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Time-inconsistent manager incentives and capital formation / José Víctor Ríos Rull, Josef Schroth, Tamon Takamura, Yaz Terajima.: FB3-5/2026-25E-PDF

"The empirical literature emphasizes the importance of protecting shareholder rights by encouraging managers to deliver a high present value of payouts. We show that this alignment is dynamically self-defeating: whenever access to outside equity is possible, even if costly, and commitment is limited, compensation tied to total payouts inadvertently generates edogenous managerial short-termism through time inconsistency"--Abstract, page 1.

Permanent link to this Catalogue record:
publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.965203&sl=0

Publication information
Department/Agency
  • Bank of Canada, issuing body.
TitleTime-inconsistent manager incentives and capital formation / José Víctor Ríos Rull, Josef Schroth, Tamon Takamura, Yaz Terajima.
Series title
  • Staff working paper = Document de travail du personnel, 1701-9397 ; 2026-25
Publication typeMonograph - View Master Record
Language[English]
FormatDigital text
Electronic document
Note(s)
  • Title from cover.
  • Includes bibliographical references (pages 20-23).
Publishing information
  • [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada = Banque du Canada, July 24, 2026.
  • ©2026
Author / Contributor
  • Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor, author.
Description1 online resource (38 pages) : graphs.
Catalogue number
  • FB3-5/2026-25E-PDF
Subject terms
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