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Auction timing under limited information : evidence from sovereign bond auctions / Jeffrey Gao [and] Adam Epp.: FB3-8/2026-51E-PDF

"This paper examines how auction timing may affect sovereign issuance outcomes through its interaction with market volatility. Using Canada as a case study, it shows that: (1) higher same-day bond market volatility is associated with larger auction tails, indicating weaker demand conditions; and (2) monetary policy announcements and certain macroeconomic data releases are systematically associated with higher sameday volatility. Together, these findings identify one observable channel linking information available at the schedule-setting horizon to auction outcomes. Within issuance frameworks that prioritize market predictability and operate under limited information sets, the results suggest that auction timing may influence outcomes at the margin"--Abstract, page ii.

Permanent link to this Catalogue record:
publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.966912&sl=0

Publication information
Department/Agency
  • Bank of Canada, issuing body.
TitleAuction timing under limited information : evidence from sovereign bond auctions / Jeffrey Gao [and] Adam Epp.
Series title
  • Staff analytical paper = Document analytique du personnel, 3110-9195 ; 2026-51
Publication typeMonograph - View Master Record
Language[English]
FormatDigital text
Electronic document
Note(s)
  • Cover title.
  • Includes bibliographical references.
Publishing information
  • [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada = Banque du Canada, October 16, 2026.
  • ©2026
Author / Contributor
  • Gao, Jeffrey, author.
Description1 online resource (ii, 13 pages).
Catalogue number
  • FB3-8/2026-51E-PDF
Subject terms
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