000	00000cam 2200000zi 4500
001	9.965203
003	CaOODSP
005	20260814113654
006	m     o  d f
007	cr cn|||||||||
008	260814e20260724oncd    ob   f000 0 eng d
040	|aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP
086	1 |aFB3-5/2026-25E-PDF
100	1 |aRíos-Rull, José-Víctor, |eauthor.
245	10|aTime-inconsistent manager incentives and capital formation / |cJosé Víctor Ríos Rull, Josef Schroth, Tamon Takamura, Yaz Terajima.
264	1|a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |cJuly 24, 2026.
264	4|c©2026
300	|a1 online resource (38 pages) : |bgraphs.
336	|atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337	|acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338	|aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
490	1 |aStaff working paper = |aDocument de travail du personnel, |x1701-9397 ; |v2026-25
500	|aTitle from cover.
504	|aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 20-23).
520	3 |a"The empirical literature emphasizes the importance of protecting shareholder rights by encouraging managers to deliver a high present value of payouts. We show that this alignment is dynamically self-defeating: whenever access to outside equity is possible, even if costly, and commitment is limited, compensation tied to total payouts inadvertently generates edogenous managerial short-termism through time inconsistency"--Abstract, page 1.
650	0|aSaving and investment|xEconometric models.
650	0|aTime and economic reactions.
650	6|aÉpargne|xModèles économétriques.
650	6|aTemps et comportement économique.
710	2 |aBank of Canada, |eissuing body.
830	#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2026-25.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
856	40|qPDF|s678 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2026/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2026-25-eng.pdf