectively this trade or diminish its ravages among the Native people.[32]

The Church took a stand against brandy trafficking in 1657 when the abbé de Quéylus, Sulpician priest at Ville-Marie, Grand Vicar of the Archbishop of Rouen and highest ranking ecclesiastic in the colony at the time, ruled that although the use of intoxicants was in itself an indifferent matter, drunkenness as an end in itself (the charge levelled against the Native drinkers) was a mortal sin and should be repressed by the civil authority. Two years later, Bishop Laval arrived on the scene, adopted Quéylus' thesis, and soon launched a determined prohibition campaign. The churchmen's views were aptly recorded by another Sulpician who was the missionary to the Iroquois of the La Montagne reserve near Montreal, the abbé François Vachon de Belmont, in his Histoire de l'eau-de-vie. He concluded that the Native people "drink only to get drunk" as far as their drinking habits were concerned, and that on the matter of motivation "they get drunk only to do evil" and more specifically "as a cover for their most heinous crimes." This set the pattern for the interpretation of the nature, motives and consequences of Native drinking throughout the French régime.[33]

At least the Church directed its prohibitionary efforts at the sources of supply -- that is, at Frenchmen who traded or gave alcohol to the Native people. By a mandamus of 5 May 1660, Bishop Laval placed under minor excommunication, with the right to absolution of such a penalty reserved to himself alone, all persons who "give in payment to the natives, sell, trade or give freely and out of gratitude, either wine or brandies". Laval's authority was questioned but a reference to the Sorbonne University drew the theological opinion that he was within his ecclesiastical rights to impose the penalty of excommunication in such cases. The mandamus was renewed in 1662, but with little visible effect, for even the

earthquake of 1663, interpreted by the clergy on occasion as an indication of Divine displeasure, did not result in permanent "conversions". Again in 1669, Laval renewed his ecclesiastical prohibition and censures, and the Sorbonne in 1675 once more upheld his authority and interpretation of the sinful nature of the trade. Bishop Saint-Vallier, his successor, in the 1690s restricted himself to instructing the clergy in their duties towards attempting to diminish the evils of the trade. Quite clearly, ecclesiastical censures did not produce the desired results.[34]

Indeed, a decision of the Sorbonne University in April 1696 had affirmed that retailers who sold intoxicants and traders who carried it into the upper country for their own use were not guilty of any sin. This seemed to place the guilt largely on the Native people who wanted alcohol, who drank abusively and committed crimes and sins under its influence, while not absolving French traders who sold directly with the intention of inebriating their clients.[35] Missionaries in all fields continued to deplore the effects of this traffic on their evangelism. Even the reserves were subject to the undermining effects of the drug. The abbé Belmont had moved the La Montagne mission to Sault-au-Recollet to get away from Montreal in 1696, and to raise his flock in a more protected environment. The Lorette reserve of Hurons was lauded in the seventeenth century for having banned alcohol completely and for having enforced a regime of total abstinence on all its inhabitants. The Intendant Raudot wrote in 1710):

> ...they are wise Natives, obedient and who drank neither brandy, nor wine, nor beer. It appears very surprising that Natives whose greatest passion is to drink, and to get drunk, have reduced themselves to never tasting intoxicants although every day they have occasion to do so with us and among us in this town (Quebec) where they come to sell the produce they have.[36]

However, when Charlevoix visited the reserve in the 1720s he noted that there had been some falling away from this earlier zealousness although breaches of the solemn vow of total abstinence were subject to "a public penance". Peter Kalm later noted that "one seldom sees them drunk" and Latierrière in 1766 said that most had held out against all the temptations posed by the proximity of a European population anxious to provide them with intoxicants.[37]

Nevertheless, the stereotype of Native people with an inordinate desire for alcohol and of the "drunken savage" unable to "hold his liquor" remained. In November 1730 Bishop Hermann Dosquet issued another mandamus in which he berated his erring flock because "this torrent of iniquity swells from day to day and flows faster than ever". He forbade all the confessors of his vast diocese to absolve any person who directly or indirectly made intoxicants available to the Native people and reserved such cases to himself.[38] And still the traffic persisted. Laval, Saint-Vallier and Dosquet had all warned of possible divine retribution; the last bishop of the French regime, Pontbriand, issued a similar warning, and in fact the population may have understood the British conquest at some point as this long-announced Divine punishment.

The state supported the church's stand on the sale of intoxicants, but never with the same zeal. First, the duty on imported liquors brought the state an attractive revenue. Secondly, the conviction remained that alcohol had become a necessary ingredient in trade and war if the Native commercial and military alliances were to be retained. Finally, state officials wished to avoid any confrontation with the Native people on the matter of the application of French laws to Native nations. In 1644, Governor Montmagny issued the first ordinance prohibiting the sale of intoxicants to the Native people, whether or not converted, and followed this up with a number of directives for implementing the restrictions. When Pierre Boucher went to France in 1660 to urge more direct state direction of colonial

affairs he sensitized the Court to the enormity of the 'brandy question' in Canada. It was he who put forward the thesis that they had no tolerance to alcohol, that they had an inordinate desire for it and drank to become inebriated, that under its influence they committed terrible crimes and indecencies. As a result, the state was predisposed to accept the arguments of the abbé de Quéylus and Msgr. Laval on the need to impose prohibition.[39]

Accordingly, on September 15, 1663, the Sovereign Council at Quebec issued its first ordinance of prohibition providing for a 300-livre fine and, in the case of recidivism, for flogging and banishment. New ordinances with increased threats were issued, but to no avail. In 1678 the Governor and Intendant received orders from Versailles to hold a consultative assembly of twenty leading inhabitants to discuss the matter and a possible course of action. Fifteen of the members of this consultative assembly, sometimes erroneously referred to as the "Brandy parliament", thought the trade should not be restricted too severely, although all agreed some measures of control were necessary and that the moral and physical effects on the Native people had been disastrous. The result of this consultation, not an uncommon practice in matters of peculiarly colonial nature, was the proclamation of a royal edict in 1679 forbidding the carrying of intoxicants to the dwellings of the Amerindians.[40] The royal compromise avoided both absolute prohibition and unrestricted liquor trade; it did nothing to provide more effective control over French traders and soldiers, over the innkeepers, or over the Native people who tried to acquire it.

Efforts at control were no more successful in the eighteenth century. A decree of the Sovereign Council, dated 18 January 1707, restricted trade with the Native people in the settlement area to the three chief towns, forbade all traffic in brandies, required cabaret owners to obtain new licences in keeping with the observation "that the assured means of rendering the towns important and to extend to

all the inhabitants the gains of the fur trade with the natives has been to establish kinds of fairs in the said towns so that all the natives come there to trade and all the habitants can come to participate in the profits to be made." This was a follow-up to the royal order of May 1702 which had forbidden any giving of intoxicants to the Native people for a two-year period, an order that had been followed up by an arrêt of the Council of Quebec in April 1703 in the same sense and setting fines of 500 livres or a public flogging at the hands of the public executioner. Although none of these directives had brought about much improvement, it was decided in June 1707 to extend the prohibition with no time limit indicated.[41]

The Intendant Bégon renewed the prohibition in May 1721 with the stipulation that the 500-livre fine imposed should be divided equally between the informer and the hospitals, a clause that favoured the Montreal institutions. The Intendant Dupuy renewed the ordinance in 1726. A few traders were tried and convicted during Bégon's administration, but the fines were often only 100 livres rather than 500 livres and there seem to have been no informers rewarded, so the hospital at Montreal was the beneficiary. It should be noted that trafficking in brandies and other intoxicants did not constitute a criminal offence in the colony, rather it was "a matter of public order" as Colbert had defined it for Governor Frontenac in 1674.[42]

The church censures were not always easy to get around. The storekeeper at Frontenac in 1733, apparently worried about his spiritual status after having been denied for four years the right to confession by the Recollet chaplain, came down to Quebec to receive absolution from the coadjutor bishop. The bishop informed the Superior of the Recollets that it would be well if the chaplains were not too strict, this as a result of the complaints from Governor Beauharnois and Intendant Hocquart that "the curtailment" of brandy supplies in the interior "has caused part of the Indians from the posts to go to trade with the English", a matter of grave concern

because the Native people might "gradually detach themselves from the French" and still worse "the English will come to be the masters of the whole trade". Four years later, these same administrators repeated that they "unfortunately see no means of destroying or breaking the commercial relationships which this drink maintains between the Indians and the English." Post commanders also expected to be able to carry on some trade as part of the perquisites of office. The lease granted for Forts Frontenac and Niagara in 1742 had the following understanding attached to it:

> St. de Chalet agrees to trade this drink with convenient moderation. I have reason to believe that he will give it the necessary care so that there will be no abuse in this respect; and in that case it will be convenient that you should do your utmost to prevent any disturbances in this branch of his trade, the importance of which you are aware.

It was quite evident that the bureaucrats and officers were basically acting to protect their interests and that they viewed the Native people as valuable friends both as military allies and as customers.[43]

Studies of the fur trade often ignore the effects of alcohol in disrupting Native life. Eye-witness accounts of the disorder and destruction caused by excessive drinking are numerous -- some from those ideologically opposed to the traffic and some from those engaged in it. Father Le Jeune singled it out as a factor contributing to serious depopulation. The missionaries told of scenes of violence, murders, sexual assault, destruction of property and even the selling of children into slavery. One account said:

> ...drink is a demon that robs them of their reason, and so inflames their passion that after returning from the chase richly laden with beaver skins, instead of furnishing their families with provisions, clothing and other necessary supplies, they drink away the entire proceeds in one day and

> are forced to pass the winter in nakedness, famine and all sorts of deprivation. There have been those whose mania was so extraordinary that, after stripping themselves of everything for liquor, they sold even their own children to obtain the means of intoxication.

Collet's memorandum on brandy in 1703 emphasized the violence that resulted from this traffic, noted the falling away from religion of both traders and Native people, and provided a long list of unscrupulous traders who had met with accidents and violent death attributed to Divine intervention. Father Aulneau reported in 1736 that the traffic in intoxicants had reached the Lake of Woods area from both Hudson's Bay and French sources and that it had resulted in the "financial ruin" of several traders "but neither the loss of temporal goods nor the fear of the loss of God in eternity has as yet availed to abolish so shameful a trade", and it had resulted in "the destruction of several flourishing missions, and has induced many an Indian to cast aside every semblance of religion."[44]

These accounts, many embellished with lurid details and descriptions of pitiful demoralization, did point out three important characteristics of the problem. Firstly, it was not a problem confined to the Native people. The fulminations of the clergy against drunkenness and disorders in the Canadian parishes were equally numerous. Governor Duquesne pointed out the disorders that abounded among the French traders, soldiers and habitants in the upper country:

> What puts the capstone on this disorder is the fact that the French who inhabit this post [Illinois] have become as drunken as the Indians and to such a degree that they completely neglect their farms, and there is reason to fear that that place which formerly was a great resource for foodstuffs may not henceforth be able to supply itself...

What was already a problem in the area of French settlement became a much greater problem on the frontier away from the social restraints of civility. Similarly, the assault on traditional Native society by the totality of European intrusion had weakened the social restraints of their society. Instead of speaking of becoming "as drunken as the Indians" it may have been more accurate to write about becoming "as drunken as the French traders".

Secondly, there was the question of accountability and the acceptance of blame and responsibility. The traders said they only provided what the Native people wanted in order to preserve their business interests and prevent them from going over to the hated English. Even the missionaries rationalized that Native character was somewhat deficient and that their desire for alcohol was innate and uncontrollable. The Native people, on the other hand, blamed their weaknesses and problems on the Europeans and held them responsible, because they had introduced alcohol and continued to supply it. Perhaps there was a naive belief that the French were genuinely interested in their welfare, as the missionaries proclaimed, and that economic factors were not relevant to the problem.

Thirdly, there is the question of alcoholism. It would appear that the drinking pattern was occasional and seasonal, associated with trading encounters, fairs, the conclusion of alliances, etc. and that alcohol was not available in most areas on a sustained and regular basis in large quantities. The disorders consisted by and large of occasional three or four-day 'frolics'. It was only the "domiciled" Indians on the reserves near Montreal, Quebec and Trois Rivières who were exposed to year-round temptations, and many of them had set up strong abstinence fraternities. Therefore there is little relationship between later studies of alcohol addiction among Native people and the drunken deportment of the French regime. The reasons for drinking, however, may have been similar. These could range from release of suppressed hostility, the quest for

spirit possession, the ritualized eradiction of social inhibitions, protest behaviour, or simply a self-validating process of behaving as expected. The causes for the kinds of results it produced range from toxic poisoning, genetic idiosyncrasy, to theories about susceptibility and management of alcohol.

Another aspect of the brandy traffic and the economic relationship with the Native people was the great willingness to strike out against the coureurs-de-bois as supposedly the main perpetrators of disorders in the upper country. There is reason to believe, nevertheless, that they were not the only and not always the main instruments in passing brandy to the Native people. There is also reason to believe that they were the object of civil and ecclesiastical criticism and legislation because they represented an independence of spirit that was seen as threatening to established order and the fabric of an authoritarian society. They were attacked not only because of the brandy traffic but because they supposedly attracted others from the agricultural life of the parishes into a wandering existence that was adventuresome, unrestrained, exciting and uninhibited by social conventions. Were they not young men who escaped from social controls and authority, whether administrative, clerical, seigneurial, or familial? There is no documentation to support the view that the Native people had the same view of them, for they seemed to be the class of French who best accommodated to Native social conventions and way of life. Nor is there much evidence that at the popular level in New France they were loathed and despised. After all, did they not return for the most part to marry and settle in the colony, raise their families in the constraints of the seigneurial system and the Catholic religion? Did they not bring useful skills learned among the Native people to both the life of the habitant and that of the militiaman? And did they not also bring some needed capital back either for their families or to enable them to

establish themselves and provide for a family? In other words, they were condemned more on ideological grounds than on economic and practical grounds.[45]

That is not to say there were no abuses in the conduct of the fur trade. Traders sometimes pillaged each other's supply fleets and the Native people were not always above pillaging too. Raudot reported that a number of Saulteurs near Sault Ste. Marie "flock to pillage French canoes when they come along". Others, both French and Native middlemen, trafficked in English merchandise. The engagés were sometimes defrauded of their fair wages. In the 1740s the Ottawa at Michilimackinac complained that the Jesuits held back half the pay of a much appreciated gunsmith and consequently "it is impossible for him to provide for his wife and eight children who have become our responsibility, coming each day to eat in our cabins."[46] The granting of credit was forbidden yet widely practised. Both the French furnishers of trade goods and the Native suppliers of dressed furs could be the victims of this arrangement. The French trader might extend credit hoping to bind the Native client rather permanently to an exchange in which the mark-up on goods was grossly exaggerated. But the Native trader might also obtain merchandise on credit and, after he had become indebted, take the furs he owed in back payments to some other post or even to the Anglo-American or the Hudson's Bay post.[47]

Most frequently recorded are the abuses that crept into the trade operating out of the military posts under the supervision of Canadian officers of the troupes de la Marine which garrisonned the interior. A memorandum of 1718 said that if this abuse were removed the trade with the Native people would soon be "flourishing" and numbers of Canadians would go to settle in the hinterland and considerable towns would grow up around the posts. More than three decades later, Governor La Jonquière was warned about the same abuses:

> It would be wrong to leave you in the dark as to the complaints that have been reaching the King on the condition of trade in Canada. It is said that the management of the posts has been arranged in such a way that the whole trade is in the hands of a private company made up of a handful of individuals among whom are the officers of the post. Few trading opportunities remain therefore for the colony businessmen of those in France who usually send ships across. It is added that apart from the disreputability of the manoeuvring that thus occurs, the resulting abuses do great damage to the colony and its trade and even to our control of the Natives.
>
> I am far from forgetting that the measures you have already reported to quell the abuses in the Native trade in furs on the part of traders and outfitters may have been effective in stirring up these complaints. Yet they are too sweeping to be taken as unfounded. It would not be surprising to find that you were, at the beginning of your administration, invited to see the benefits for the colony in arrangements which are open to abuse, and people you ought normally to trust may have deceived you.

Louis Franquet wrote, at the same period, that the officers were more preoccupied with trade than with their military duties and made great profits with which they retired eventually to their town houses. Some made a profit of about 100,000 livres after a three-year tour of duty in the upper country. He said that Captain Marin, for example, at Baie des Puants had sent back 400 bales of beaver pelts and 365 of other furs in one season. A memorandum of 1758, destined for publication, deplored this use of public military office for private gain, a preview of the criticisms that would lead in a couple decades to a reform of the French bureaucracy. The author wondered what the Native people thought of such "illicit and shameful gains" made while presumably serving the interests of the Crown.[48]

The illicit trade carried on with Anglo-American contacts, notably at Albany, while depriving the monopoly company of an undetermined proportion of Canadian furs and depriving the administration of the revenues from the export duties on these furs, did permit the entry of foreign goods into an otherwise closed mercantile system. The clandestine trade between Montreal and Albany (or Orange as the French persisted in calling it) began to flourish when a glut occurred on the French market in 1696 and Canadians still felt obliged to accept all the furs the Native people presented in exchange for European merchandise. Pontchartrain in Versailles warned the Governor-General that it was "unfortunate that you were obliged to permit a few of these natives to go to Orange to trade and it is an extremity into which one must absolutely never again fall." Instead, Vaudreuil was told by the Minister of Marine and Colonies that he should stir up a war between the "domiciled natives" and the English.[49]

The crux of the problem was that the Native people were not bound by French mercantilist directives, and they had the right to trade with anyone, including the English. When the French seized bales of furs being carried illicitly to Albany, the plea invariably was that they belonged to the "domiciled natives" of either the Jesuit or the Sulpician reserve near Montreal, who enjoyed freedom of trade. The Governor-General, who was commonly believed to have sympathized with those Montrealers who "passed" furs to New York in this manner, asked the Council of Marine in 1715 to permit him, the Intendant and a senior Councillor to rule on disputed cases in order to avoid long judicial procedures which would "alienate the natives from our cause". The Governor of Montreal and the Intendant were afraid that interference with this Native right might upset the interior tribes as well. The firm of Neret and Gayot, which held the lease on the fur trade monopoly in 1715, was obliged to repay to the Sault St. Louis

Iroquois the duties they had charged them. A clause had been written into the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) confirming the Iroquois right to trade freely.[50]

In the spring of 1718, Vaudreuil assembled the Natives people of Sault St. Louis and Sault-au-Récollet reserves to obtain their agreement that henceforth they would be required "to obtain permission in writing from him to carry there [Albany] only the peltries of their hunt, the quantity being stipulated therein." The Council of Marine in Versailles approved of this measure in 1721 but insisted that the military officers at Fort Chambly on the Richelieu River and at the northern end of Lake Champlain should carefully check all shipments of goods in each direction. The local Governor of Montreal should also assure himself that only goods for the personal use of the reserve residents were imported. The local authorities agreed to these controls, saying they would "continue to give the Natives to understand their canoes bound to and from Orange are searched only to prevent the French from committing fraud" and that they should bring back only "goods of the quantity and quality used by them". It was common knowledge that these consignments included English trade goods suitable for the western fur trade and luxury goods for the Montrealers, including the religious communities.[51]

It was a contraband trade that profited certain Albany merchants too. Three examples serve to confirm this. John Henry Lydius was engaged in this illicit trade at an early date and in 1725 moved to Montreal, married there, and acted as agent for a number of New Englanders who participated in the clandestine trade. Although he was eventually forced to leave Montreal, he moved to Fort Nicholson on the upper Hudson, from which point Peter Kalm informs us he continued to carry on commerical relations with Montreal merchants.[52] Cornelius Cuyler was also heavily involved in this trade and thought it sufficiently important to his overall operations to visit Montreal in person in 1751. Governor-General La Jonquière

complained officially that while there he was "constantly conferring with the Natives in a house in which he lodged in this town, all of which is highly improper."[53] Robert Sanders, who was mayor of Albany during the peak of his trading operations with Montreal in the early 1750s, was extremely successful in establishing undercover relations with leading merchants, using a code for communicating in three languages (French, English, Mohawk), and using the services of the "domiciled natives" to run the furs and return merchandise. This illicit traffic was confided to five or six trustworthy trading captains and it succeeded in bribing the officers at military check-points when necessary, and avoided detection and prosecution for many years through the activities of the Desaulniers sisters at Caughnawaga and probably the connivance of the Jesuit missionaries as well.[54]

Contraband trade involving furs and Native participants existed in other areas, of course, but not on the same scale as the Montreal-Albany network. The considerable Louisbourg trade with New England, which historians too often neglect, does not appear to have involved the Micmacs and rarely did it include furs. Versailles warned Vaudreuil in 1706, when he appointed Vincennes commander at Miami fort and Louvigny at Michilimackinac post, both of whom had been tried for contraband activities, that if they persisted in their illicit pursuits in the upper country Vincennes would be dismissed. There is no indication that furs from the remote posts were scrupulously directed only to the Company's warehouse in Quebec. Albany merchants in the 1730s had started shipping goods to Canada over the ice of Lake Champlain during the winter months. Illicit trade flourished at Fort St. Frédéric after 1737, and the Abenakis on the reserves south of Trois Rivières became involved in it. In the 1750s this contraband activity drew some official attention as a Mme de Lusignan, who ran a store at the fort, quarrelled with the officers over control of this lucrative trade, which included even the exotic ginseng.[55]

Contraband trade was reported in the early 1750s as being directed towards Oswego from the Lac des Deux Montagnes reserve on the east to Fort Rouillé (Toronto) on the west. Benjamin Stoddert, operating out of Albany, drew furs away from Fort Frontenac and Fort Rouillé on the north shore of Lake Ontario. At Fort Niagara, clandestine trade with the English had become sufficiently profitable to induce several French traders to settle at Albany. In 1724, some traders in the lower St. Lawrence valley had been apprehended for trading with New England. It was a problem that was never resolved because the profits were sizable and payments for furs were immediate; the goods acquired were eagerly sought by the wealthier members of colonial society; some trade merchandise was almost essential to the western fur trade; and convictions for contraband trading were difficult to obtain because of the involvement of the Native people who enjoyed immunity from mercantilist restrictions.[56]

An important aspect of trade relations was the competitiveness that characterized French and British activities in North America. The French authorities thought they could prevent their own traders from dealing directly with the English but they had no illusions about being able to force the Native people to trade only with them. Intendant Raudot said in 1707 that "regarding the natives, we can only solicit them not to go to the English and we cannot stop them from doing so." This commercial competition, from the Native point of view, involved non-economic as well as economic considerations. A memorandum of 1730 summarized the situation as follows:

> It is believed and is a fact that, in general, all the natives like and stand in awe of the French, distrust the English, and all our merchandise is much better. And they recognize that they cannot get along without our powder, our white blankets, and our cloth for over-clothing, our vermillion, cutlery, trinkets -- so there are only yard-goods

> and kettles which they obtain more reasonably from the English and which are two items to which our attention must be turned...[57]

Competition involved three major considerations: human relations, quality of goods, and exchange rates.

In terms of human relations, we have already seen the generally favourable intercourse that resulted from the trade, missions, exploration and military contacts which required the acquiescence, if not open support, of the Native people. By avoiding any authoritarian impositions and shunning any dispossession from ancestral lands, the French were able to distinguish themselves from the English who often acted differently in their Atlantic seaboard colonies. The observance of traditional Native ceremonialism in trade and alliances, the frequency of métissage, the presence of coureurs-de-bois in the hinterland, the emergence of a syncretic Catholicsm were some of the evidences of an acculturation which, while not always meeting with the approval or support of the French authorities, brought the Amerindian and European cultures into a more harmonious relationship.

To provide the Native people with the kinds of goods desired, in terms of durability, practicability, attractiveness and aesthetic appeal, it was sometimes necessary to manufacture specifically for the American market, or else to obtain goods from one's competitor. In 1713 Governor Vaudreuil and Intendant Bégon informed the Minister of Marine and Colonies that the Native people seemed to prefer English strouds, therefore they asked that either similar cloth be sent or that the King grant permission to import from England "since necessity knows no law." Three years later, in response to this Native demand for strouds, which was a popular item in the British trade, manufacturers in Languedoc had produced a scarlet woollen cloth "more beautiful than those of the English and which in future will look exactly like them because of the attention that will be paid to

imitating them carefully." At the same time the Crown forbade the direct importation of all foreign manufactures into Canada. But the Native consumers were not satisfied because not only were the colour and feel of the cloth different from the English but "the natives are as refined in judging the quality of stuffs as the most clever wholesaler, taking care to burn the pile of the sample to examine the thread." In 1717 samples of the English and Languedoc écarlatines were sent to Versailles -- with the comment that the French material was more loosley woven, contained less wool, was less strong and the warp and woof were different — so that proper strouds could be made for the Canadian market.[58]

In 1722, the Council of Marine asked the firm of Veuve Pascaud in La Rochelle to import écarlatines and blue cloth from England, but the wealthy widow agreed only after she was granted permission to send 23,000 pounds of castor sec from Quebec direct to Holland in order to meet the additional overhead costs of such a transaction. In 1749, after the War of Austrian Succession, another attempt was made to duplicate English strouds in France. Governor La Jonquière and Intendant Bigot were not impressed with the results and commented that "the article is frightful; the red cloth is brown and undressed; the blue, of a very inferior quality to that of England; and that as long as such ventures are sent out, they will not become the favourites of the natives." By the 1750s, French blankets and ratteen used in making stockings were in demand once again as some of the Native people had discovered that English strouds were made of woollen rags. A financial observer wrote in 1758 that since French goods had driven English cloth out of the Levantine trade there was no reason for not supposing Montauban écarlatines with Carcassone dyes would not carry the day in America. The Native people wanted strouds for every day use and finery, for both men and women; the wealthier ones wanted red, blue and black cloth with borders and fringes of different colours, and the others wanted plain white four and half

point blankets. The demand for English manufactures was being kept alive by certain Montreal merchants engaged in a remunerative illicit trade with Albany, according to Governor La Galisonnière.[59]

The quality of goods offered in trade depended upon the standard demanded by the Native people and on the quality offered by the English competitors. French trade goods were generally of high quality and were much appreciated by the Native people. As Jérémie said, "we trade with the Natives on very favourable terms as long as we have merchandise according to their specifications." In the eighteenth century the French dominated in the Spanish colonial market, and by mid-century they had displaced the British in the Levant, Spain and Portugal. They were taking the lion's share of the cod off Newfoundland, while the Hudson's Bay Company's share of northern furs declined from 69,911 pounds in 1738 to 39,505 pounds in 1748. It would appear from the studies of Harold Innis, Jean Lunn, Dale Miquelon, Murray Lawson, Arthur Ray and W.J. Eccles that the French fur trade more than doubled the English on the average. It was the better quality of their goods in general, except for woollens, and their attention to the tastes and demands of the Native people -- what the American Gazeteer in 1762 called "some secret of conciliating the affections of the savages which our traders seem stranger to" -- that ensured this superiority in the North American trade.[60]

Supplying better goods required constant vigilance and sensitivity to Native reactions. Governor Beauharnois protested in 1702 that "some of the goods sent this year from Rochelle on the public account, are found to be defective, and others spoiled." A quantity of tobacco was described as "absolutely rotten" and was sent back to be replaced because the Native people expected exceptionally high quality tobacco from the French. In 1736 the lower Mississippi was to be supplied from Canada because the quality of cloth imported

at Quebec was superior to that available at New Orleans. The following year precise instructions were given about the kind of guns required:

> Instead of the trade guns that we had requested for the Natives and of which we had great need, there were sent to us from Rochefort some very heavy buccaneer's muskets which they do not like. We shall try to find a market for them among the settlers. The swords are likewise useless for us because of their weight, and the colony will never be better provided for so long as they are unwilling to be convinced at Rochefort that everything that is heavy is not at all suitable for the Natives because people who are always running through the woods wish nothing except what is very light.[61]

By the 1750s, silver objects had become an important item of trade in the Great Lakes region. Oswego ran stiff competition with Fort Niagara, as the abbé Picquet informs us:

> ...we wanted to imitate the English in the trifles they sell to the Natives, such as silver and other bracelets, etc. The Natives compared both and weighed them, the storekeeper at Niagara assured me, and it was found that the bracelets of Chouegan weighed as much as ours and were of purer silver and more attractive and cost only two beaver pelts, whereas we wanted to sell them for ten beaver at the King's posts. Instead of gaining credit we were discredited this year among the nations so that this silverware is going to remain as a dead loss in the King's magazine.[62]

The Native buyer was discriminating in taste and value and, far from being exploited and taken in by inferior quality or short measure, he could command goods of acceptable standard.

The Hudson Bay Company was very conscious of the good reputation of the French trade, as it often cut seriously into its

profits. Hatchets, Brazil tobacco and brandies were imported from France and muskets were made on the model of those the French supplied after 1726. One report in 1728 said:

> Never was any man so upbraided with our powder, kettles and hatchets, than we have been this summer by all the natives, especially by those that border near the French. Our cloth likewise is so stretched with the tenter-hooks,...the natives are grown so politic in their way in trade, so as they are not to be dealt with as formerly, for they value not giving a skin or two more than what is common, providing the commodity be good and serviceable...

One factor observed in 1733 that so long as "their cloth exceed ours in goodness" the northern hunters would be drawn away in significant numbers. From Moose River in the following year came the warning that English powder was of such poor quality that the hunters who "sometimes trade with the French and know the difference between theirs and ours" would cease trading with the English. Another aspect of the French trade was that the coureurs-de-bois went far into the hinterland to collect the furs and bring trade goods so that the northern hunters did not need to travel to tidewater to trade. Many Algonkians "choose rather to trade the goods up in the country than have the fatigue of coming down here, and are grown so nice and difficult in the way of trade."[63]

Price was a consideration for both the French and Native traders. It is difficult to know at what price specific items were sold at Montreal, Michilimackinac, or Fort Niagara. We have some indications of the fluctuations in prices of goods in La Rochelle, some lists of the barter values at Montreal in terms of beaver pelts, and some estimates of comparative prices at New York and Montreal. But these tell us very little about what was paid to or exacted from the Native trader. It tells us little about overhead costs for getting goods to and from the interior, or the "hidden" costs in

presents, hospitality, and so on. A memorandum of 1730 observed that kettles, a popular item of trade, had to be light-weight and easy to carry for the use of the nomadic hunting bands, but this item did not bring high profits to a French trader because a kettle could serve 10 to 12 persons and last for 8 to 10 years, whereas cloth, being less durable and each person requiring about 4 ells each year, was a more profitable trade item. There is some evidence that French goods did compete successfully with those of the Hudson Bay Company. In 1743, Arthur Dobbs said that because the French gave "goods at a cheaper rate than the Company, all the Eastern and Southern Trade is in a manner lost to the French."[64]

The Hudson Bay Company also recognized that "the French are a people that seldom spare for cost when a good bargain is to be purchased." Not only was the price and quality of European trade goods an important element, and the Native people had something to say about this as well as we have seen, but also the price offered for pelts of varying kinds and quality was important. A Paris document, dated 1689, would seem to indicate that there was quite a disparity between what was paid at Orange for eight pounds of powder and a gun and what was paid at Montreal -- three prime beaver pelts at Orange and nine at Montreal, but if the furs travelled from Montreal to Albany this disparity takes on a very different meaning. The interior tribes traded with Montreal at the annual fair or else through French voyageurs in the hinterland, not directly with Albany. In the eastern region of the Hudson Bay Company operations a factor acknowledged in 1732 that the French offered "one marten as one beaver, whereof our standard is rated as three martens to one beaver, which causes the natives to trade their small furs with them." On the other hand, a report from Fort Albany in 1716 claimed that the Natives there "all in general told me that the French trade hard with them, and I give twice the value for beaver and all other furs, cats excepted." It was hoped to capture a "Benjamin's portion" of the trade started by

Pierre Esprit Radisson "not out of more love to us than to the French but purely on account that we give near twice the value for the furs."[65]

These subjective statements do not resolve the issue of how profitable the trade was to each participant. They do indicate that the Native people were not systematically exploited and cheated of fair value of goods and they indicate that the French found their profit as well. It has sometimes been said that the Native people were unaware of the value of the furs they offered in exchange when these reached the European market. By the same token, a French manufacturer could not estimate the value in economic or non-economic terms of a given article when it finally became the possession of an Iroquoian warrier or an Algonkian hunter. There were intermediaries on both sides of the overall transactions. Each culture may have valued the items traded by a different scale of values. It is certain the French had to consider the high transportation costs of goods both ways across the ocean, the risks involved and costs such as insurance and handling charges, as well as the overhead expenses between Quebec and the interior. The Native people, on their part, spent far more time and effort in preparing goods for exchange than did the Europeans. Both became involved so deeply in this trade that they became somewhat dependent on each other and neither party could unilaterally extricate itself completely. The economic tie was one that truly bound them together.

## Chapter IV Endnotes

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CHAPTER V

## Security and Stability: French-Amerindian Military Relations

It has already been indicated that initial contacts were not always friendly or peaceful. Not only were the French aggressive in their approach to "new peoples" but also the Native people had learned to mistrust the intruders from Europe and to suspect their motives and keep themselves in a state of military preparedness. Furthermore, the French contacts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries coincided with important inter-tribal wars, hence a period when external intrusion and participation could shift the balance in favour of one of the protagonists.

Cartier's expeditions came at the time of Laurentian Iroquoian occupation of the St. Lawrence valley, and possibly during the last phase of an Iroquois-Micmac war. There also seems to have been considerable Micmac-Inuit hostility, as the Inuit were being forced to retreat from the northern shore of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the rugged terrain that Cartier called "the land God gave to Cain". Even the Stadaconans, distributed in at least six villages in the vicinity of present-day Quebec, and Hochelagans, living in at least three villages on the island of Montreal, do not appear to have been on particularly friendly terms with each other. The Hochelagans described for Cartier their enemies, the agojuda (Hurons?) or evil men, who lived up the Ottawa River and wore wooden-slat armour; the Stadaconans, he learned, were in constant conflict with the Toudamans (Micmacs?). The French, having made no permanent settlements in the 1540s, were not drawn into these conflicts.[1]

Between the time of Roberval's withdrawal in 1543 and the return of the French traders in the St. Lawrence valley in the 1580s the Laurentian Iroquoian villages and their inhabitants had disappeared leaving a no man's land for later French settlement in the

seventeenth century. The French were puzzled by this annihilation and advanced a number of hypotheses that have continued to stimulate speculation and research in our day. Lescarbot said in 1609 that the Iroquois had destroyed the Laurentians; the Recollets Denis Jamet and Gabriel Sagard, as well as the Jesuit Relation of 1635 and Du Creux's History of Canada, adopted the same explanation. But a Jesuit Relation of 1642, which Charlevoix repeated in the eighteenth century, claimed that the Laurentians had been Algonkian peoples and the Hurons had decimated them. Nicolas Perrot opined that the Iroquois were the original inhabitants of the St. Lawrence valley and the Algonkians had driven them out. It is not certain whether this oral tradition referred to an earlier Iroquois occupation of the region or to the Laurentian occupation. Charles Aubert de la Chesnaye attempted in 1697 to put together a number of oral traditions; he concluded that Algonkian peoples had originally inhabited the St. Lawrence valley, that Iroquoian peoples (Laurentians?) had displaced them and, shortly before the arrival of the French, the Algonkians with several Iroquoian tribes had driven them out.[2]

Pierre Chauvin and Samuel de Champlain established trading counters at Tadoussac (1600) and Quebec (1608) during the last phase of an Algonkian-Huron war against the Five Nations Iroquois. It seems quite possible that the Algonkians and Mohawks had been responsible for the destruction of the Stadaconans and that the Hurons destroyed the western villages and absorbed the remnants of the Hochelagans. In any case, the Iroquois League seems to have come into being as a defensive alliance in about A.D. 1570, and the Huron-Algonkian alliance was still in effect when French trade and settlement came into the region. Champlain could profit from a fertile river valley open to French settlement, but the price paid was joining in the war still being waged against the Iroquois.

France became involved in a century of warfare against the Iroquois as a result of these circumstances. The traders entered into an alliance with the Algonkian, Montagnais and Huron nations. To maintain these trade relations and enlist the co-operation of the Native people living north of the St. Lawrence entrance to the continent, Champlain agreed to accompany a raiding party into Mohawk country in 1609. In a battle on the shores of Lake Champlain, he fired his arquebus and killed two Iroquois chiefs. The Iroquois fled in panic but they would return many times to harrass the French settlements. In April 1610, the allied tribes were waiting for Champlain when he returned from a journey to France to start another expedition against the Mohawks who had built a palisaded fort at the mouth of the Richelieu River. Champlain led a successful attack and routed the Iroquois once more.

In May 1615, when Champlain returned from another voyage to France, the allied tribes were again anxious that he accompany them against the Iroquois. He decided to push into the interior, into the Huron country near Georgian Bay, in company with some Recollet missionaries. In September, a large party of Hurons set out for the Iroquois country south of the eastern end of Lake Ontario. Champlain accompanied them and they attacked a heavily fortified Onondaga village which had four stockades about ten metres high. The undisciplined Huron attack failed to penetrate these defenses, and in the fighting Champlain received a couple arrow wounds, one in the leg and the other in the knee, which put an effective end to his travelling extensively by canoe. The Iroquois were now confirmed enemies of the French while the Hurons were staunch allies.

The French presence in Huronia and the central role of the Huron Confederacy in the trade of the interior determined the Iroquois to destroy the latter and to establish themselves as middlemen. It was the Huron who re-opened hostilities in 1641 after a number of years of relative peace. Meanwhile, in 1645 the Montagnais made peace

with the Mohawks at Trois Rivières. By 1648, Seneca and Mohawk raids into Huron Territory proved so destructive that a number of villages were abandoned and crops left unharvested. The Hurons appear to have been demoralized as a result of severe epidemics, the famine of 1648-49, and the bitter struggle between Catholic converts and traditionalists for control of their tribal councils.

The Iroquois, encouraged by their success, kept an unusually large armed force of over 1,000 warriors in the forests north of Lake Ontario throughout the winter, ready to strike in the spring. The Huron villages were attacked in succession. They were unable to co-ordinate their defense and concentrate their forces to relieve besieged villages. The Iroquois, contrary to widely disseminated interpretations, possessed neither superior arms nor superior numbers; it was their well co-ordinated attacks, making superb use of traditional weapons, armour and mobility, that carried the day. The Jesuits burned their mission headquarters at Ste. Marie-des-Hurons and soon many survivors found themselves running an Iroquois blockade of the lower Ottawa River to seek refuge at Quebec. The Huron-Iroquois war had resulted in the dispersal of the Huron Confederacy and the destruction of the most promising Catholic missions; it also posed an Iroquois threat to the fur trade of the upper country.[3]

The Iroquois continued to press their advantage. Marie de l'Incarnation and the Jesuits saw them either as Satan's agents bent on destroying the church of the New World or as God's instrument for punishing recalcitrant Catholics and unresponsive pagans. Bishop Laval felt disposed to preach a crusade against "the infidels". Governor Rémy de Courcelles headed up a punitive expedition with troops from France in January 1666, a season when the Mohawks would least expect an attack and at a time when the Five Nations Confederacy was experiencing the effects of a smallpox epidemic and attacks from hostile tribes. The French expeditionary force never made contact with the main body of Mohawks, but it

suffered severe casualties from the winter weather and a sudden spring thaw on Lake Champlain. In September 1666, a second expedition of 1,400 men set out with about 100 Hurons and Algonkians. They burned four principal Mohawk villages and destroyed all their food supplies. A large cross and a post with the King's arms were set up claiming the land for France. The Iroquois accepted the French peace terms.[4]

By 1675 the Iroquois, having come to terms with their Andaste and Mahican enemies, were once again ready to challenge French trading activities in the Lake Ontario region. Governor Frontenac hesitated to take any military action, even when the Iroquois began pillaging French trade brigades. LeFebvre de la Barre, who succeeded him, called an assembly of notables at Quebec on 10 October 1682 to deliberate policy concerning the Iroquois. It was decided that only a war of extermination could save the French colony and the Native allies, but this could be undertaken only if substantial troop reinforcements were sent from France. In the meantime, the Iroquois pressed their attacks against the Miamis and Illinois, while stalling for time by negotiating with La Barre. When the Iroquois attacked Fort St. Louis on the Illinois, La Barre finally decided to take the offensive. He wrote:

> I shall go into the Iroquois country with 1,200 settlers and spend the winter there, in order to entice all the Natives to come and attack us in the spring of 1684, when they will be destroyed. They number 2,600 warriors, but our young men are hardened and accustomed to the woods, beside the fact that we shall wage war better than they, and that a few cannon will give us a great advantage.

La Barre's expedition numbered only 700 Canadian militiamen, several hundred Native allies and 150 French regulars. In August peace negotiations were held on marsh terrain (at a place appropriately named Anse de la Famine) on the south-eastern shores of Lake Ontario; La Barre's men were ill in great numbers, and so the Governor-General

was forced to accept humiliating terms which included the abandonment of the Illinois allies to their fate at the hands of the Iroquois. The allied tribes felt they could no longer rely on French support in case of attack. La Barre was recalled for having signed a "shameful peace" just when 300 seasoned soldiers arrived at Quebec from France.[5]

The Marquis de Denonville had the unenviable task, upon assuming the office of King's representative in New France in 1685, of humbling the Iroquois and restoring French prestige and honour. He travelled to Fort Frontenac to survey the colonial situation and quickly came to the conclusion it needed a stronger military character. He supported the militia, began the practice of giving the sons of Canadian nobility career opportunities as officers in the Troupes de la Marine, started a school for navigation at Quebec, and set the troops to building defensive palisades around the town of Montreal. To deal with the threats to the system of Native alliances, he sent an expedition under Pierre de Troyes to James Bay to capture the three Hudson's Bay posts and secure the northern flank of the fur trade region. Then, in June 1687, with a combined force of over 2,200 men, he headed towards Fort Frontenac, where an advance party had already captured some 60 men and about 150 women and children who were sent down to Montreal as hostages to be used in later negotiations as required. The Senecas fled after a brief encounter but their villages and food supplies were destroyed. A new fort was built at Niagara before the army returned to Montreal. Denonville had been ordered to enslave the Iroquois tribes and to send a large number to serve as slaves in the Mediterranean galley fleet, but he only sent 36 prisoners to France with a request that they be well treated and soon released.

The Iroquois, however, were not destroyed and they kept up their raids on French outposts, especially when an epidemic raged through the French towns and seigneuries. When war broke out between Britain and France in 1689 the Iroquois were encouraged to take the

offensive once again. On 5 August 1689 a force of about 150 warriors attacked Lachine, destroyed 56 homes, killed 24 settlers on the spot and took scores prisoner, killing 42 of these later. A small punitive expedition managed to kill 18 Iroquois and capture 3 others who were brought to Montreal and burned alive on the main square of the town. Fort Niagara and Fort Frontenac were both abandoned. However great Denonville's military skills, he was unable to bring the Iroquois war to a successful conclusion.[6]

Exhausted by his overseas posting, Denonville asked to be replaced, and his successor was none other than Frontenac returning for a second term. Among the colonists Frontenac enjoyed a rather undeserved reputation as a great military leader and skilful negotiator with the Native people. His appointment boosted colonial morale. In 1690 he sent three small raiding parties into northern New England to harrass the backers of the Iroquois.

The Iroquois came to the very gates of Quebec, burning houses and stores in the lower town and lighting a huge bonfire at the gates of the fort. They demanded that Frontenac give them one of the nuns as a hostage, a demand he did not want to concede. But he felt obliged to honour them so, on the advice of the Jesuits, he had "dressed up as a religious the most beautiful of the ill-reputed woman just come out from Paris and delivered her to those brutes". He then agreed to a truce and gave them strong drink to conclude the negotiations. When they were intoxicated he traded two containers of brandy for the release of the woman.

When a Boston fleet under Sir William Phips failed to frighten Quebec into surrendering, Frontenac's reputation soared. It was the Iroquois, not the English, who would do most of the fighting. In July 1696, Frontenac ordered an attack on the Onondaga village where the council fire of the Five Nations was located. The Onondaga burned their village and fled as the French force closed in on them.

The French destroyed all their stores and corn crops before moving on to attack the main Oneida village and its food supplies. By attacking the central tribes, rather than the Mohawks or keepers of the eastern gate and Senecas or keepers of the western gate, the French were striking at the heart of the League and shaking its very foundations. They were also carrying out the total war the Ministry of Marine and Colonies had decided was necessary to bring the Iroquois to terms:

> What obliged His Majesty to send a large corps of troops to Canada was, in the first place, the design of exterminating the Iroquois and next the obligation to defend oneself against the English. One must give up the opinion of destroying this nation using regular troops only, these savages running the woods like wild animals and not being caught by surprise except by people who make war like them, for which the officers and soldiers of Europe are not suited.[7]

The signing of peace between the British and French in 1697 enabled the French to concentrate their efforts on ending a century of fighting with the Iroquois. English sources reported that the interior tribes brought pressure to bear on the Senecas, that many Iroquois were induced to come to live on the two reserves near Montreal, and that the French nurtured factionalism "and take off by Poison those that cannot be seduced and deluded." Negotiations began in earnest in 1700 with the officers Maricourt and Joncaire, along with Father Bruyas, attending the Onondaga council. Governor Callières suggested to Versailles that the Iroquois country be "declared neutral, and a stipulation made that neither French nor English be allowed to make any establishment there." When the Iroquois delegates came to Montreal to continue the talks, they said:

> When we came here last, we planted the tree of Peace; now we give it roots to reach the Far Nations, in order that it may be strengthened; we add leaves also to it, so that good business may be transacted under its shade...

Peace was signed between the Iroquois tribes, the Allied Nations of the upper country and the French with great festivities at Montreal in 1701. In 1703 a Seneca chief came to pledge friendship to Governor Vaudreuil saying as he presented a wampum belt, "we give you absolute domain of our country" and asking that "if any mischance befall us, in which we need aid, consider us as your children." This was not a proposition emanating from the central council, and Vaudreuil suspected a plot against the Ottawa nation which had taken up a middleman role in the western trade. The French Jesuits seized the opportunity to return to Onondaga to pursue their evangelical labours and political intrigues, but they were forced to leave in 1709. Nevertheless, the peace of 1701 held, and the Five Nations maintained a neutral role while playing off French and English to their own advantage.[8]

In 1700, prior to the Treaty of Montreal, the Iroquois recognized the right of the Ottawas to hunt along the north shore of Lake Ontario, saying "we are glad to see you in our country" and gave a wampum belt as a pledge of "perpetual peace and friendship between us and our young men to hunt together in love and amity." The founding of Detroit by Lamothe Cadillac in 1701 complicated western French policy. His ambitious plans for the settlement resulted in closer contacts between the interior tribes and the Iroquois (enhancing the opportunities to influence the Allied nations), and the relocation of many Ottawas, Miamis and Hurons near Detroit resulted in inter-group conflicts. It was the Miamis who in 1704 broke the general peace by killing some Iroquois. Vaudreuil suspected this had been done at the instigation of the English. He had the commandant at St. Joseph River, Sieur de Vincennes, upbraid them:

> Should you not remember what we said when we made general peace among all the nations that you would henceforth hunt peacably and that you took the Iroquois for your brother, that you would all have the same kettle, the same knife, and that together

> you would drink the same broth when you met? You have nevertheless broken your word; you have reddened the ground with the blood of the Iroquois.

The Ottawas, according to reports from Sieur de Tonty, interim commander at Detroit, were stirring up trouble too, were insolent to the French, and had attacked a Seneca hunting party near Fort Frontenac, killing several hunters and carry others off as prioners to Michilimackinac. French policy was quite clearly to maintain peace among the Allied Nations so that trade and missions could proceed unhampered. It may have been the re-opening of hostilities with Britain that set new intrigues in motion.[9]

The War of the Spanish Succession placed enormous strains on the alliances. In the autumn of 1705 the Illinois killed two Frenchmen and seriously wounded the Jesuit missionary Jacques Gravier. Governor Vaudreuil cut off all shipments of arms and ammunition to Michilimackinac and decided to press the Ottawas near the latter post to send down the slaves they had promised to give the Iroquois in compensation. He wanted at all costs to avoid an Iroquois-Ottawa war "because these two nations balance each other and if the Iroquois entirely defeated the Ottawas they would be in a position to make war on us not having anything more to fear from the people of the upper country." Cadillac's insults profferred to the Senecas did not help to stabilize the situation. The Ottawas did come down to Montreal in 1707 to make amends for their attack at Detroit, offered two slaves "to cover the dead" and presented a collar to the Governor-General "to have free passage to the Great River".[10]

As the British prepared a full-scale invasion of Canada, the Jesuits were forced to leave the Onondaga mission and seek refuge at Albany. All but the Senecas, who had the most to fear from an attack by the allied tribes of the Great Lakes region, were ready "to take up the hatchet" against the French. De Ramezay at Montreal prepared a counter-force made up of Abenakis, some domiciled Iroquois, Ottawas

and Nipissings to meet this new Iroquois threat, backed by Anglo-American troops, but on the advice of the Amerindians and the Canadian militia decided to wait and see how events developed. The Mohawks were the principal advocates of war against New France, while the Onondagas counselled maintaining their neutral position. Father Charlevoix later recounted how Montreal was saved from attack:

> In fact, the Iroquois had no sooner joined the English army, than, believing it strong enough to take Montreal without their help, they thought only of means to destroy it, and resorted to the following. The army was encamped on the banks of a little river; the Iroquois, who spent almost all of the time hunting, threw into it, just above the camp, all the skins of the animals they flayed, and the water was thus soon all corrupted. The English, unsuspicious of this treachery, continued to drink this water, and it carried off so many, that Father de Mareuil, and two officers who went to Orange to conduct him to Canada, observing the graves where the dead were buried, estimated the number at over a thousand.

This was successful bacteriological warfare.[11]

Vaudreuil and de Ramezay's policy had paid off, especially since word came from France that no additional support would be forthcoming from the metropole as "His Majesty would not be in a state presently to offer protection of one tribe against attack from another." The keystone was the Iroquois realization, as expressed by Charlevoix, that "they were persuaded that if either of these nations [Britain and France] should entirely get the ascendent over the other, they must soon be subjected themselves." Hence they developed "the secret of balancing their success."

In 1711, approximately 500 warriors from the allied tribes arrived at Montreal to pledge support against the Anglo-Americans. In these circumstances, the Iroquois renewed the terms of the general

peace of 1701 at a parley in Montreal in 1712. The Treaty of Utrecht, which ended the war between the European rivals, gave the Iroquois the advantage of offical British protection while enjoying a neutral status and the right to trade freely with both the French and English and their respective allies. In other words, the Treaty of Utrecht gave international recognition to a situation that had already been negotiated more than a decade earlier at Montreal. In fact, this permitted Montrealers through Native intermediaries to trade with Albany as well. As a follow-up to the peace terms, the French built forts at Niagara, Rouillé (Toronto) and Quinté in the 1720s. Governor Beauharnois wanted to destroy the English fort at Oswego in 1727 but the Iroquois insisted that both the French fort at Niagara and the English fort at Oswego were on their territory and they approved of the presence of both. The Iroquois as well as the French had demonstrated considerable diplomatic astuteness.[12]

French relations with the Fox tribe were to prove less successful. Fox hostility went back to Father Allouez's unsuccessful attempt to convert them in 1667-70 and their ill-treatment at a parley in Montreal in 1671. By the end of the century they were plundering French trade canoes bound for the western Great Lakes. The fact that the French supplied some firearms to their Sioux enemies did not improve relations. Nevertheless, they participated in the peace conference of 1701 in Montreal and in 1710, when Cadillac was named Governor of Louisiana and Jacques Dubuisson took over at Detroit, some 800 Fox warriors with their wives and children came to settle near Fort Pontchartrain at Detroit. The French feared sinister motives, and so Governor Vaudreuil, at a parley in Montreal 1711, told them to return to the Green Bay area west of Lake Michigan.

In 1712, some Ottawas, led by Chief Saguina, attacked and killed some Mascoutens. The Fox came to the support of the Mascoutens, attacked the Ottawas and captured Chief Saguina's wife. Dubuisson made a decision regarding this inter-tribal conflict that

cost the French dearly in the decades to come. He supported the Ottawas, who were the dominant middlemen in the trade, and called on all the allied tribes to attack the Fox. He had a garrison of only 30 men, and the Huron and Ottawa hunters had not returned yet from their annual hunt. He therefore had to submit to daily insults as the Fox "killed the chickens, pigeons and other animals belonging to the French". The Fox also fortified a position near the French fort, and it was with considerable difficulty that the French managed to haul their supplies of corn to safety.

When hundreds of Hurons, Miamis, Illinois, Potawatomis and Osages arrived, all demanding "tobacco to smoke...lead and powder to fight beside you", a 19-day siege of the Fox position ensued. The Fox burrowed into the ground as protection from French fire-power -- the original foxholes! -- and it was only sustained cannon fire that forced them to seek a truce. When terms could not be agreed upon, the Fox sent flaming arrows into Fort Pontchartrain and set the main buildings aflame. On a dark and rainy night the Fox silently stole away and entrenched themselves near a small creek, where four more days of bloody fighting followed. The casualties were said to have surpassed 1,000. About 150 Fox were taken prisoner, many were subsequently shot, some enslaved and a few were tortured in the usual fashion. This bloody incident set off a full-scale war in the interior, commonly known as the first Fox War.[13]

The Illinois and Fox had long been enemies. Now the Mascoutens and Kickapoos came to the aid of the Fox, and 77 Illinois warriors were killed or captured in 1714. The French tried to organize a confederacy against the Fox and their allies. A large force was to meet the Illinois at Chicago, but the plan miscarried. An epidemic of measles prevented Wea participation, and when 400 Illinois warriors found no one to meet them at the rendez-vous they dispersed. The epidemic spread to the Ottawas at Michilimackinac where at least 240 died. A convoy of 10,000 livres of merchandise

destined for the Crozat establishment on the Wabash was ordered to lay over at Michilimackinac so the 20 or so men could join the expedition against the Fox. Similarly, an amnesty was granted to all coureurs-de-bois who would join the punitive expedition. When the Hurons and other tribes from Detroit finally arrived at Chicago, they succeeded in recalling the Illinois, and the combined forces attacked 70 lodges of Mascoutens and Kickapoos in November 1715, killing about 100 and taking 47 warriors prisoner. The next day, 400 Fox attacked the invaders but were repulsed after a 9-hour battle. This first expedition had not been very successful.[14]

In 1716 a second expedition was placed under the command of Louvigny, who was making a reputation for himself as a military commander and negotiator. With 200 voyageurs from Montreal and another 250 coureurs-de-bois picked up at Detroit and Michilimackinac en route to the Wisconsin region, and an equal number of allied Native people, he attacked the principal Fox village on the "river of the Fox". Louvigny was not impressed with the mission confided to him by the authorities at Quebec:

> ...war against the Native does not suit this colony in its present stage, without troops, without money, with disobedient Frenchmen accompanied by Natives of different nations, many enemies one of the other and all having no other view but to weary the French into giving them presents, at whose mercy we are obliged to remain in a remote country, in order to obtain our food and support, without order and discipline, whose customs are opposed to ours, who promise without fulfilling, and who return to their villages and abandon the best planned enterprises, on the least dream, or by some superstition, or some unforseen event. That, Sir, in a few words is the truth about what one can expect by way of help from the Natives against the Natives.

Louvigny laid siege to the fortified stronghold in typical European fashion, using trenches, mortars and mining operations. When the Fox were reduced to desperation, Louvigny granted them easy terms and marched off. The allied Native people were very disappointed because they had expected a war of annihilation, but the French traders were pleased with the beaver skins the restoration of peace provided. The allied nations concluded the French had made peace for "thirty bales of beaver and fifteen slaves", while the Fox themselves concluded that they could always pay off French blood with beaver pelts! Louvigny was given a special gratuity and, in 1720, was named commander-in-chief of the pays d'en haut, a position created specially for him, for having brought the first Fox War to a successful conclusion.[15]

It was not long before war was resumed. In 1719 Fox and Kickapoo chiefs came to Montreal to offer an alliance and propose the Sakis as mediators in the war they entered into once more against the Illinois. Chief Kiala seems to have attempted to arrange a confederacy against the French but the latter suspected his plotting. When the Fox seized a couple Potawatomis near Chicago in 1721, Vaudreuil sent orders to let the allied nations attack them and he ordered supplies sent. Father Charlevoix, who passed down the Illinois river in 1721, wrote that the Fox "infested with their robberies and filled with murders not only the neighborhood of the Bay, and their natural territory, but almost all the routes communicating with the remote colonial posts, as well as those leading from Canada to Louisiana."

This renewal of hostilities occurred when Vaudreuil was quarrelling with Louisiana over the northern limits of that southern colony which, since 1717, had laid claim to the Illinois country. Louisiana wanted the Governor-General to undertake the pacification of the Fox, but Vaudreuil negotiated a treaty that was advantageous to the Canadian traders and permitted the Fox to continue their hostilities against Louisiana. This prevented Louisiana

traders from moving into the fur trade of the upper Mississippi and Missouri valleys. The French did send a relief expedition to the Illinois, who were reportedly under attack at Prairie des Roches and Pimitoui, but they found the Illinois had driven off the Fox and inflicted heavy casualties on them.[16]

Fox insolence became more manifest. They commanded the trade route to the Sioux and other Mississippi tribes. The French were anxious to pursue trade with these western tribes and also to press forward with their search for the route to the western sea. As middlemen, the Fox exacted heavy tribute from all those wishing to pass through their territory. In 1727 they resumed their attacks on the Illinois and killed several Frenchmen in the skirmishing. In October 1728, the Kickapoos and Mascoutens captured 17 Frenchmen returning from the Sioux country and turned most of them over to the Fox. Father Michel Guigans was held captive for five months but during this time he succeeded in weaning these tribes away from their alliance with the Fox.

In the meantime, Governor Beauharnois had decided to mount a major campaign against the Fox and to open the trade route to the Sioux. The King was convinced of the "necessity of destroying this nation" and budgeted 60,000 livres for the military operations. Two hundred Native warriors joined the French force at Detroit and another 300 at Michilimackinac. At Green Bay, Fox villages were found abandoned so they burned them and destroyed the standing crops. The Fox, discouraged by the desertion of their former allies, decided to accept on Iroquois offer of asylum. In 1730 a band of about 300 warriors and their families began their trek eastwards, only to be intercepted by the French and their allies. On the banks of the St. Joseph River, a fort was besieged for 23 days until the Fox "were reduced to eating leather, and we were little better off," said Coulon de Villiers. When the Fox tried to flee during a storm, a trick that had worked on a previous occasion, they were slaughtered in

large numbers, some were enslaved and a chief was sent prisoner to Montreal. Beauharnois would report to Versailles on the outcome of this campaign "to extinguish this race":

> We can presently flatter ourselves of the complete ruin of this nation as by all the letters addressed to me from the upper country and places having a perfect acquaintance with events it is said that what remains consists of only fifty or sixty men who beg for mercy on all sides...

The small remnant found asylum west of the Mississippi among the Sauk and eventually among the Iowa. Raids continued intermittently. On 16 September 1733, for example, Coulon de Villiers attacked some Fox who had taken refuge among the Sauks, but his poorly planned attack, described by the Governor as "rash and foolhardy conduct", resulted in the French commander's death. In 1743 some Fox and Sauk were persuaded to return to settle in their old territory along the Fox River. In 1754 a general peace was signed between the Illinois and the Fox and the Sauk. The French had come to impose themselves on the Fox only with considerable difficulty and after a long lapse of time.[17]

The French were caught up in another inter-tribal war in the western Great Lakes region. The Crees and Assiniboines had eventually joined together against the Sioux. This made life very complicated for French traders and missionaries because although they were anxious to establish good relations with the Sioux, renowned fighters of the plains, they were also anxious to wean the Crees away from the Hudson's Bay Company trade. Father Louis Hennepin had visited them in 1680 and, during his stay, had met Daniel Greysolon Dulhut and five other Frenchmen who came to trade. During the next decade the French tried to arrange a truce in the region, but some of the illicit traders tried to exploit the existing hostilities to their advantage by threatening the Crees with co-operation with the Sioux. On the

other hand, coureurs-de-bois coming up from Louisiana supplied the Sioux with arms and ammunition, and Pachot thought it might be necessary to mount an expedition against them in 1720.[18]

In 1727 René Boucher de La Perrière built Fort Beauharnois in the Sioux country to secure their trade and friendship. Claude Marin and Louis Hamelin had developed a good trade working in partnership. When Christophe de La Jemmeraye was posted there he found that the Fox were stirring up the Sioux against the French, and he himself was a virtual prisoner in a Fox village for 21 days. In 1733 La Jemmeraye was back in Sioux country and went as far as Lake Winnipeg in the interests of arranging better relations between the Crees and Sioux. It was La Vérendrye who, in the 1730s, tried to bring an end to the inter-tribal war and to stabilize the situation in favour of French trade and eventual missions. Besides the search for the western sea there was also some interest in developing the copper mines of the Lake Superior region.

In 1734 the Sioux had reportedly killed some French traders. The Crees went on the warpath, and Jean-Baptiste La Vérendrye accompanied them. The following year he was murdered, as were Father Aulneau and 19 other Frenchmen at Lake of the Woods by a party of Sioux. Eight hundred Assiniboines then set out to avenge these deaths and would have been joined by the Crees, except that an outbreak of smallpox hampered their participation. By 1739 the Sioux were ready to ask for terms of peace, which the French were happy to grant because they feared increasing English hostility in other quarters. Paul Marin persuaded delegates from the Sioux and five other nations to accompany him to Quebec to ratify the general peace settlement in 1754.[19]

In the Maritime region military relations with the Native people, especially the Micmacs, were of great importance as well. It was laymen rather than the clergy who laid the foundations of

Micmac-French friendship and alliance during the seventeenth century. Although documentation for this early period is limited, it is well established that permanent French settlement dated from 1604 under Pierre de Monts and missionary work started in 1611. In 1613 Claude de La Tour built Fort Pentagouet on the Penobscot and started a profitable trading relationship. His son Charles took charge of Acadian affairs from Charles de Biencourt (an early associate of de Monts) and built a fort at Cape Sable in 1623. His first wife was a Micmac, and one of his daughters married a fur trader who later established himself on the St. John River in 1672 with the title of Sieur de Martignon. Isaac de Razilly founded an important colony at La Hève in 1632 and he also entertained good relations with the Micmacs. Especially beloved by the Native people was the enterprising Nicolas Denys who undertook farming and fishing enterprises over a wide area: he founded a base at Miscou in 1645, a post on the Miramichi in 1647, bases at St. Pierre and Ste. Anne on Cape Breton Island in 1650, and his chief centre of operations at Nipisiguit (Bathurst) in 1652. His son Richard, who married a Native girl, carried on his father's operations, initiated some important lumbering and coal-mining activities, and was careful to maintain cordial relations with the Native people of the region. Even Clerbaud Bergier, a Huguenot explorer and leading member of the Compagnie de la Pêche sédentaire de l'Acadie founded in 1682, was careful not to offend Native sensibilities.

These pioneer founders were in good measure responsible for inspiring the Micmacs, Malecites and Abenakis with confidence in the French. French fishing activities and farming near tidewater, often on salt marshes, did not interfere with the Native way of life. The two societies were somewhat complementary, each having some articles to trade, and were more than occasionally united through marriage ties. The Micmacs seem to have been quite puzzled by the frequency with which Acadia changed hands between French and British. France's claim was challenged even by the Scots, for in 1621

Sir William Alexander was granted title over the entire area, known as Nova Scotia, by King James VI. Even more puzzling must have been the bitter struggle between Charles d'Aulnay and Charles de La Tour who had been given overlapping sections of Acadia in 1638.[20]

Acadia was without a French governor from 1654 to 1670. Hector de Grandfontaine restored French authority, had the forts rebuilt and encouraged the missionaries to resume their apostolic labours. It was at this time that the secular clergy who served as missionaries in Acadia began to assume an important political role. Grandfontaine established himself at Pentagouet in contested territory, claiming that the boundary with New England was at the Kennebec River and that the Abenakis were in his jurisdiction, whereas the English maintained the boundary was at the Penobscot River. When some Dutch pirates overran the French posts in 1674, the Baron Jean-Vincent de Saint-Castin managed to escape to Quebec where Governor Frontenac entrusted him with the mission of rallying the Abenakis to the French cause. Saint-Castin married the daughter of Chief Madokawando of the Penobscot band and, in 1676, was able to influence the Abenakis to join in King Philip's war against the New Englanders.

In 1688 New Englanders sacked Pentagouet. This was countered by Abenakis raids on New England, and by Acadian and Micmac seizure of fishing vessels off the Acadian coasts. In the spring of 1690, William Phips came up from Boston, destroyed the French settlements, mistreated Governor Louis de Meneval, and aroused Micmac hostility by pillaging their settlement near Port Royal, burning their mission church and imprisoning their missionaries, the abbés Claude Trouvé and Louis Petit, in Boston. Joseph Robinau de Villebon arrived as Governor shortly thereafter and made it his policy to have the Native people harry the New Englanders incessantly. The abbé Louis Thury took part in a number of Abenakis raids and was present with Villebon and Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville at the capture of the English fort at

Pemaquid by the Abenakis in 1696. Soon thereafter, the abbé Thury founded the mission of Pigiguit (Minas Basin) where he planned to relocate all the Micmacs in one large settlement stretching from Shubenacadie to Chibouctou.[21]

In the War of the Spanish Succession the Micmacs proved to be active supporters of the French. Some 25 Micmac families established themselves at Placentia in order to enjoy the spoils of piracy with French corsairs. Governor Subercase thought they had left temporarily "in order to permit their country to become repopulated with moose". Instead, some took up residence on the island of St. Pierre. Versailles was pleased with this development and so informed Governor Costebelle in 1708:

> I cannot refrain from telling you on the subject of these Natives that Messrs Broullin and Subercase used them profitably when they were at Placentia to harrass the English, and it seems to me you could have done the same. Thus I recommend that you deal tactfully with those who have stayed on because they could be employed very usefully.

Subercase made a point of distributing presents each year to the Micmacs and appointed Bernard-Anselme de Saint-Castin commander of the Abenakis in 1706. However, no aid was sent to the Abenakis when they were attacked in the spring and in the autumn of 1707. Added to this disappointment was the fact that the French gave a poor price for beaver pelts. Consequently, the Abenakis did not come to the assistance of the French when Port Royal was attacked in 1710.[22]

Nicholson's descent on Port Royal in 1710 was successful, but it aroused the Acadians and their Native allies to action. Nicholson accused the French of mistreating New England prisoners and, "by your cruel and barbaric savages and Frenchmen having killed many poor people and children", having laid waste several frontier settlements. He warned that any "French or Savage directly or indirectly committing

any act of hostility such as murder, cruelty or other bad treatment" would be treated as civilians having no official military combat status and, furthermore, that vengeance would be taken on leading Acadians. Vaudreuil replied that the French had never been guilty of either inhumanity or barbarism, that English prisoners were regularly ransomed from the Native people and placed in French homes awaiting prisoner-of-war exchanges, and that the Native allies "are not yet sufficiently in our dependency to have them change their habits and customs." Saint-Castin, on the other hand, threatened the Acadians who co-operated with the English during the occupation of Port Royal (renamed Annapolis Royal). He warned that the Micmacs and Abenakis "will kill your cattle and take you prisoners as enemies of the King."[23]

Pontchartrain in Versailles ordered arms sent to the abbé Antoine Gaulin, missionary among the Micmacs, to continue the harrassment of the English and prevent them from becoming well established in Acadia. When a party of about 60 English soldiers left Annapolis Royal it was ambushed by Micmacs; about half the party were killed and the rest were taken prisoner. Raids were made on eight New England settlements in the spring of 1711 and then news was received of the failure of Walker's naval expedition to ascend the St. Lawrence River to attack Quebec. Samuel Vetch, who was named commander of the British garrison at Annapolis Royal, reported that the Acadians were "still in a ferment" and that the Micmacs "threatened to dispossess of the Fort". Vetch tried to control the situation by removing the missionary to Boston for a year and by threatening to slaughter the cattle of the Acadians. The abbé Gaulin was unable to mount a full-scale attack on the fort because the ship bringing arms, ammunition and clothing to the Micmacs was captured by the British. More threatening still, Vetch brought in loyal Iroquois warriors in 1712, described by him as "better than three times their number of white men", who were traditional enemies of the Micmacs. The definitive treaty of peace, signed at Utrecht in 1713, saw peninsular

Nova Scotia pass into British hands and a boundary commission named to determine the precise boundaries. The Abenakis and Malecite lands seemed to remain under French control, as did Isle St. Jean (Prince Edward Island) and Isle Royale (Cape Breton Island). But the majority of the Acadians and the Micmacs found themselves in British territory and had a year to relocate in what remained of the former Acadia.[24]

Micmac and Abenakis hostility was not abated with the change in sovereignty. Indeed, there were cases where the Micmacs attacked English and French vessels off the coasts indiscriminately. The missionaries tried to stop pillaging but the English thought they instigated it. The fact was that the missionaries, by their own avowal, had little influence over their converts in such temporal matters. The Abenakis, seeing the Acadians living under British rule in Nova Scotia, were sure it was they who had urged the English to charge higher prices for their trade goods. While Governor St. Ovide at Louisbourg deplored the renewal of Micmac raiding on English shipping in 1726-27 as an invitation to hostilities, his superiors at Quebec and Versailles thought it was a good means "to foment quarrels" in a newly acquired British colony.

Generally speaking, the Micmacs perceived less threat from the English than expected because no sizable settlement occurred, the garrisons tended to decline in number, the majority of the Acadians had elected to remain on their farmlands along the Bay of Fundy, and their own population began to increase. The Micmacs seem to have moved more inland and to have settled in smaller and more dispersed groups. Some even took up residence among the Acadians. In 1732 Lieutenant Governor Armstrong had to give up a plan to build a fort at Minas, and as late as 1738 the Micmacs, who had a Native captain commissioned and paid by the French in every important bay, would not "suffer an Englishman to settle or cure fish" in any part of southern Nova Scotia.[25]

The Micmacs were active participants in the War of Austrian Succession, despite being under British protectorate. The Abenakis were threatened by the Massachusetts authorities with Mohawk intervention if they did not maintain a strict neutrality throughout the war. The Malecites were unmoved by any threats and they followed their missionary's advice to join the French and Micmacs in the war against the Anglo-Americans. When a delegation came from St. John River to Annapolis Royal to ask the commander Paul Mascarene for a clarification of British intentions, they were reassured that the war against the French "is not in the least Intended against the Friendly Indians." Be that as it may, on 19 October 1744 Massachusetts and Nova Scotia declared war on them. They had no choice but to follow their missionary's advice.[26]

The French at Louisbourg learned of the outbreak of international hostilities before most of the British did. On 24 May 1744, a force of French and Micmacs launched a surprise attack on Canso and captured it. Governor DuQuesnel ordered the abbé Jean-Louis Le Loutre at Baie Verte to "accompany as chaplain" expeditions of the Micmacs against British bases. On July 1, Annapolis Royal was besieged by 300 Micmacs, accompanied by Le Loutre, but they retired when the expected naval contingent from Louisbourg failed to arrive. In September another attack was launched with 50 French soldiers and 200 Malecites and Micmacs, but the siege was lifted in early October.

Mascarene asked for New England wood-rovers and "friendly Indians", or "people who are used to hunt Indians" in a way regular troops were not, to hold off these Micmac attacks. When such a force did arrive from Boston under Captain Gorham, their first victims were five women (three of whom were pregnant) and three children. Maillard recorded a number of such irregularities, including the descecration of Micmac burial grounds, and he accused the New Englanders of deliberately spreading disease by distributing infected clothing to

the Native people. This may have been the source of the "distempers" that carried off hundreds of Le Loutre's Native fighters and nearly as many of Maillard's in late 1746.[27]

In May 1745 a force of 700 French and Micmacs launched a third attack on Annapolis Royal but retreated when it was learned that Louisbourg was under seige. At the siege of Louisbourg (1745), an Acadian and Micmac contingent of 150 men attacked the Anglo-Americans from the rear and succeeded in detaching 600 men from Pepperell's invasion force. The invasion force also included some Native warriors from Connecticut, but after the capitulation of Louisbourg these were quickly sent home because they drank heavily and quarrelled with the American recruits. The British did not have the same entente with their Native fighters as the French had. The abbé Maillard was taken prisoner when he appeared at Louisbourg, allegedly under a flag of truce; he was taken to Boston and then sent to France. But he was back in Nova Scotia with the ill-fated fleet of the Duc d'Anville in 1746 which was supposed to recapture Louisbourg and liberate Acadia. Atlantic storms and an outbreak of smallpox were responsible for the collapse of this expedition. The Acadians and Micmacs were largely on their own, although Louisbourg was restored to France by the terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle in 1748. The Governor-General and Intendant at Quebec pondered how they might offer relief to the Micmacs should some of them wish to settle in Canada. On the other hand, if the Micmacs did not continue their harrassment of the British it was possible the Acadians might have to pay dearly. They reported almost prophetically in 1745:

> We cannot imagine that they could entertain the idea of removing those people, in order to substitute Englishmen in their stead, unless desertion of the Indians would embolden them to adopt such a course, inhuman as it may be...

It has been assumed that most of the orders came from military officials at Quebec and Versailles to the three missionaries in Acadia, but this disregards the fact they had to act circumspectly because strict orders had been issued by the Bishop of Quebec not to intervene directly in political affairs.[28]

When the British took the offensive it became increasingly difficult for the clergy not to become involved directly in the struggles of the Acadians and Micmacs. In 1746 Mascarene decided to drive the French forces out of the Minas basin and quarter troops on the Acadian population during the winter. The expedition was commanded by Arthur Noble and met with little resistance, as the main force had withdrawn already to winter quarters at Chignecto. On 11 February 1747, Jean-Baptiste Ramezay with 300 French and Micmacs attacked the New Englanders during a howling snowstorm, killed about 70 of them and sent the rest back to Annapolis Royal after they capitulated.

More difficult to deal with was the building of Halifax in 1749 as a port and naval base to rival Louisbourg. The Intendant François Bigot stopped at Louisbourg on his way to take up his duties at Quebec in the spring of 1749 and promised the abbé Le Loutre all the supplies he required to carry on against the British occupation. Governor Cornwallis insisted that the Micmacs had to renew the treaty of peace and friendship signed in 1726 because, as Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts explained to La Galissonière, any tribe that did not renew continued automatically in a state of war with Britain, because the Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle did not include "rebellious subjects" within its scope. Some Malecite bands came to renew their treaty but the Micmacs stayed away. Instead, on August 19, they seized Englishmen at Canso and took them captive to Louisbourg where Governor Desherbiers released them. In September they attacked two English ships at Chignecto and raided a sawmill

close to Halifax, and in November they captured a detachment of 18 soldiers near Chignecto. Cornwallis declared that it seemed necessary to remove all the Micmacs:

> The French are certainly doing everything in their power to excite the Indians to molest us...Tis firmly my opinion, my Lords, that if the Indians do begin we ought never to make peace with them again. It will be very practicable with an addition of force by sea and land to root them out entirely.

His Council decided to pay a premium or bounty of ten guineas for live prisoners or scalps. Not surprisingly, on 23 September 1749, the Micmacs declared war on the British for having settled without permission on their ancestral lands for undertaking to exterminate them. The Lords of Trade in London were not favourable to such extreme measures, fearing that "by filling the minds of bordering Indians with ideas of our cruelty" they might instigate a general continental war. The idea of removing the Micmacs may have been a fore-runner of the policy six years later of removing the Acadians.[29]

In 1753 the abbé Le Loutre was back in Nova Scotia after a visit to France where he had obtained promises of material support and also spiritual advice for dealing with the Acadians and Micmacs under British rule. The Micmacs had come to terms with the British in 1752, during the missionary's absence, but they were soon actively seeking British scalps when he returned among them. Le Loutre wrote to Governor Lawrence asking for the creation of an independent Native territory "which they only shall enjoy, suitable for hunting and fishing, and for the establishment of a village and a mission as a parish" consisting of much of eastern Nova Scotia. On this neutral territory he proposed "there shall exist neither fort nor fortress belonging to the French or the English." The request was not treated seriously because it represented a surrender of British territory and the dismantling of British forts only.[30]

Le Loutre also used the Micmac hatred of the English to threaten the Acadians with Micmac attacks on their property and persons if they submitted to British pressures to take the oath of allegiance and if they did not remove themselves to French territory. This problem was resolved by the British capture of Fort Beauséjour in June 1755 and the subsequent deportation of large numbers of Acadians to the southern colonies. Some Acadians tried to escape and were aided by the Micmacs. At River Chipoudy, for example, the English burned the village, including the church. The Governor-General's report said:

> Mr. de Boishébert, at the head of 125 Acadians or Indians, overtook them at the river of Pelkoudiak; attacked and fought them for three hours, and drove them vigorously back to their vessels. The English had 42 killed and 45 wounded. Mr. Gorham, a very active English officer, was among the number of the wounded. We lost 1 Indian and had three others wounded.

By the end of that year, the three missionaries in Nova Scotia had been detained, a fourth had disappeared, and Le Loutre was captured at sea and taken prisoner to England. When the French abandoned their fort at St. John River, the Malecites were forced to seek peace with the British too. The last Micmac raids took place in 1758, after the fall of Louisbourg. At Halifax, a plan to "surprise and fire the town, and in the confusion to butcher all the troops and inhabitants" was discovered. The Micmacs also made a raid on Lunenburg. But throughout 1760 and 1761 bands came to Halifax to make their formal submission because it now seemed that the British had effectively replaced the French.[31]

Although the Abenakis have been mentioned in the course of tracing French military relations with the Micmacs it seems worthwhile to mention the special features of their relationship with the French. The Abenakis were a loose Confederacy of Algonkian-speaking

tribes comprising the Malecites of St. John River (already mentioned), Passamaquoddys, Norridgewocks, Penobscots, and probably the Sokokis. Their first contacts with the French came through trade and missions, but their most notable contact was through warfare with the Iroquois and the English. In 1637 Governor Montmagny forbade them to come to Quebec to trade because it was alleged that they carried off some of the most valuable peltries to the English and Dutch to the south where they obtained better prices. The missionaries were asked to add their influence, however slight at the time among the Native people, to protecting the interests of the Company of New France. In 1646 two Abenaki chiefs, one of whom was a Catholic convert, came to Quebec to ask the Governor to authorize the Jesuits or other religious community to open a mission in their country. The Governor does not seem to have seized the diplomatic importance of such a move at the time, and the missionaries were too occupied with other promising missions to contemplate moving into Abenaki territory.[32]

But as the Abenaki became involved in war with the Mohawks, and the French sent them aid, it became clear that they shared common interests and goals. In 1676 Abenaki refugees from New England incursions on their lands began arriving near Quebec and along the St. François River. Father Jacques Bigot became aware of them as they arrived at the Sillery reserve in 1679. He settled some of them at a mission he called St. François de Sales near the falls on the Chaudière River and, from 1684 onwards, he began making annual preaching tours into their country near the New England frontier. He was impressed with their willingness to accept Catholicism and was quite happy to accept Governor Denonville's suggestion in 1687 that he go as far south as the vicinity of Boston to encourage the Abenakis to leave the proximity of English settlement, move farther northwards and enter into a firm alliance with the French. In 1694, his brother Vincent Bigot, who was also a Jesuit missionary, founded a mission for the Abenakis at Pentagouet. This mission was moved to Naurakamig four years later at a time when Father Sebastien Rasle started a mission at

Norridgewock on the Kennebec River. By the last decade of the seventeenth century the Jesuits had established themselves firmly in Abenaki territory, and the Abenakis had shown themselves disposed to Catholicism and to a French alliance.[33]

The wars with the English are not the proper subject of this study except in so far as they determined the nature of relations with the French. The Abenakis were engaged in bitter warfare with New England from 1688 to 1693. In August 1693 the Penobscot tribe signed a humiliating peace with Massachusetts officials. By its terms they accepted to be called aggressors and agreed to desist in their acts of hostility, to abandon the French cause, and to concede that New Englanders might "enter upon, improve and forever enjoy all and singular their rights of lands, and former settlements and possessions within the eastern parts of the said province of Massachusetts Bay". It was the great Chief Madokawando who had been forced to accept these terms, but when he died in 1698 he was succeeded by his son-in-law, the baron Jean-Vincent de Saint-Castin. Thereafter, the English and French became more directly involved in hostilities with each other.

The English sources make much of the horrible massacres supposedly instigated by the French officials and Catholic missionaries, of the failure of the Abenakis under French influence to keep their treaty obligations, and the unscrupulous scheming and conscienceless double-dealing of the officials of New France. French sources, on the other hand, reiterate complaints concerning English impingement on Abenaki lands, the evil influences of English traders, and New England efforts to discredit the Catholic religion in the eyes of the Native people. These were but symptoms, of course, of the rivalry between the two imperial powers, which the Abenakis tried to exploit and sometimes simply had to adjust to. The boundary between New England and New France had never been fixed; therefore the Abenakis found themselves on debatable territory, although they consistently and logically claimed it was their homeland. As already

stated, the British, the French and the Native people had their own concepts of ownership, territoriality and possession. There was also the question of the binding quality of formal agreements and treaties entered into between a European power and an Amerindian tribe or band. Were the Abenakis subject to British or French jurisdiction and, more specifically, did the treaty obligations imposed on them by Massachusetts have a binding force in international law? Overlaying all these considerations was the implacable religious intolerance of both the Catholic and Protestant European contestants.[34]

The Abenakis traded mostly with the New Englanders but they became firmly attached to their Catholic missionaries. When the War of the Spanish Succession erupted, Governor Dudley of Boston called the Abenakis to Casco to sign a treaty of neutrality. The Abenakis agreed, but Rasle's account of the negotiations includes the following revealing speech by their chief negotiator:

> Great Chief, you have told us not to unite with the Frenchman in case that you declare war against him. Know that the Frenchman is my brother; we have one and the same Prayer both for him and ourselves, and we dwell in the same cabin at two fires, he is at one fire and I am at the other fire. If I should see you enter the cabin on the side of the fire where my brother is seated, I should watch you from my mat where I am seated at the other fire. If, observing you, I perceived you had a hatchet...I would seize mine and rush at the Englishman to strike him. Would it be possible to see my brother struck in my cabin, and I remain quiet on my mat?

Neutrality for the Abenakis meant that the English also would not strike at their French allies. It should be noted that in Abenaki thinking it was their territory and their cabin, and that there were two fires and two mats. This reflected the dualism that the French had accepted and that the English seemed to ignore. The Abenakis did not remain neutral, but in Rasle's words they were "ready to take up

the hatchet against the English" whenever Governor Vaudreuil gave the order. In the raiding that followed, two captives taken in New England by the Abenakis had notable religious vocations in the French colony: Mary Ann Davis spent 51 years as a Hospital Nun in Quebec, and Esther Wheelwright entered the Ursuline order and was its superior at the time of the Conquest.

The official correspondence indicates that the civil authorities did direct the missionaries to stir up the Abenakis against the English, but it also indicates that Vaudreuil's policy was more defensive than offensive in so doing. The role of the missionaries emerges as being more defenders of the faith than political agitators. The Abenakis were not simply the willing instruments of French diplomacy but they defended their own interests as best they could in a difficult situation. In the winter of 1705 the English began to make reprisals, sacked several villages in the hope of capturing Father Rasle whom they looked upon as the evil genious. Rasle returned to Canada and founded a new reserve at Bécancour where a number of Abenaki refugees from English retaliatory raids could settle. It was the threat of famine as much as their attachment to the missionaries that induced them to leave their country and settle at Bécancour.[35]

The Treaty of Utrecht did not clearly establish a definitive boundary between the English and French possessions. Father Jean-Baptiste Loyard, missionary to the Malecites, warned that this would result in English encroachment on Abenaki lands and a threat to Quebec itself. Governor Shirley confided that an advance of only 25 miles higher up the Kennebec River would bring them "within a hundred and ten miles of Quebec" and would represent "a considerable step toward chasing the French out of that country". The Abenaki chiefs were summoned to ratify a special treaty, following the Treaty of Utrecht, at Portsmouth and then at Casco Bay. It was on this occasion

that they learned that the French had supposedly ceded some of their lands to the English. The English encroached on their lands, as Loyard had predicted, and several forts were erected.

In 1716 a delegation headed by chief Mog came to Quebec to seek assistance, but Vaudreuil would promise only moral support and some arms, not direct intervention. In 1719 another delegation came to Quebec seeking help to oust English settlers from the mouth of the Kennebec River, but Vaudreuil temporised and offered only powder and shot. The Abenakis said threateningly that all the Native nations would have to unite "to chase out all the foreigners whoever they might be" from the continent. They were aware of being used as pawns by the European powers and were becoming more receptive to an Iroquois offer to join in a war against the French. Vaudreuil was worried by the threat of a rising of all the Amerindian nations against all the Europeans in north-eastern America, but his intelligence service reassured him that the Abenakis thought the Iroquois were being manipulated by the English and the Iroquois believed the French still influenced the Abenakis. It may have been their Catholicism that kept the Abenakis within the French orbit.

A split developed among the Abenakis concerning their relationship with the French. English encroachments drove the two factions together again, especially as raiding intensified in the early 1720s, and in August 1722 Massachusetts formally declared war on them. After Father Rasle's death and the burning of his mission station in 1724, the Abenakis united against the New Englanders. By 1724-26 they were obliged to sign a series of treaties recognizing English land claims against them and the Abenakis living in New France "for whom we are fully empowered to act in this present treaty". Although ratified in August 1726 at Casco Bay, the Abenakis of Canada did not consider that this bound them in any way. Thereafter, their history was bound up with that of the reserves. They ceased to play an important role in military affairs until 1755, although they were

marginally involved in the war of 1745-48. La Galissonière wanted them included in the general treaty of peace of 1748 but they, like the Micmacs, had to come to terms separately in 1749 and 1752.[37]

The French have been accused of paying bounties to the Micmacs for Beothuk head trophies and thus, along with the fishermen of Newfoundland outports, contributing to the extinction of the "Red Men". There is no documentary evidence to indicate that French contacts with the Beothuks, however infrequent, were bellicose. Cartier stopped at Quirpon in 1534 to exchange goods with them, and Thévet commented in 1557 that they "are little prone to warfare if their enemies do not search them out". The hostility of the fishermen most likely arose from the habit of these Native people of salvaging cabins, boats, stages and drying racks left behind by the Europeans who made annual visits to those coasts. Leslie Upton thought the thesis of French hostility originated with W.E. Cormack who alleged in 1827 that "about a century and a half ago" the French put a bounty on Beothuk heads and supplied the Micmacs with guns to hunt them down. Senator Frederick Rowe thought the myth originated with the publication of J.B. Juke's Excursion in Newfoundland (1842). The tale was repeated thereafter until it gained wide currency both in Europe and in North America.[38]

In 1705 the French did employ some Micmacs against the English in southern Newfoundland, and atrocities were not uncommon because Governor Costebelle threatened to cut off their brandy supply unless they fought "in the French fashion". In 1720, a few Micmacs settled permanently at St. Georges Bay from where they kept in touch with French traders and Catholic missionaries on Isle Royale. But there is no mention of contact with the Beothuks of the interior region. In the same year, we do read that Frenchmen accompanied Montagnais who went to winter in north-western Newfoundland "in order

to be able to keep them in the subordination required so that they do no harm." A memorandum on Beothuks recorded no attempts to exterminate them. It said:

> It is near this location that live natives whom we call the Redmen because they are painted in this colour from head to foot. As soon as they see a European they take flight and it is impossible to rejoin them.

The memorandum went on to describe their bark canoes, their lodges, their sleeping burrows, and especially their pillaging of fishing equipment to obtain nails, wire and other manufactured goods. There was no suggestion of any French contact with the Beothuks or of any hostile acts against them in this northern sector. A much better case can be made for hostile contact with the Inuit, who seem to have been regarded consistently as "wild men" and cannibals, the French in the eighteenth century still joining with the Montagnais in expeditions to exterminate them.[39]

In contrast to charges of hostile relations with certain coastal peoples, it has been assumed that French relations with the interior tribes and bands were pacific and friendly. Relations with the allied nations began to deteriorate during the War of the Austrian Succession. The French policy of a line of forts linking Louisiana through the Mississippi and Ohio country to the Great Lakes basin and St. Lawrence valley, which represented a strategic expansion into the interior to keep the Anglo-American colonies hemmed in along the Atlantic coastal plain, coincided with the interests of the majority of the western nations. This French military policy, if successful, would prevent a line of English settlement moving over the Appalachians into Native lands. Therefore, tribal resistance to Anglo-American penetration westwards coincided well with French policy and strategy in the eighteenth century.

Versailles explained this line of conduct to each new Governor-General after 1713. La Jonquière's instructions in 1751 may be taken as typical on this point:

> It is always advisable to avoid as far as possible wars with the Natives; but it appears that on this occasion it should not have been difficult to insure against their occurrence.
>
> It is not a question of acting against the Natives. It is a question of checking illicit trade carried on by the English in a country that belongs to us, and which they had not ventured to dispute with us before the last war, and of discouraging at the same time any notions they may have of making settlements there. It should accordingly be easy to render the Natives indifferent and even to make them perceive that for their own peace, and for the freedom of their trade in which we have never hindered them, they should be willing for us to check the progress of the English enterprises.

Military strategy was tied to commercial concerns, as we have seen already. Even so, there were defectors from the French alliance as early as 1747. Reports from Forts Frontenac, Niagara, de Chartres and Detroit indicated disaffection. Boishébert even wrote about "a general conspiracy of the red skins against the whites", which he thought could be traced back to a time when "the red skins made a treaty some years ago not to kill one another, and to let the whites act against each other." A concerted effort by all Native peoples to drive out European intruders would seem to have had little chance of complete success by the mid-eighteenth century. The language employed by this French commander had taken on an uncharacteristic racial overtone that betrayed a certain sense of insecurity.[40]

In the course of the fighting in which the Native allies were involved during the Seven Years' War, it became evident once again that each participant had his own motives, if not always methods, for waging war. When Captain De Villiers held a council in June 1754 on

the Monongahela River during which he rehearsed Jumonville's "murder under a flag of truce" and "the vengence he hoped to obtain with their help", French and Amerindian motivations for waging war seemed to coincide. But, when George Washington's defeated army was promised "we give them our word of honor to restrain the savages", the differences between European and Amerindian codes of conduct were asserting themselves. Whatever might be said about the "atrocities" at Fort George in 1757, they were not instigated by the French officers, much less by the military chaplains. English soldiers contributed to their own misfortune by allowing the Native people to get hold of supplies of rum and then by trying to escape. The French officers and the three missionaries tried, at the risk of their own lives, to prevent the massacre of soldiers who had surrendered. As one of the missionaries wrote of the Native warriors, "their heart is not like that of any other human being, you may say." Father Roubaud, an eye-witness, deplored the failure of the English to retreat immediately in order under the guard of 400 French soldiers. He deplored the results:

> This butchery, which at first was only the work of some few savages, became the signal which transformed them all into so many ferocious beasts. They discharged right and left heavy blows with their hatchets...

Clearly, the French could not control their Native allies once a battle was engaged. Nor were the Anglo-Americans any more successful in this domain. Examples could be multiplied on both sides.[41]

Both the French and the British feared the consequences of an attack by Native auxiliaries, although there is no indication that the brutality of such attacks was greater than the devastation and death dealt out by an invading European force, or that the casualties were higher than those inflicted by a European army. Around 1760, the French began considering the possibility of signing a cartel with the

British according to which neither would employ Native auxiliaries against the other. It was reasoned at Versailles that it would be cheaper for the King to station regular troops in Canada than to pay for the maintenance of alliances with Native nations. The cost of these alliances is illustrated by the following statistics for a period of peace, 1731-1738:[42]

| Year | Supplies | Presents | Repairs |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1731 | 16,534# 18s 4d | 22,000# | 3,480# 13s |
| 1732 | 19,365# 3s 6d | 22,000# | 4,125# 16s |
| 1733 | 15,405# 16s 8d | 22,000# | 4,404# 2s 10d |
| 1734 | 12,264# 16s | 22,000# | 4,390# 4s 6d |
| 1735 | 14,972# 13s 2d | 22,000# | 4,691# 4s |
| 1736 | 19,256# 4s 3d | 22,000# | 5,179# 17s 6d |
| 1737 | 21,031# 14s 3d | 22,000# | 6,437# 19s 6d |
| 1738 | 19,337# 11s 11d | 22,000# | 7,254# 13s |
| Total | 138,168# 18s 1d | 176,000# | 39,954# 1s 4d |

The budget for presents more than doubled thereafter, as stated earlier in this study, and the costs of supplying the auxiliaries and of repairing their weapons and canoes, not to mention the cost of feeding their families and clothing them (which expenditures did not appear in this budget) mounted enormously after 1744. The solution seemed to be an agreement with Britain, which would be "in keeping with humanity and favourable to France", that neither Crown would use Native auxiliary troops or use only volunteers without any subsidization.[43]

The second argument raised in Versailles touched on the utility of these Native allies in the struggle against another European power. Traditionally the Amerindians had become "the boulevards of Canada and the terror of our enemies". It had to be admitted that "their ferocity, their barbarism so often depicted in

the public papers of the English" had made them greatly feared. France was facing a financial crisis in 1760, and military expenditures had to be directed into the most fruitful pursuits. Native alliances were no longer so perceived. Two arguments were advanced on this score. First, there were "hidden costs", such as the necessity of feeding and sheltering the families of warriors, and "hidden losses", such as the loss to trade and to food supplying, to which Native people contributed when engaged in normal pursuits and not "on the warpath". Secondly, there was much fraud, which resulted in greatly inflated expenditures. This was perpetuated by the Native people themselves, but more often by the French officers at the posts. The enormity of the debts that accumulated was facilitated by the fact that there was no real budget, but only an annual <u>état du roy</u> with arrears payable mounting.[44]

The supposed hostility between French regular forces on the one hand and Canadian militia units and Native auxiliaries on the other seems to have been distorted. It might be more proper to speak of the relations between French staff officers and the Canadian Governor-General and local commanders. The last Governor-General, who was Canadian-born, did insist on more use of guerrilla tactics, on a strong campaign to maintain the interior posts, and on efforts to secure the Amerindian alliances. The plan to concentrate troops at Montreal because it was the rendez-vous with the allied nations made little sense militarily in the light of Montreal's weak defences. The French generals of the Ministry of War were career soldiers who knew how to deal with a British invasion force that used European tactics and strategy. The Amerindians, and even the Canadian militiamen, did not accommodate well to this style of fighting. Even the Intendant François Bigot defended General Dieskau's attack on a superior force at Lac St. Sacrement in 1755 and his defeat:

> He counted on the Canadians and Natives to march like the regular troops, and he ignored the fact that neither one nor the other stands out in the open, and that they fight only as long as they can load their gun behind a tree; there was in fact only a part of the Canadian and Natives who presented themselves before the enemy retrenchments, and even these stayed at the edge of the wood from where they fired.[45]

It would be incorrect to suppose that the French officers commanding the regular troops from the metropole had no respect for the fighting qualities of the Amerindians and Canadian militia. Montcalm, for example, did show appreciation of the Native role in North American warfare and did not discount the value of traditional ceremonial and Native protocol. He did dance the war dance on the reserves and he did include the chiefs in war councils. But he did not concede that their participation would be very effective against a British navy and against British regulars. Indeed, he went so far as to question the necessity of equipping the Canadian militia and the Native auxiliaries quite as elaborately and as expensively as had become customary. As for the matter of supposed lack of respect or civility towards the Native contingents, one wonders how much hostility and misunderstanding may have been generated by the interpreters, who were Canadians and not especially enamoured of French officers.[46]

In any case, the Amerindians were not entirely forgotten by the French in their hour of defeat. This despite the fact that there had been several reports of habitants' homes and farms, temporarily abandoned during the advance of the British forces, having been looted by the Native auxiliaries. In the capitulation of both Quebec in 1759 and Montreal in 1760, the French sought to protect Native rights and to have their warriors treated as soldiers under arms, not as civilians. In the articles of capitulation of Montreal, the French also asked that the Native auxiliaries of the British be sent home "immediately after the signing of the present capitulation" in order

"the better to prevent all disorders", but the British refused to concede this request. To a further request that in case some remained after the surrender they be prevented "coming into the towns", the British replied only that their auxiliaries "do not insult any of the subjects of his Most Christian Majesty."[47]

The Native people did not forget the French either when the latter were faced with handing over New France to British rule. Not only did the well publicized threats to aboriginal rights of occupancy posed by the Anglo-Americans colonists now become a primary concern in Canada's upper country, but also the longstanding relationship with the French, whatever its occasional discords had been, took on idealistic qualities. Our study began with a statement of the génie colonial thesis and some considerations of its limitations. French concepts of sovereignity and of Native nationhood, the religious civilizing mission, the commercial contacts, and the search for military stability were all aspects of a contact experience that was not always as felicitous as many later historians would depict it. But it seemed, from the perspective of Native people in 1760-63, a Golden Age compared to future prospects under British rule. The French had had the advantage over the British of a unified and coherent policy and of a single chain of command and of responsibility for Native affairs. Even after the Albany Congress of 1754, the Anglo-American colonies persisted in pursuing their individual policies; the Imperial authorities therefore imposed "a centrally directed continental strategy" and a "coherent policy towards the Indian tribes". The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the embodiment of that new approach, which in some respects closely followed the traditional French policy.[48]

The departure of French officials and troops in 1760 left the Native allies isolated and fearful. They were not convinced the colony would remain British or that the French would never return. As a matter of fact, some French remained in the upper country, contacts

continued through Louisiana, and later both naval and military forces would return to North America. The upper country tribes were particularly angered, and impoverished, by the disappearance of the French trade, the annual presents and the other material benefits flowing from the former military alliances. The British failure to deliver sufficient substitutionary presents, the flood of unregulated English traders who, because of the competitive nature of their operations, drove hard bargains and often cheated the Native suppliers, and the presence of French inhabitants who encouraged Native resentment all played an important role in setting the stage for an attempt to drive out the conquerors.

The hope for a return of French authority was not altogether unrealistic once the interior tribes were excited by the messianic dream of a Delaware shaman of a revitalization religion. Together the Native people would drive out the "English dogs", restore the old ways and seek the protection of His Most Christian Majesty. This appears to have been the objective of the extension of the Three Fires Confederacy to include several other interior tribes in May 1763 under Pontiac's leadership. In addition to their fear for their lands, their dismay at the termination of French economic aid, and their anger at the alleged British disdain for them, there was the hope of intervention from Louisiana.[49]

Governor Kerlérec at New Orleans, on hearing of Spain's entry into the war, urged the interior tribes to take up arms and drive out the English. Pontiac's warriors succeeded in a few months in capturing all the northern posts except Fort Duquesne before attacking Detroit. A British historian of the period recorded the French role in this startlingly successful general rising:

> Many of the French had enlisted under the banners of Pondiac; and one of them became his secretary. It was a thing without precedent, for such a multitude of Indians to keep the field so long...

> But on this occasion, the influence of Pondiac kept them together, whilst the address of his secretary procured them provisions. To accomplish this, he issued formal orders to the neighbouring inhabitants, in the name of the French king, for what flour and cattle was wanted...[50]

Once the end of hostilities in Europe became known, Kerlérec called off all military action in the Illinois country in October 1763, leaving Pontiac and his supporters isolated. Pontiac was caught between his warriors inflamed with prophetic zeal and fanaticism and the warning of French officers that supplies would be cut off because "the English have become brothers". He had no choice but to lay down his arms. However, the western nations had demonstrated that they could engage effectively in concert in their own interests, as well as that they still considered the French to be the protectors of those interests. It was a lesson the British Imperial authorities seem to have learned and they acted accordingly in the decades that followed.[51]

It is generally assumed that in the War of American Independence the Native people of Canada supported the British. Nevertheless, in August 1775 some domiciled Native people from the Caughnawaga reserve sent a deputation to General George Washington to indicate their willingness to help the rebels in the event of an invasion of Canada. Subsequently Sir Guy Carleton appealed to them to join his army to repel the invaders, but he met with little positive response, although those of Lake of Two Mountains and St. Regis displayed more loyalty. Albeit, after the fall of Montreal to the American invaders in December, the Native people at Caughnawaga reserve did not co-operate with the Americans and would do no more than promise to observe a strict neutrality. The same kind of uncertainty and hesitations occurred in Nova Scotia. Late in January 1776 some Malecites joined the few Iroquois from Caughnawaga and some Abenakis at Washington's camp near Boston. The Micmacs were less

certain and, in June 1776, asked for an explanation of the revolution, saying, "Old France and Canada did not do so", therefore they would have to wait and see.[52]

A French explanation for this lack of Native enthusiasm for either British loyalism or American rebellion was probably accurate. The French-Canadians were identified with the French, and in the measure that the former resisted American blandishments so did the Native population. The French still believed that direct intervention on their part would rally the Native people to their support:

> The other effect would be the rising of a large portion of these native Nations who formerly had treaties with France and who would certainly take up arms in her favour if it stood up against England. It is remarkable that the Native nations of Northern Canada who armed themselves against the Americans took this part less to please the English than the Canadians who are considered Frenchmen.[53]

When the Micmacs and Malecites were informed in August 1778 that France had entered the war against Britain, there was a widespread conviction that, whatever the merits of the American revolution, the most important fact was that "our Father the King of France takes their part" and that this was their opportunity to reclaim their ancestral lands. Admiral d'Estaing, commander of a French squadron cruising the western Atlantic, issued a proclamation calling for a general uprising against the British throughout the former French colony. The French consul at Boston sent copies of this proclamation to various Malecite and Micmac band leaders. To counter this action, the abbé Bourg was sent from Quebec with authorization to excommunicate all those who acted against the British government. General Haldimand ordered the arrest of all Native people who distributed treasonous material. On 24 September 1778, the Malecites and Micmacs entered into a treaty at Fort Howe. They took a new oath of allegiance, handed over the presents the Americans had given them,

and then were allowed to receive the sacrament from a priest present at the ceremony. The following year, an army of 300 warriors from the western tribes was organized by the British to invade the Illinois country. But a French trader told the Potawatomi that the Illinois country was garrisoned by 4,000 French troops. The western tribes abandoned the war at the prospect of fighting their former allies.[54]

The presence of French troops among the American rebels unsettled the British but also disturbed the Native people who still felt a strong attachment to the French but had little sympathy for the Americans. Five Iroquois from Caughnawaga reserve were received at the French headquarters at Newport, Rhode Island, in August 1780. They were well received by the French commander and were greatly impressed by the entertainments and military shows put on for their benefit. When they returned they were given copies of a proclamation drawn up by Count Rochambeau in both English and French which they were asked to distribute among friendly Natives. The French general's proclamation read as follows:

> The King of France, your Father, has not forgotten his children. As a token of remembrance I have presented gifts to your deputies in his name. He has learned with concern that many nations, deceived by the English who were his enemies, had attacked and lifted the hatchet against his good and faithful allies, the United States. He has desired me to tell you that he is a firm and faithful friend of all the friends in America and a decided enemy to all his foes. He hopes that all his children whom he loves sincerely will take part with their father in the war against the English.[55]

Less satisfying to his American allies than to the Native people was Vergennes' declaration in 1782 regarding the upper country.

> Furthermore, I do not see under what right the Americans would form pretensions to the lands bordering on Lake Ontario. Either these lands

> belong to the natives, or they are a dependancy of Canada. In one or the other case, the United States has no claim whatsoever thereto...[56]

The American alliance presented many difficulties for the French, particularly in their relationship with the Native people. The position adopted by the English colonists of the United States was not substantially altered by the Revolution, but the British in Canada found it necessary to adopt many aspects of the traditional French policy towards the Native people.

The wars of the French Revolution brought new anxieties for the British in North America and new hope to some of the Native people of obtaining some redress of wrongs committed against them. In 1793, for example, there were revived fears among settlers and officials in Nova Scotia of a French invasion and a Micmac rising in favour of their former allies. Lieutenant-Governor Wentworth thought it essential to pacify them with gifts of food and clothing so "that the peace of our scattered Inhabitants may not be disturbed by them, and also that they will join us in case of an invasion." The Micmac by this time had been deprived of much of their lands and they were in a state of poverty, which made subversion an attractive possibility. Because of Citizen Genet's efforts to arouse the French-Canadians to rebellion, it was feared that his agents might also be at work among the Micmacs exploiting their economic and social conditions to French advantage. Wentworth thought it necessary to warn all to watch out for "Democratic french practices among these Savages." The British government also allocated funds for financial relief of the Micmacs when Wentworth described some unusual activity among them at Windsor "during the expectation of a Descent."[57]

As late as 1796 there were fears in Upper Canada that the French and Spaniards might attack that inland colony and rally the Native people against British and American rule. It was the fear of a general Native rising (which the French themselves had feared at one

point in the closing years of their regime) that may have stimulated the attempts to reach rapid settlement of land cessions. On the other hand, it was the process of extinction of Native title to large areas of land that disquieted the Native people. The Iroquois were reasserting their own sovereignty in 1796, two years after a number of land cessions had been exposed as having been improperly documented and therefore most likely invalid. Nothing came of the hope of a restoration of French sovereignty over the interior region, but the image of the French as having afforded them a measure of economic security while permitting and encouraging them to continue in their ancestral way of life persisted.[58]

From this tangled skein of military relations with the Native people the thread of a favourable image of the French emerges throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The pattern was not consistently one of friendly relations, as wars with the Iroquois and Fox in particular confirm, but it was never generally one of hostility. Seen in a comparative framework of Anglo-American relations with the Native people, it was a positive relationship between allies. Of course, a closer examination of English-Amerindian relations would probably reveal more positive aspects than have been assumed generally to have characterized that relationship. The keystone of the French relationship, if one can be identified, would appear to have been the inseparability of the military alliances, the commercial encounters, the religious civilizing mission, and concept of Native nationhood under French sovereignty. In comparison to the British in North America, the French appeared, on the surface of things, to have had what Thomas Mante called a consistent, unitary and centralized policy. In the military sphere it meant that Canadian militia units and French regulars, "joined to the numerous tribes of Indians in the French interest, being conducted by one chief, formed an infinitely more formidable power than the regular and provincial troops of the English, who could not unite their strength on account of the jarring interests of the different provinces".[59] Yet, the

British proved superior. Ultimately, the French triumph lay not in military superiority but in the totality of their relationship with the Native people of New France and Acadia..

## Chapter V Endnotes

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10. P.A.C., MG 1, Series $F^3$, Vol. 9 (1), Vaudreuil to Cadillac, 20 June 1706, 10; Vaudreuil to Cadillac, 3 July 1706, 16-17; P.A.C., MG 1, Series $C^{11}G$, Vol. 3, Vaudreuil and Raudot to Minister, November 1706, 101-104, 110-112; Vaudreuil and Raudot to Minister, 16 July 1707, 158-160.

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